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 This dissertation asks, from the fiscal perspective, whether the Chinese government 
has been effective in moving towards a more equitable development strategy. It seeks 
to answer this question through an in-depth examination of China’s 
intergovernmental fiscal system with respect to the following three aspects: public 
expenditure policies, fiscal inequality, and the intergovernmental fiscal transfer 
system. Chapter 1 aims to provide a comprehensive review of China’s experience in 
fiscal decentralization. It examines the system of central control in the pre-reform 
period of 1949 to 1978; the fiscal contracting system, which resulted from a series of 
ad hoc decentralization reforms between 1979 and 1993; and the single most 
important intergovernmental fiscal reform, that of 1994. Following a thorough history 
and background knowledge of China’s fiscal system in Chapter 1, Chapter 2 provides 
an institutional analysis of China’s public expenditure policies by looking into the 
following three areas, expenditure assignment, expenditure composition and local 
accountability. This chapter tries to answer the question of whether China’s public 
expenditure management serves the objective of adequate and equitable public 
services provision. Chapter 3 examines fiscal inequality at the provincial, prefectural, 
  
and county levels of government. Where data are available, the spending inequality 
on core public services is also explored. There is also a comparison of fiscal 
inequality at the provincial, prefectural, and county levels. With Chinese leaders and 
citizens expressing increasing concern at the regional inequalities that have 
accompanied China’s rapid growth, the question of the redistributive effectiveness of 
the intergovernmental transfer system has become more and more important. The 
distribution of fiscal resources is taking the center stage in policy debates because the 
poorest regions may not be financially equipped to provide the most basic public 
services, such as education and health care, at the national average levels. The 
intergovernmental transfer system could ease fiscal disparities by equalizing fiscal 
capacity across regions. Chapter 4 conducts a comprehensive evaluation of the 
redistributive effects of the intergovernmental transfer system, at both the provincial 
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Is China moving from growth to a more equitable development strategy? 
 
As China has risen in three short decades to become the world’s fourth-largest economy, 
its national wealth has increased rapidly, with GDP growing at an average rate of about 
10 percent a year. Poverty has also fallen by all definitions, in an extraordinary reduction 
from 65 percent of the population in 1981 to 7 percent in 2005 (World Bank 2008). But 
not all of China’s people have had their share of this wealth. By international standards, 
income inequality in China has risen sharply. In the 1980s, China’s level of income 
inequality was comparable to that of the most egalitarian countries in the Northern 
Europe in the 1980s. In 2004, its inequality was higher than in the least egalitarian 
developed country (the United States) and reached a level similar to that of the world’s 
most unequal countries, in Latin America and Africa (Bourguignon 2008). 
 
China’s retreat from equity stands in sharp contrast to the Communist Party’s ideology of 
social equity and inclusiveness. Yet it was Deng Xiaoping who called for “letting some 
people [regions] get rich first”. That call initiated a series of policies in favor of the richer, 
coastal regions. The logic was that if market reform led to rising inequality, it was a 
necessary sacrifice to pay for the rapid economic growth that was required to lift the 
country out of abject poverty (Wong 2007).  
 
Given the miracle of two decades’ worth of sustained economic growth and in poverty 
reduction, Deng’s call remained the overriding development strategy until mounting 




social imbalances took the center stage in political debate in the late 1990s. Then the 
issue of widening regional inequality attracted more attention from both policy makers 
and researchers, shifting the discussion on fiscal decentralization from economic 
performance to fiscal disparities that are essentially reflected in marked inequality in 
access to basic public services.  
 
Chinese authorities recognize the need to promote more balanced regional development 
and to improve basic public services. As early as 1998-99, the central government 
initiated the Western Development program by pouring more fiscal resources into poor 
western provinces. Starting in 2003 under the administration of Hu Jintao and Wen 
Jiabao, government policies began assigning priority to rebalancing the economic 
structure, as well as to environment and social objectives. The Eleventh Five Year Plan, 
developed during 2003-05, presented a turning point in China’s development strategy. It 
was a major shift from the dominant objective of quantitative growth targets to a 
sustained, people-centered development strategy (World Bank 2007a).  
 
This dissertation asks, from the fiscal perspective, whether the Chinese government has 
been effective in moving towards a more equitable development strategy. It seeks to 
answer this question through an in-depth examination of China’s intergovernmental fiscal 
system with respect to the following three aspects: public expenditure policies, fiscal 
inequality, and the intergovernmental fiscal transfer system.  
 




Chapter 1, “A Historical Review of Fiscal Decentralization in China”, aims to provide a 
comprehensive review of China’s experience in fiscal decentralization. It examines the 
system of central control in the pre-reform period of 1949 to 1978; the fiscal contracting 
system, which resulted from a series of ad hoc decentralization reforms between 1979 
and 1993; and the single most important intergovernmental fiscal reform, that of 1994.  
 
Following a thorough history and background knowledge of China’s fiscal system in 
Chapter 1, Chapter 2 provides an institutional analysis of China’s public expenditure 
policies by looking into the following three areas, expenditure assignment, expenditure 
composition and local accountability. This chapter tries to answer the question of whether 
China’s public expenditure management serves the objective of adequate and equitable 
public services provision.  
 
Chapter 3 examines fiscal inequality at the provincial, prefectural, and county levels of 
government by seeking to answer the following three questions. Firstly, what is the 
current degree of fiscal inequality at each level of government? Secondly, in addition to 
static measurements, what is the trend of fiscal inequality for the provincial, prefectural, 
and county levels of government? Thirdly, which contributes more to overall fiscal 
inequality: within-region or between-region fiscal inequality? Where data are available, 
the spending inequality on core public services is also explored. There is also a 
comparison of fiscal inequality at the provincial, prefectural, and county levels.  
 




With Chinese leaders and citizens expressing increasing concern at the regional 
inequalities that have accompanied China’s rapid growth, the question of the 
redistributive effectiveness of the intergovernmental transfer system has become more 
and more important. The distribution of fiscal resources is taking the center stage in 
policy debates because the poorest regions may not be financially equipped to provide the 
most basic public services, such as education and health care, at the national average 
levels. The intergovernmental transfer system could ease fiscal disparities by equalizing 
fiscal capacity across regions. Chapter 4 conducts a comprehensive evaluation of the 
redistributive effects of the intergovernmental transfer system, at both the provincial and 


















Chapter 1:  
A Historical Review of Fiscal Decentralization in China1  
 
The last two decades has witnessed a world trend of fiscal decentralization in the 
developing countries as an escape from inadequate growth and inefficient governance. 
Fiscal decentralization is widely recognized as an essential component in China’s 
transition to a market economy, and advocated by many for its contribution to the 
country’s remarkable economic performance over the last 30 years. The country has 
made substantial efforts to break down its highly centralized fiscal management system 
with various forms of fiscal contracting systems and later a tax sharing system.  
 
Although China remains a unitary, single party, political system, the current structure of 
governance has prominent features of fiscal decentralization. Sub-national governments 
in China are organized in a four-level hierarchy, with each level of government reporting 
to the next highest level (see Figure I.1). According to the China Statistical Yearbook, as 
the end of year 2005, there are 33 provincial units, 333 prefectural level units, 2010 
county level units, and numerous townships.  
 
A good knowledge of the history and process of China’s fiscal decentralization is 
indispensable to understanding the challenges facing the country’s intergovernmental 
fiscal system today. This dissertation therefore opens with a thorough review of the major 
                                                 
1 Throughout the dissertation, ‘sub-national government’ refers to the combined levels of provincial, 
prefectural, county, and township governments, ‘provincial government’ refers to an individual province 
including its subordinate levels of government in that province, and ‘local government’ or ‘sub-provincial 
government’ refers to prefectural, county, and township governments as a whole.  




changes in China’s fiscal system since the inception of the People’s Republic in 1949. 
This survey is divided into three periods: the pre-reform fiscal system of 1949-1978; the 
ad-hoc decentralization of 1979-1993; and the tax assignment system, in operation from 
1994 to the present. For each period, the fiscal system is reviewed under three themes – 
tax assignment, expenditure assignment, and the intergovernmental transfer system. 
 
Figure 1.1 China: Structure of Government (End of 2005) 
Central Government
22 provinces and 5 
autonomous regions





333 prefectures and municipalities
2010 counties, autonomous counties and cities




















1.1 1949-1978 Pre-Reform Fiscal System: Central Control  
 
The centralization of planning, finance, and administration dominated the first 30 years of 
the People's Republic (1949-78). It was a system in which all decisions about what 
people needed were decided from the top. Revenues were collected by local governments 
and accrued to the center. The consolidated budget system forbad discretionary spending 
power for local governments. And in the context of the pre-industrial, agrarian, and 
under-developed conditions then prevailing in China, the central planning system worked 
(Lardy 1978;Oksenberg and Tong 1991;Riskin 2000;Wong 2000;Wong, et al. 1995).  
 
Tax System 
The tax system was crude, with no personal or corporate income taxes. Revenues 
were largely raised from the profit remittances of state-owned enterprises (SOEs), whose 
profitability was ensured by state-fixed prices. At the end of the 1970s, profits from SOEs 
accounted for nearly half of total government revenues. Although the provinces 
participated in raising revenues, their expenditures were budgeted by the center. 
Tax administration was simple since there were relatively few taxpayers, and 
those few were mainly SOEs. Tax collection was delegated to local governments. Given 
fixed prices and planned output and sales, the accounts of SOEs were easy to monitor and 








Expenditure and Budget  
Expenditures were essentially determined at the center. Under the consolidated 
budget system, the central government set spending priorities, approved local budgets 
according to local spending needs, and determined civil service salary scales, pension and 
unemployment benefits, educational and health care standards, etc. In the absence of 
independent budgets, sub-national governments lacked discretionary spending power. 
They were budgetary units identical to SOEs – merely agents of the central government.  
With respect to expenditure assignment, the central government was responsible 
for national defense, economic development (capital spending, R&D, universities and 
research institutes), industrial policy, and administration of national institutions. Sub-
national governments were in charge of delivering day-to-day public administration and 
social services such as primary and secondary education, public safety, health care, social 
security, housing, and other local/urban services. 
 
The Intergovernmental Transfer System: Fiscal Gap Transfers 
Since local finance came from the central budget, intergovernmental transfers 
were set to finance the gap between locally collected revenues and permitted local 
expenditures. In other words, local income in excess of expenses was submitted to the 
central government, and shortfalls were automatically covered. This revenue-sharing 
system was highly redistributive: for example, while Shanghai gave up 80-90 percent of 
its collected revenues, Guizhou was able to finance more than two-thirds of its 
expenditures from central subsidies (Wong 2000).  




The pre-reform fiscal system was simple and effective in the particular context, 
but it was completely lacking in fiscal incentives for local governments or enterprises. As 
China’s leaders set their sights on a market economy from 1979 onward, the mechanisms 
of the planned economy – including monopoly state ownership of industry, 
administrative prices, and central economic planning – were dismantled, and accordingly 
the fiscal system quickly broke down. For example, the foundation of the pre-reform 
fiscal system – profits from state-owned enterprises – collapsed in the face of the 
burgeoning non-state sector, growing competition imposed on SOEs, and rising wages 
and resource prices. Furthermore, tax administration was enormously challenged by the 
proliferation of enterprises with various forms of ownership. The fiscal system was on the 
verge of a crash, and during the 1980s a number of different revenue-sharing systems 
were tried out to overcome the rigidities of the central planning system. The next section 
will elaborate on these major fiscal reforms from 1979 to 1993.  
 
1.2 1979 – 1993 Ad Hoc Decentralization: The Fiscal Contracting System 
 
The series of fiscal reforms over the period 1979-1993 were mostly driven by the 
significant reduction in fiscal revenue collection as a percentage of GDP and the 
precipitous decline in the central government’s share of revenues. The central 
government grappled with the considerable fiscal pressure it was facing by devolving 
expenditure responsibilities to sub-national governments – a move that led to complex 
bargaining over sharing schemes between different levels of government. Fiscal reforms 
in this period were aimed at promoting local economic development through increasing 




the responsibilities of local governments and increasing their autonomy in carrying out 
fiscal functions, while also preserving an adequate degree of fiscal control for the central 
government. Three different revenue-sharing systems were introduced in 1980, 1985, and 
1988. These reforms have been described as an example of ‘market-preserving’ 
federalism, which refers to a special type of federalism that limits the degree to which a 
country’s political system can encroach upon its markets (Montinola, et al. 1995;Qian 
and Weingast 1997).2  
 
1980: The Contract Responsibility System 
In 1980, the highly centralized system was replaced by a fiscal revenue-sharing 
system. From then on, the central and provincial governments each began to ‘eat in 
separate kitchens’, which provided sub-national governments with an incentive to collect 
revenues. Under this system, central-provincial sharing rules were established by the 
central government; provincial-prefectural relations were governed by the province; and 
this principle extended to prefectural-county relations. There were three basic types of 
revenues under the reformed system: central-fixed revenues, local-fixed revenues, and 
shared revenues. During the period 1980-84, about 80 percent of shared revenues were 
remitted to the central government and 20 percent were retained by local governments. 
                                                 
2 Montinola, Qian, and Weingast identify a set of five conditions that represent an ideal type of institutional arrangement for market-
preserving federalism (italics in original).  (1) There exists a hierarchy of governments with a delineated scope of authority (for 
example, between the national and sub-national governments) so that each government is autonomous in its own sphere of authority. 
(2) The su-bnational governments have primary authority over the economy within their jurisdictions. (3) The national government 
has the authority to police the common market and to ensure the mobility of goods and factors across sub-government jurisdictions. (4) 
Revenue sharing among governments is limited and borrowing by governments is constrained so that all governments face hard 
budget constraints. (5) The allocation of authority and responsibility has an institutionalized degree of durability so that it cannot be 
altered by the national government either unilaterally or under pressure from sub-national governments. While condition (1) is the 
defining feature of federalism, conditions two through five are required to ensure federalism’s market-preserving qualities.  
 




The bases and rates of all taxes, whether shared or fixed, were determined by the central 
government. Enterprises were supposed to pay taxes to the level of government to which 
they were subordinate. Most revenues were collected by local finance bureaus. 
 
1985: The Modified Contract Responsibility System 
The uniform-sharing formula reform during the period 1980-1984 boosted 
revenue collection in many areas, creating large surpluses in affluent provinces – but also 
deficits in poor provinces. In 1985, the State Council redesigned revenue-sharing 
arrangements by varying schedules based on localities’ budget balances in previous years. 
The financially weak provinces were allowed to retain more revenues, but the wealthier 
regions, like Shanghai, Beijing, Tianjin, Liaoning, Jiangsu, and Zhejiang, were penalized 
by a requirement to remit more revenues to the center. As a consequence, the revenues 
from these regions generally grew more slowly than the national average, since the high 
level of remittance curbed local enthusiasm for expanding their tax bases.  
 
1988 Fiscal Contracting System 
In the period 1988-1993, the ‘fiscal contracting system’ was implemented. This 
system required each level of government to contract with its subordinate level to meet 
certain revenue and expenditure targets. Six types of central-provincial revenue-sharing 
methods were adopted and applied to a range of provinces (see Table 1.1). Sub-national 
governments were required to finance their own expenditures through self-generated and 
shared revenues (Agarwala 1992;Lou 2008). 
 





The Intergovernmental Transfer System: Mixed Gap-Filling Transfers  
During this period, the transfer system was still predominantly a matter of 
transfers to fill gaps. When the base amount for expenditures was larger than the fixed 
local revenues, the province was allowed to keep all of the fixed revenue, and in addition 
was entitled to shared revenues, which filled the fiscal gap. When the base amount of 
expenditure in a province was less than its base amount of local fixed revenue, the 
province had to remit the surplus to the central government. And when the base amount 
for expenditure in the province was greater than both the base amounts for its fixed 
revenue and the shared revenues, then the province was permitted to keep both, filling the 
fiscal gap with ‘fixed subsidy’ grants from the central government (Zhang and Martinez-
Vazquez 2003).  
The system of intergovernmental transfers in China consisted of four kinds of 
central-local grants. First, ‘Fixed Subsidies’ were a transfer program aimed at 
redistributing revenues and expenditures to maintain local fiscal balance. Subsidies were 
given to provinces with base-year expenditures larger than base-year revenues. Second, 
‘Special-Purpose Grants’ were initially used for disaster relief, poverty reduction, and 
other specific purposes, and were later expanded in both the range of programs and the 
size of the financial resources. Third, ‘Annual Accounting Closing Transfers’, 
determined at the end of each fiscal year, acted as an adjustment to net revenues and 
expenditures, taking into account transfers between central and local governments. And 
fourth, ‘Capital Grants’ were conditional grants disbursed by the central government 
mainly for local capital construction and other investment activities. Under the fiscal 




contract system, some provinces had to remit to the central government a part of their 
revenues, set according to a predetermined lump-sum amount or to a progressively 
increasing ratio of revenues. The central government depended a great deal on receiving 
transfers from the better-off provinces during this period.  
 
 
Table 1.1 1988 Fiscal Contracting Methods 
 
1. contracted sharing rate with fixed yearly growth rate of revenue 
The central-local revenue sharing rate and the yearly growth rate of local revenues were based on the 
revenue performance of the province over recent years and negotiated by the central and provincial 
governments. If the real growth rate was greater than the contracted rate, the province could keep all the 
surpluses. If the real growth rate was lower than the contracted rate, then the province had to make up the 
gap.  
 
Central gov’t shared revenue in the province = revenue in the province in previous year * (1 + contracted 
yearly growth rate of the province) * contracted central shared ratio 
 
2. fixed local shared rate in total revenue 
The sharing rate was determined on the basis of a base amount for total expenditure and a base amount for 
total revenue. In other words, the province shares the revenue growth according to the same ratio.  
 
Local gov’t shared ratio of total revenue in the province = base amount for expenditure in province / base 
amount for total revenue in province 
 
3. fixed local shared rate in total revenue + incremental fixed shared rate 
Besides sharing total revenue on the basis of a fixed shared ratio, the province could share the revenue 
growth at a different sharing ratio.  
 
4. contracted remittance with fixed annual growth rate  
The province remits to the central gov’t a fixed amount per year plus a variable amount determined by a 
fixed yearly growth rate contracted by the center and the province.  
 
5. fixed contracted remittance 
The province remitted to the central gov’t a fixed amount every year which equal to the revenue surplus in 
the base year: 
 
Fixed contracted remittance in province = base amount for revenue – base amount for expenditure 
 
6. fixed contracted grants 
For all provinces whose base amount for expenditure was larger than the base amount for revenue, they 
keep all the base revenue and in addition get a fixed contracted grant from the central gov’t every year 








Despite the persistent efforts to revamp the malfunctioning fiscal system, the late 
80s and early 90s were marked by a series of challenges, including the continuing decline 
of the ‘two ratios’ (budgetary revenue to GDP, and central to total budgetary revenue); 
interference of local governments in the private sector;3 increasing regional fiscal 
disparities; devolution of expenditure responsibilities (accompanied by diversion of 
resources away from formal budgets into extra-budgetary channels); and ongoing distrust 
between the center and localities (Lou 2008). The following section will address these 
issues in detail, one by one.  
 
Fiscal Decline 
  The 1988 fiscal contracting system further dampened fiscal power at the center. 
Since the assignment of revenue was not clear, sub-national governments continued to 
appropriate central revenues. The center relied on local tax collection, which was highly 
subject to local authorities who frequently granted tax exemptions without proper central 
authorization. The local abuse of tax power instigated a vicious cycle of jurisdictional 
competition. The central government’s share of revenue fell from 33 percent in 1988 to 
only 22 percent in percent in 1993 (see Figure 1.1). On the other side, local governments 
increased their revenue share, particularly those that were major contributors to the 
central government’s revenue. The fiscal contracts were not strictly adhered to and were 
revised repeatedly for some regions. The resulting phenomenon of a ‘weak trunk with 
strong branches’ compelled the central government to borrow continuously from local 
governments. The role of the central government in bridging regional fiscal disparities 
                                                 
3 For example, duplification of industries to capture revenues that formerly flowed to the national treasury; 
granting of generous tax concessions to local SOEs; and expanded lending to these SOEs by local banks. 




was dramatically weakened, and central support for basic public services was also 
constrained.  
 
Figure 1. 1  The Two Ratios, 1979 – 1993 
 
           Source: Author’s calculation  based on data from China Statistical Yearbook 2004. 
 
Distortion in the Private Sector 
The fiscal contracting system of the 1980s, aligning tax revenues in accordance 
with the ownership of SOEs, induced a number of problems. First, the system aligned the 
interests of the government with those of enterprises, which not only encouraged sub-
national governments to interfere in the operation of the enterprises and hence hindered 
the process of separating governments from enterprises (Zhengqi Fenli), but was also 
detrimental to the market economy by rendering special treatment to SOEs and 
destroying fair competition. Second, the system provided local governments with 
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local enterprises such as distilleries and cigarette factories, which generated overlapping 
construction and development, and meanwhile stirred local protectionism. 
 
Increasing Fiscal Disparities 
The fiscal contracting system also contributed to greater regional disparities. With 
a variety of fiscal contracts in use (see Table 1.1), the system was primarily the result of 
political negotiation between the central government and individual provinces, and it 
worked in a way detrimental to the poor regions. Rich provinces in the coastal region, 
like Canton, Shanghai, and Shandong, were able to have more advantageous contracts 
due to their development strategies and their political leverage. These provinces 
accumulated a substantial and growing revenue base by retaining most of the incremental 
revenues within the province. In the meantime, the central government was financially 
incapable of narrowing regional imbalances.  
 
Devolution of Fiscal Responsibilities and Growing Distrust between Center and Local 
Fiscal stress at the center forced the central government to cut intergovernmental 
transfers and shed more spending responsibilities to the lower levels of government. 
Meanwhile, local expenditures grew much faster than central expenditures, especially in 
unemployment insurance, pension funds, and housing subsidies. The share of local 
expenditure rose from 45 percent of the total in 1981 to about 72 percent in 1993. The 
role of local governments shifted from simply providing services to acting as both 
financier and provider.  




A climate of distrust featured in intergovernmental fiscal relations in the early 
1990s. The central government recognized that the continuing fiscal decline was partly 
due to local government unwillingness to collect taxes, while local government was also 
diverting funds from budgetary to extra-budgetary channels. From the local perspective, 
the repeated changes in revenue-sharing rules were viewed as a sign of a lack of firm 
commitment at the center to building solid local finances. Moreover, on several occasions 
during the 1980s, the central government revised the ownership of key sectors and 
introduced new levies – for example, the Energy and Transport Key Construction Fund 
and the Budget Adjustment Fund – in order to increase its share of revenues,. The central 
government also ‘borrowed’ revenue from local governments as a way of absorbing 
excessive local revenues. The manipulative actions by the center convinced local 
governments that surplus revenues were not safe from the center’s predatory behavior, 
and thus significant revenues were subtly switched into myriad extra-budgetary funds 
(Ahmad, et al. 2002;Wong, et al. 1995). 
 
While the fiscal reforms of the 1980s all failed to reverse the trend of falling fiscal 
revenues, on the positive side, fiscal reforms during this period provided a device to 
mobilize local revenue collection in an effort to promote local economic development. 
When the 1988-90 system was supposed to expire in 1991, the central government failed 
to pursue alternative approaches, and the contracting system was extended until the end 
of 1993. A radical reform of the fiscal system was finally cooked up in 1994, at the 
climax of the fiscal struggle in China. The Tax Sharing Reform of 1994 was initiated 
with fixing the intergovernmental fiscal system as its main objective.  




1.3 The 1994 Tax Sharing Reform 
 
The 1994 reform, which created a framework of fiscal relations between the central and 
local governments, is considered the most intensive and far-reaching institutional 
restructuring for intergovernmental fiscal relations since 1949. The reform was 
essentially an attempt to deal with basic revenue problems by curbing the fiscal decline 
and providing sufficient resources, especially to the central government; simplifying the 
tax structure by reducing tax types and rates; and unifying the tax burden on taxpayers. It 
also put central-local revenue-sharing on a more transparent, objective basis by replacing 
negotiated contracts with a rule-based system of tax assignment.  
The centerpiece of the reform was the introduction of the tax assignment system 
(fenshuizhi), which specifies the way revenues are shared between the central and 
provincial governments. A detailed analysis of the tax assignment system is provided in 
the next section. The tax structure was greatly simplified. Value Added Tax (VAT) 
replaced the turnover-based product tax and was implemented at a uniform rate of 17 
percent. Corporate income tax was unified to include all domestic enterprises, and the top 
rate was reduced from 55 percent to 33 percent. Excise taxes on tobacco, liquor, and 
other luxuries were introduced. The previous system of profit and tax contracts, under 
which SOEs negotiated annual transfers to the government budget, was largely 
eliminated (Ahmad, et al. 2002;Wong 2000). 
Along with the changes in the division of revenue sources, a major effort was 
made by the central government to establish its own revenue-collection bodies which in 
effect centralized the revenue system for the first time since the economic reform started 




in 1978. In 1994 and 1995, National Tax Services (NTS) were established in all 
provinces to collect central-fixed revenues and shared revenues. These NTSswere 
organized on the basis of the divisions in charge of central-fixed and shared taxes within 
previous tax bureaus. The former divisions in charge of local taxes became Local Tax 
Services. The State Bureau of General Taxation, the central headquarters of the NTSs, 
was empowered to supervise local NTSs, appoint their directors and provide funding for 
their operations. 
The 1994 reform achieved the following successes.  
Improving the “two ratios”: The immediate impact of the tax assignment 
system on the division of revenue sources between the central and sub-national 
governments was significant, and finally ended the situation of the central government 
relying on local remittances to finance its outlays. As shown in Figure 1.4, the ratio of the 
central government’s revenue to the total jumped from 22 percent in 1993 to about 56 
percent in 1994. Although the ratio came down slightly after 1994, the average was above 
50 percent and 52.3 percent in 2005, compared to no more than 40 percent for the 15 
years after 1978. One of the prominent changes in the tax system that can be credited 
with increasing the central government’s share of revenue was the central collection of 
VAT. In 1994, VAT alone accounted for about 42 percent of total government revenue. 
The creation of the NTSs has also certainly made a difference. Owing to the unified 
taxation system, in which local governments are forbidden to introduce tax reductions or 
exemptions without central approval, the fall in the ratio of revenue to GDP was halted in 
1996, after a 17-year decline. The national fiscal revenue increased from 521.8 billion 
yuan in 1994 to 3,161.8 billion yuan in 2005, an average annual increase of 17.8 percent. 




Total government revenues as a percentage of GDP increased from 12.3 percent in 1993 
to 17.3 percent in 2005. It is important to mention that GDP was increasing remarkably 
during the same period. 
 
 
Figure 1. 4  The Two Ratios, 1978-2005 
 
 
Source: Author’s calculation based on data from China Statistical Yearbook 2006. 
 
Simplifying the Intergovernmental Fiscal System: The 1994 tax assignment 
system replaced the previous system of six types of fiscal contracts. The clearer and more 
appropriate assignment of taxes not only put a stop to the enduring misappropriation of 
revenues between the central and local governments, but also provided the right 
incentives for sub-national governments. For instance, since excise taxes were assigned 
to the central government and business taxes to local governments, the incentives for 
localities to over-develop enterprises with higher tax returns, such as distilleries and 
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Tightening Fiscal Control: The establishment of National Tax Services offered 
tighter control over general tax collection and local tax exemption policies. The 
interference of local authorities in tax administration and collection of central and shared 
revenues was substantially restrained. The 1994 reform abolished all the tax reductions 
and exemptions that provincial governments had granted for turnover tax in the past. Any 
new tax exemptions must be approved by the center and must be reported in a separate 
schedule of the tax return.  
 




The tax-sharing reform of 1994 explicitly defined taxes as central taxes, shared taxes and 
local taxes. Table 1.2 summarizes the current tax assignment system in theory and Table 
1.3 illustrates central and local revenues as distributed in 2005. Taxes that can be used in 
the pursuit of maintaining national objectives are assigned as central taxes, such as tariffs; 
taxes that can be interpreted as more relevant to economic development are assigned as 
shared taxes, including value added tax, business tax, stamp tax on sales of securities, 
personal income tax, and company income tax; and taxes more suitable to be collected 
and administered by local governments, such as the Urban Maintenance and 
Development Tax and the taxes on Use of Arable Land and Urban Land Use, are 
assigned as local taxes. The central government slightly amended the revenue-sharing 
arrangement between the central and sub-national governments after the 1994 reform. 




First, from May 1997, the sharing ratio of stamp taxes on sales of securities between the 
central and local governments was adjusted from 50-50 to 88-12; from 1 October 2000, it 
was changed to 97-3. Second, the business tax rate on the financial and insurance 
industry increased from five percent to eight percent, with all the extra revenues going to 
the central government. Third, from 1 January 2002, the central and sub-national 
governments shared company income tax and personal income tax in a ratio of 50-50. 
From 2003, the ratio was altered to 60-40, central-provincial (Su 2003;Zhang and 
Martinez-Vazquez 2003).  
 
As shown in Table 1.3, the revenue-sharing practiced by the central and 
provincial governments in 2005 was consistent with the 1994 tax assignment policy, 
except for some minor deviations – for instance, provincial governments accounted for 
27 percent of VAT collection, instead of the 25 percent assigned to them in principle. The 
present tax-assignment arrangement has two outstanding features.  First, the central 
government gets a grip on major profitable taxes, collecting 73 percent of VAT (793.41 
billion yuan), 60 percent of company income tax (320.40 billion yuan) and 60 percent of 
personal income tax (125.69 billion yuan). In 2005, the fiscal revenue of the central 
government accounted for 56 percent of the total tax revenues. Second, sub-national 
governments are highly dependent on shared taxes. Figure 1.2 highlights this observation 
by looking at the composition of sub-national revenue by major tax categories in 2005.  
Business tax accounts for 32 percent of the total sub-national tax revenue, VAT 22 
percent, company income tax 17 percent, and personal income tax 7 percent. Further, 
local own-source tax revenue is only about one-fifth of the total local tax revenue (see 
Figure 1.2). The taxation power in China mostly resides at the center. The two major 




means of controlling tax revenues are to determine the tax rate and to define the base, and 
in China the centralization of both of these is remarkable. Sub-national governments have 
latitude only in determining the rates of minor taxes, and even for these they are only 
allowed to set tax rates within a limited range (Ahmad 2008). The most important local 
tax is the Urban Maintenance and Development Tax, which made up six percent of total 
sub-national revenues in 2005.   
 







Central Tax   
        Tariffs 100 0 
        Consumption Tax 100 0 
Shared Tax   
        VAT 75 25 
        Business Tax 3 97 
        Stamp Tax on Security Exchange 97 3 
        Personal Income Tax 60 40 
        Company Income Tax 60 40 
Local Tax   
        Resource Tax 0 100 
        Urban Maintenance and Development Tax 0 100 
        Urban Land Using Tax 0 100 
        Agriculture and Related Tax 0 100 
        Tax on Contracts 0 100 
        Tax on the Use of Arable Land 0 100 
        Vehicle Purchasing Tax 0 100 



















Table 1. 3 Central and Sub-national Revenues, 2005 



















Central Tax     
          Tariffs 106.62 106.62 0 0 
          Consumption Tax 163.38 163.38 0 0 
          Consumption Tax and Value Added   
                Tax on Imports 421.18 421.18 0 0 
           Vehicle Purchase Tax 58.33 58.33 0 0 
           Cargo Tax 1.38 1.38 0 0 
Shared Tax     
           Value Added Tax 1,079.21 793.14 286.08 27 
           Business Tax 423.25 12.96 410.28 97 
           Stamp Tax on Security Exchange 6.73 6.53 0.2 3 
           Personal Income Tax 209.49 125.69 83.8 40 
           Company Income Tax 534.39 320.4 213.99 40 
Local Tax     
           Urban Maintenance and  
                   Development Tax 79.57 0.47 79.1 99 
            Tax on Contracts 73.51 0 73.51 100 
             Resource Tax 14.22 0 14.22 100 
             Tax on the Use of Arable Land 14.19 0 14.19 100 
             Urban Land Using Tax 13.73 0 13.73 100 
             Agriculture and Related Taxes 5.94 0 5.94 100 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook (2006). 
 
Figure 1.2  Sub-National Revenue Composition, 2005 
 
               Source: Author calculation based on data from China Statistical Yearbook 2006. 
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Do the above observations, based on the aggregate sub-national data, hold true in 
individual provinces? Table 1.4 breaks down sub-national tax revenue by 31 provinces in 
2005. The provinces are ranked by their revenue capacity, from the highest (Guangdong) 
to the lowest (Tibet). The picture is very clear: provincial finance is highly dependent on 
shared taxes – business tax, VAT, company income tax, and personal income tax. For 
instance, in 2005 Beijing obtained almost 80 percent of revenue from the four shared 
taxes, or 73 billion yuan out of the total 92 billion. Business tax is the foremost important 
local revenue source. The only exceptions are Shanxi, Heilongjiang, and Tibet, where 
revenue from VAT surpasses business tax. Thanks to their remarkable economic 
performance, wealthy regions, including Guangdong, Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, and 
Beijing, are also able to reap the benefits of company and personal income tax. Revenue 
from purely local taxes is relatively large in affluent provinces. In Guangdong, for 
example, local tax accounts for about 31 percent, compared to 22 percent at the sub-














Table 1. 4 Government Revenue by Province, 2005 
Unit: million yuan 
Province Total VAT BT CIT PIT TUMC 
       
 Total 1,488,422.0 264,422.1 410,281.6 174,590.2 83,796.9 79,101.9 
       
  Guangdong 180,720.40 32,358.50 55,576.70 23,644.80 13,242.50 6,433.70 
  Shanghai 141,739.80 22,612.40 51,292.70 24,914.90 11,192.40 4,979.10 
  Jiangsu 132,267.50 26,557.10 34,281.80 17,769.60 6,619.50 7,065.70 
  Shandong 107,312.50 19,300.40 21,779.30 11,082.80 3,889.40 6,595.10 
  Zhejiang 106,659.60 20,423.40 32,433.50 16,791.90 6,611.90 6,163.60 
  Beijing 91,921.00 9,759.80 38,376.20 16,476.20 8,452.30 3,883.40 
  Liaoning 67,527.70 11,305.70 16,468.50 7,219.90 3,280.50 3,992.00 
  Henan 53,765.10 8,796.90 11,159.60 5,156.40 2,204.50 2,917.70 
  Hebei 51,570.20 12,103.50 10,527.90 5,336.80 2,824.00 2,925.10 
  Sichuan 47,966.40 7,107.40 13,476.40 3,994.10 2,208.40 2,808.60 
  Fujian 43,260.00 7,312.70 12,460.80 5,426.50 2,741.40 1,855.40 
  Hunan 39,526.50 5,893.30 9,424.50 2,183.40 1,675.70 2,502.20 
  Hubei 37,552.20 6,591.00 9,133.50 3,906.40 1,746.20 2,402.80 
  Shanxi 36,834.40 10,269.50 6,070.00 3,699.50 1,368.10 2,131.00 
  Anhui 33,401.70 5,772.40 7,810.40 3,008.10 1,249.60 2,048.60 
  Tianjin 33,185.10 6,423.80 9,645.50 4,141.60 1,882.20 1,587.60 
  
Heilongjiang 31,820.60 8,501.60 5,956.00 1,857.60 1,556.20 2,760.40 
  Yunnan 31,264.90 5,601.90 6,764.30 3,334.80 1,194.40 2,957.30 
  Guangxi 28,303.60 3,932.70 6,838.10 1,854.10 1,457.60 1,291.60 
  Inner 
Mongolia 27,745.50 4,844.70 7,827.10 1,935.50 1,006.80 1,424.50 
  Shaanxi 27,531.80 5,534.40 6,927.20 2,059.40 1,022.40 2,076.60 
  Chongqing 25,680.70 3,365.50 7,020.20 1,398.20 1,066.60 1,315.90 
  Jiangxi 25,292.40 3,387.40 6,284.00 1,741.20 1,126.50 1,127.20 
  Jilin 20,715.20 3,953.30 4,759.00 1,391.60 1,112.20 1,315.70 
  Guizhou 18,249.60 3,137.00 4,630.60 1,608.10 889.7 1,291.30 
  Xinjiang 18,031.80 4,293.60 4,766.50 757.6 931.2 1,367.00 
  Gansu 12,350.30 2,533.40 3,158.90 843.2 517.9 935.8 
  Hainan 6,868.00 974 2,367.90 452.7 356.9 370.1 
  Ningxia 4,772.20 873.2 1,575.80 260.8 222 303.9 
  Qinghai 3,382.20 783.8 1,001.80 254 102.9 232 
  Tibet 1,203.10 118.2 487.2 88.8 44.8 41.1 
Notes: 1. VAT – Value-Added Tax; BT – Business Tax; CIT – Company Income Tax; PIT - Personal 
Income Tax; TUMC – Tax on Urban Maintenance and Construction.  
Source: Statistical Yearbook of China (2006). 
 
 
In the absence of specific central government guidelines, the actual division of 
expenditure responsibilities among sub-provincial governments is left to the discretion of 
each level of government. The higher-level government has discretion to determine the 




expenditure assignment of the level immediately below it. In other words, provinces 
determine the assignments of cities/prefectures, prefectures determine the assignments of 
counties, and the latter determine the revenues and expenditures of townships. Table 1.5 
illustrates the in-principle assignment of responsibilities in China today. The exclusive 
central responsibilities include national defense, foreign affairs, geological prospecting 
expenses, and public debt. The exclusive sub-national responsibilities are urban 
maintenance and construction, environmental protection, water supply, and community 
services. All other government spending is shared by the center and sub-national 
governments. Sub-national governments at each level are responsible for delivering 
public services, including education, health care, social welfare, public safety, and other 
local and urban services; government administration; and local economic development.  
 
Table 1. 5 Expenditure Assignment by Administrative Levels 
 
Functions Central Provincial Prefecture County Township 
National Defense *     
Foreign Affairs *     
Geological Prospecting Expenses *     
Public Debt *     
Education * * * * * 
Health Care * * * * * 
Social Welfare * * * * * 
Agriculture * * * * * 
Government Administration * * * * * 
Capital Construction * * * * * 
Research and Development * * * * * 
Culture Development * * * * * 
Policy Subsidies * * * * * 
Armed Police Troops * * * * * 
Urban Maintenance and Construction  * * * * 
Environmental Protection  * * * * 
Water Supply   * * * 
Community Services    * * 
 
Source: Finance Yearbook of China (2006). 
 




How is public expenditure distributed in practice? Table 1.6 compares budgetary 
expenditure for the top ten items between the central and sub-national governments in 
2005. The total central expenditure was 1,125.55 billion yuan, only 24 percent of overall 
government spending. The central government allocated most of its financial resources to 
national defense (21.74 percent of the total central expenditure), servicing the interest on 
public debt (14.17 percent), and capital construction (12.13 percent). Sub-national 
government spending was 3,527.30 billion yuan, accounting for 76 percent of total 
government budgetary expenditure. The most important spending items at the sub-
national level included operating expenses for culture, education, science, and health care 
(15.64 percent of total sub-national spending), operating expenses for education (10.57 
percent), and capital construction (7.59 percent). For specific sectors, sub-national 
governments accounted for 94 percent of the operating expenses for education, 98 
percent of the operating expenses for health, and 87 percent of social security subsidiary 
expenses. The hierarchical assignment of responsibility has two prominent features. First, 
sub-national governments, particularly at the county and township levels, are excessively 
burdened (see Table 1.5). In practice, education and health care are concentrated mostly 
at the county and lower levels, although these public services would be more 
appropriately assigned to the central and provincial levels in respect to the spillover 
effects for the society as a whole. The redistributive government function for social 
security is mainly administered at the provincial and prefecture levels, whereas it 
commonly relies more on the central government in order to reap the benefits of risk 
pooling and equalization. Second, the assignment of responsibility is ambiguous, given 
the fact of wide concurrent expenditure assignments. The vague definition has created a 




loophole for each level of government to push its own responsibilities downward while 
retaining as much revenue as possible. Ultimately, the bottom level of government is 
taking a disproportionately large share of the responsibilities with only a limited revenue 
base.   
 
Table 1.6 Budgetary Expenditure by Function, 2005 
 
 
Top 10 Central Spending Items 
item Billion yuan  percent 
Total  1,125.55  
  Expenditure for National Defense 244.7 21.74 percent 
  Interest Payment for Domestic and Foreign Debts 159.47 14.17 percent 
  Expenditure for Capital Construction 136.56 12.13 percent 
  Expenditure for Price Subsidies 59.14 5.25 percent 
  Operating Expenses for Culture, Education, Science and Health Care 58.77 5.22 percent 
  Other Expenditures 47.46 4.22 percent 
  Expenditure for Government Administration 46.43 4.13 percent 
  Expenditure by Using the Vehicle Purchase Tax 40.39 3.59 percent 
  Other Price Subsidies 35.46 3.15 percent 
   Innovation Funds and Science & Technology Promotion Funds 33.79 3.00 percent 
 
 
Top 10 Sub-national Spending Items 
Item Billion Yuan  percent 
Total  3,527.30   
  Operating Expenses for Culture, Education, Science and Health 
Care 551.65 15.64 percent 
  Operating Expenses for Education 373 10.57 percent 
  Expenditure for Capital Construction 267.58 7.59 percent 
  Other Expenditures 246.8 7.00 percent 
  Expenditure for Government Administration 241.92 6.86 percent 
  Expenditure for Public Security Agency, Procuratorial Agency and 
Court of Justice 176.41 5.00 percent 
  Expenditure for Supporting Rural Production 164.49 4.66 percent 
  Social Security Subsidiary Expenses 158.09 4.48 percent 
  Expenses of Agriculture, Forest, Irrigation and Meteorology 148.57 4.21 percent 
  Urban Maintenance and Construction Expenditure 139.36 3.95 percent 
 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook 2006. 
 




The Intergovernmental Transfer System  
 
Central-provincial and provincial-local fiscal transfers are the dominant source of 
revenues of provincial and local governments in China, accounting for 67 percent of 
provincial, accounting for more than half of local fiscal resources. Central transfers4 in 
China can be classified into two broad categories: general purpose and specific purpose 
transfers.  The general purpose transfers consists of (a) the tax rebate designed to return a 
fraction of revenues by origin (province of collection), and (b) the equalization transfer 
established in 1995 as effort to ease the widening regional disparities. The equalization 
transfer was called “transitory period grant” until 2001 and then renamed “the general-
purpose grant” since 2002. The equalization grant has grown rapidly in size from only 
2.07 billion yuan in its initial year to 74.5 billion yuan in 2004. Specific purpose transfers 
include (a) grants for increasing wages (b) grants for rural tax reform (c) grants for 
minority regions (d) prio-1994 subsidies (e) other ad hoc transfers.  About 200 plus ad 
hoc grants, termed as “earmarked grants” (Zhuanxiang Zhuanyi Zhifu) by the Ministry of 
Finance, China, are used to subsidize a wide variety of spending projects such as capital 
constructions and social relief for calamities.  
Figure 1.3 illustrates the structure of the central-local transfers in 2004. The 
largest central-provincial fiscal transfer was the tax rebate (404.97 billion yuan), followed 
by earmarked grants (322.33 billion). These two transfers accounted for more than 70 
percent of the total central-provincial transfers. The 2004 equalization transfer was 74.50 
billion yuan, amounting to 7 percent of the total central-provincial transfers.  
                                                 
4 The sub-provincial transfer design is quite similar to that of central transfers to provincial governments, 
though the grant composition varies significantly across provinces due to the diversity of regional fiscal 
resources. 




The major transfer programs will be introduced briefly in the following.  
 








(a) Tax Rebate 
With the 1994 tax reform, VAT and excise taxes were brought under central tax 
administration and a program of tax rebates were instituted for VAT and excise taxes in 
1994 which returned a fraction of these revenues to the province of origin. The provinces 
were assured that under centralized collection, each province would receive at the 
minimum the VAT and excise tax revenues it retained in 1993. For VAT and excise taxes, 
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30 percent of the growth in VAT and excise tax revenues (Budget Committee 2002). 

















 TRt - tax rebate to a province at year t 
 VAT – value-added tax 
 ET – Excise taxes (Xiaofei Shui) 
 
In 2002, Personal Income Tax and Company Income Tax were also brought under 
the central tax administration and a program of tax rebate similar to VAT tax rebate was 
instituted. Effective on January 1, 2002, all income taxes from enterprises5 and personal 
income were shared by the central government and provincial governments at the ratio of 
50 to 50. Since 2003, the central share has been raised to 60 percent. To assure stability in 
provincial revenues, income tax rebate program to institute to ensure that all provinces 
received income tax revenues no less than what they received in 2001. 
 
(b)The Equalization Grant 
In 1995, the equalization grant, the first formula based transfer (the so-called transitory 
period grant until 2001) was established with a view to reducing regional fiscal 
                                                 
5 The income tax from the following enterprises is excluded from the sharing policy: rail transportation, 
state post office, Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, Agricultural Bank of China, Bank of China, 
Construction Bank of China, State Development Bank, China Bank of Agricultural Development, Import 
and Export Bank of China, enterprises of offshore oil and national gas, China Petroleum and Natural Gas 
Co. Limited, and China Petroleum Chemical Co. Limited.  




disparities. The amount of the equalization transfer for a province i is determined by three 
factors: standard revenue of the province, standard expenditure of the province, and the 






= *  
 
Where 
 iET -- the equalization transfer for province i 
 TET – total equalization grant available in the budget year 
 SEi – standard expenditure of province i 
 SRi – standard revenue of province i 
 SE – total standard expenditure of the country 
SR – total standard revenue of the country  
 The size of the pool for the equalization transfer (TET) is determined by the 
central government on an ad-hoc basis, subject to annual funding availability.  
The standard revenues are equal to standard local own and shared taxes plus tax 
rebate plus various grants subtracted by remittances to the central government. In the 
formula, tax rebate, various grants, and remittances to the central government are actual 
amounts  paid by the central government. For each type of tax,  standard tax revenue is  
determined by multiplying the  standard tax base  with the standard tax rate. For personal 
income tax, the standard tax base includes salaries and income of private industrial and 
commercial enterprises. The actual income tax collection from other bases is regarded as 
the standard revenue. The income tax base of salaries is estimated using per capita 




taxable salaries net of exemptions and number of employees. The tax rate of salaries is 
local average effective tax rate, adjusted with a regional coefficient. The standard 
expenditures are measured as the total spending of seven sectors and for each sector the 
standard spending cover personal expenditure (salaries and bonus) and office 
expenditures (vehicles, heating, and others).  
Although the equalization grant has been growing rapidly (2.07 billion yuan in 
1995 to 74.5 billion yuan in 2004), but growth in specific purpose transfers has outpaced 
the growth of equalization transfers (Shah and Shen 2006).  
 
(c) Earmarked Grants 
The ad hoc transfers are categorized as “earmarked grants” by the Ministry of Finance. 
Various ad hoc transfers to finance various programs have grown over time in number 
and size. Currently there are about 200 programs accounting for more than 20 percent of 
total central transfers. These transfers are program-based and allocated for specific 
purposes such as subsidizing agricultural development, supporting infrastructure 
construction, assisting backward regions, and providing emergency funding for natural 
catastrophes. This transfer has risen to 322.3 billion yuan in 2004 (Shah and Shen 2006).  
 
(d) Grants for Increasing Wages of Civil Servants  
When the center raised the wage rate for public sector employees in 1999 and 2001, a 
special grant was established in 1999 to support the implementation of this policy in 
western and central regions. Thus the purpose of this transfer is to fill the fiscal gap 
caused by the central policy mandate. The wage rate was first increased by an amount of 




monthly 120 yuan per capita on July 1, 1999, then further raised at a rate of monthly 100 
yuan per capita on January 1, 2001, and on October 1, 2001, additional 80 yuan per capita 
per month was added. The wage increase was also accompanied by the construction of a 
bonus system for civil servants from 2001 (equivalent to an approximate increase of one 
month of wages) and by the establishment of a subsidy system for remote areas. More 
than 700 counties were eligible to receive this grant. Besides, provinces faced with 
difficulties of paying teachers’ wages in rural elementary and middle schools are also 
compensated by this transfer (Zhang 2003). 
 The grant allocation can be characterized as: 
 iii oditureRatiBasicExpeneExpIncreasWageGrant *=   
Where 
 WageGrant – the grant for increasing wages received by province i 
ExpIncrease – the increase of provincial budgetary expenditure due to central 
policy of increasing wages 
BasicExpenditureRatio – the ratio of the personal and office expenses to the total 
disposable revenue of the province i 
According to the formula, the volume of the grant received by province i is dependent 
upon the provincial expenditure increase due to the wage policy and the share of basic 
expenditure (including personnel and office expenses) in the total disposable revenue of 
the province. The increased expenditure is determined by the number of civil servants in 
province i and the standard of wage increase by the central government. The total transfer 
in 2004 amounted to 91.94 billion yuan (Shah and Shen 2006). 




(e)Grants for Rural Tax Reform  
The transfer was created in 2000 to foster the implementation of the central policy to 
rescind “three village deductions and five township charges” (xiangtongchou he cun tiliu ) 
and gradually abolish agricultural taxes. The “three deductions” collected by villages are: 
collective investment, public welfare funds, and cadre compensation. The “five charges” 
include charges for rural education, family planning, militia training, rural road 
construction and maintenance, and subsidies to entitled groups levied by townships. This 
transfer is aimed at filling the fiscal gap caused by the rural tax reform. In 2004, the total 
of 52.33 billion yuan was transferred to provincial governments.  
 
(f) Grants for Minority Regions 
The grant for minority regions was established in 2000 in order to support economic 
development in minority regions which are usually backward in their economic 
performance. The total grant equals a base amount of 1 billion yuan in 2000 with a yearly 
growth rate equal to that of central VAT revenue, and the rebate of the 80 percent of the 
central increased VAT collection in minority areas. This transfer has risen to 7.69 billion 
yuan in 2004 (Shah and Shen 2006). 
 
(g) Prio-1994 Subsidies 
Prio-1994 subsidies are the contracted fixed grants under the “Fiscal Contracting System” 
during the period 1988-1993. The total of the grant was both 12.6 billion yuan in 2003 
and 2004. Since 1994, local governments have continued to remit revenues to or receive 
transfers from the centre according to their fiscal contracts in effect in 1993. The amount 




of transfers is approximately equal to the estimated deficit (gap between revenue and 
expenditure) measured in the base year. Sixteen provinces, including Inner Mongolia, 
Jilin, Fujian, Jiangxi, Shandong, Guangxi, Hainan, Sichuan, Guizhou, Yunnan, Tibet, 
























An Institutional Analysis of Public Expenditures in China 
 
As reviewed in Chapter 1, China’s fiscal system has been extensively decentralized in a 
comparative perspective. Fiscal decentralization has had an important impact on China’s 
public expenditures. As China is in transition from the extensive government intervention 
characteristic of the previous centrally planned economy to the much more limited and 
focused intervention appropriate to a market-based economy, public expenditure policies 
have increasingly become the key instrument to achieve certain economic and social 
goals.6   
 
China’s transition towards a more equitable development strategy has increased 
the need for better institutions and mechanisms for implementation of its expenditure 
policies. Premier Wen Jiabao, in his report to the Tenth National People’s Congress in 
March 2006, stressed the importance of hexie shehui (harmonious7 society), reflecting an 
essential shift in China’s development strategy from the dominant pursuit of economic 
growth to greater attention to fairness and equity among the poor and economically 
marginalized. The report emphasized that deepening reform of the fiscal system was 
regarded as one of the key policy areas in achieving this objective.  
 
 
                                                 
6 In this regard, China has undertaken a series of reforms to develop its public expenditure system, such as  
improvement of budget coverage, experiment on mid-term expenditure framework, and a new budget 
classification system since 2004. 
7 The concept of “harmonious society” in Chinese originally comes from Confucius. The traditional 
meaning of a harmonious society refers to a state in which perfect order prevails, and virtuous men are 
rewarded.   




This chapter provides an institutional analysis of whether public expenditures serve the 
country’s more equitable development strategy, or more precisely, whether government 
expenditure policies serve adequate and equitable public services. The first section, an in-
depth analysis of expenditure assignment between multi levels of government, examines 
whether sub-national governments have sufficient resources for basic public services 
provision. The next section examines expenditure composition at different levels of 
government to find out whether allocation of fiscal resources has shifted the emphasis 
from physical capital to human development. The critical issue of the accountability of 
local officials for performance in public service provision is analyzed in the third section.  
 
2.1 Expenditure Assignments 
 
Decentralization is in fashion worldwide -- see, for example, (World Bank 2005) -- based 
on the belief that assigning more responsibilities to local governments is a means of 
achieving a more efficient allocation of resources and of stimulating economic growth. It 
is recognized that fiscal decentralization can contribute to more efficient provision of 
public services by a better matching of expenditures with local priorities and preferences 
(Shah, et al. 1994). The subsidiary principle argues for the provision of public services to 
be devolved to the lowest-level jurisdiction in accordance with the benefit area (Oates 
1972;Tiebout 1956). However, the trade-off is the possibility of weakening the 
government’s capacity to ensure equitable provision of services to citizens in different 
jurisdictions, or to maintain macroeconomic stability (Bahl and Martinez-Vazquez 2006). 
In some scenarios in which administrative capacities are concentrated at the central 




government level, devolution of responsibilities is likely to result in inefficiency and 
deterioration of public services (Prud'homme 1995).  
 
In theory, therefore, there is no one-size-fits-all template for the assignment of 
responsibility across different levels of government. Which level of government should 
be responsible for the provision of which public service depends on the overall design of 
the intergovernmental fiscal system. Due to the trade-offs between efficiency and 
equality, between effectiveness and stability, countries decide on different degrees of 
fiscal decentralization in congruence with their priorities, as well as with their own 
unique historical/social circumstances. Furthermore, at a given level of fiscal 
decentralization (often as measured by sub-national expenditure share), countries also 
vary in terms of the configuration of their intergovernmental fiscal arrangements, with 
some granting local governments greater revenue autonomy and others putting more 
emphasis on the use of intergovernmental transfers (World Bank 2007a). But no matter 
how decentralized a country is, or how much of its own source revenue local 
governments have, or how important a role is fiscal transfers play, the ultimate goal is to 
develop an intergovernmental fiscal system that provides adequate public services 
efficiently and also equitably as well as satisfying local preferences and needs.     
 
With the current intergovernmental fiscal arrangements in place since 1994, China has 
become one of the most fiscally decentralized countries in the world, even compared with 
those with explicit federal structures. From a comparative perspective, China is much 
more decentralized than most developing and transitional countries, especially on the 




spending side (see Table 2.1). In 2005, more than 70 percent of all public expenditure 
was made at the sub-national levels, in contrast to the average 19.6 percent in developing 
countries, 22.3 percent in transitional economies, and 32 percent in OECD countries. 
 
Table 2. 1 Fiscal Decentralization Indicators: China vs. Other Countries 
 






Subnational share of 
government revenue 
48 16.6 18.4 19 
Subnational share of 
government expenditure 
74 19.6 22.3 32 
Source: Data for China are from China Statistical Yearbook 2006; data for other countries are for various 
years and adapted from Shah (2004). 
 
 
Figure 2.1 maps out the degree of fiscal decentralization in major OECD countries and 
China. As shown, China is more decentralized on the expenditure side than any other 
country included in the comparison – Spain 52.2 percent, Denmark 61.5 percent, 
Switzerland 64.1 percent, and even Canada 70.7 percent. On the revenue side, China also 
ranks high in terms of local revenue share (around 45 percent), behind Spain at 51.2 
percent, Denmark 56.3 percent, Switzerland 67 percent, and Canada with 69.5 percent. 
An apparent pattern is observed that in the most decentralized countries indicated – Spain, 
Denmark, Switzerland, and Canada – the level of decentralization on the expenditure side 




is roughly comparable with the level of devolution on the revenue side. China, however, 
is an exception.  
 
Figure 2.1 Comparative View: Degree of Fiscal Decentralization in China (2005) 
 







































Sub-national Share of Total Expenditure




Sub-national share of total revenue 
 
Source: author’s calculation based on data from Government Finance Statistics (IMF). 
 
 
China’s sub-national revenue, however, is much less decentralized than its expenditure. A 
close examination of China’s sub-national share of revenue and expenditure is provided 
in Figure 2.2, which tracks the changes from 1978 until 2005. From 1994, the sub-
national share of revenue is considerably below the corresponding ratio for sub-national 
expenditure. The revenue ratio is noticeably lower than in the early 1990s, largely due to 
the increase in the central government share. Sub-national governments account for 47.7 
percent of total revenue, compared with 74.1 percent of total expenditure in 2005.  
 

























Sub-national Share of Total Revenue




Figure 2.2 Division of Revenue and Expenditure between Central and Sub-national 
Governments, 1978 – 2005 
 
 
Division of Revenue 
 
 
Division of Spending 
 
Source: Author calculation from China Statistical Yearbook 2006.  
 
 
The mismatch of expenditure and revenue assignments in the current fiscal system has 
much to do with the piecemeal reforms by the Center to deal with the emergence of 
various issues resulting from the transition from a planned to a market system. Largely 
because of the erosion of state-owned enterprises (SOEs), policy attention in the 1980s 
was geared to stimulating local efforts in revenue collection as a way of moderating sharp 
fiscal decline. This continued into the 1990s, when a ten-year decline in the central share 
of fiscal revenues (by 1993, it had fallen to 22 percent) seized top priority on the political 
agenda. The 1994 Tax Sharing Reform was devised to put an end to the continuous 
weakening of the central fiscal position. But during all these years, virtually no attention 
was paid to the expenditure side, and the 1994 reform only restructured revenue 
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As described in Chapter 1, sub-national governments take the major responsibility for 
public spending on education, health, and social welfare. The burden inherent in the 
devolution of expenditure responsibilities to these governments has been aggravated by 
central government-imposed requirements to support workers laid off from SOEs and 
other unfunded mandates.  
 
The gaps between expenditure responsibilities and the resources assigned to finance these 
spending needs exist at every level of the sub-national governments, and are particularly 
severe at the county and township levels. Figure 2.3 further breaks the division of 
revenue and expenditure down to county levels. Since China’s fiscal system is based 
upon a “layer cake” model in which there is a strict vertical hierarchical relationship 
among different orders of government, each level of government decides what fiscal 
resources to allocate to its subordinate level, according to the criteria that are largely 
unregulated and vary widely across the country. There is a general lack of objective 
principles to ensure that revenues are assigned with expenditure needs. This process tends 
to reserve resources upward while pushing spending responsibilities downward, leaving 
substantial fiscal gaps at the lowest levels of government – counties, townships and 
villages (Figure 2.3). The disaggregated data show that the provincial level manages to 
achieve a balance between its share of revenue and its share of expenditure, and the 
prefectural level also has sufficient funds to handle its spending requirements. It is the 
county level that struggles most, with a 26.7 percent of revenue share financing 34.9 
percent of total sub-national spending responsibilities.    
 










Source: Author’s calculation, based on the provincial data from China Statistical Yearbook (2006), and the 





















The gaps vary widely across provinces. As mentioned earlier, neither the Constitution nor 
the Budget Law (1994) assigns authority to the intermediate levels. Authority is 
delegated – implicitly – by the Central government to the intermediate levels to oversee 
their subordinate levels of government. Since counties and townships reside at the bottom 
of the hierarchy, they are dealing with a variety of fiscal arrangements from provinces 
and prefectures that interpret central policies differently and design revenue/expenditure 
assignments in their own way. This decentralized approach to revenue/expenditure 
assignment has been noted in several earlier studies (Qiao and Shah 2006;Shah and Shen 
2008;World Bank 2002). For example, some provinces such as Jiangsu and Henan are 
devolving revenues to lower levels, while others such as Liaoning and Heilongjiang are 
centralizing revenues to the provincial level (World Bank 2006a). Even within a single 
province, fiscal arrangements can vary across prefectures. As shown in Figure 2.4, the 
three provinces -- Zhejiang, Guangdong and Qinghai -- differ remarkably in their sub-
national shares of expenditure across levels of government. In Zhejiang, county 
governments shoulder the heaviest spending responsibilities -- 63.2 percent of the total 
sub-national expenditures. In contrast, Qinghai’s county governments account for only 
34.6 percent, but provincial government takes nearly half of the total. Another scenario is 
represented by Guangdong, where prefectural governments are spending almost half of 









Figure 2.4  Sub-national Shares of Expenditure: Provincial Variety (2003) 
 
Source: Adapted from World Bank (2007a). 
 
Not only is the vertical fiscal gap large at the county level, but also it has been widening 
over the years. The trend is presented in Table 2.2. In the 1980s, both revenue and 
expenditure shares were increasing at the county level, and the two ratios were relatively 
balanced. After the 1994 reform, however, the share of revenue and the share of 
expenditure were growing apart. While expenditures rose around 30 percent, the county 
governments’ share of revenues fell swiftly, from 30.1 percent in 1992 to only 17.2 
percent in 2004. The divergence between the two ratios resulted in the enlarging fiscal 
gap at the county level, from about 8 percentage points in 1998 to more than 14 



























Table 2.2 Vertical Fiscal Gap at the County level, 1986-2004 
  Share of Total Revenues Share of Total Expenditures Fiscal Gap 
 percent 
GDP 
1986 21.7 percent 24.7 percent
-3.0 
percent -0.7
1988 28.6 percent 28.3 percent 0.3 percent 0.1
1990 28.4 percent 29.7 percent
-1.3 
percent -0.3
1992 30.1 percent 30.9 percent
-0.8 
percent -0.1
1998 20.3 percent 28.2 percent
-7.9 
percent -1.0
2000 19.7 percent 26.2 percent
-6.5 
percent -1.1
2002 17.1 percent 28.6 percent
-11.5 
percent -2.1





The provision of public services in rural areas poses a challenge in countries around the 
world. Governments in rural areas tend to have large a fiscal gap with low revenue 
resources, weak administrative capacities and high expenditure needs, and therefore have 
greater dependence on fiscal transfers. Services provision is costly, particularly in remote 
communities. Factors such as geographic conditions and low population density lead to 
smaller class sizes in school, public facilities being used at lower capacities, or higher 




compensation to attract qualified teachers/doctors. In developed countries in the OECD, 
rural governments rely on a mix of local taxes, user charges, and importantly fiscal 
transfers to meet national standards of minimum services provision for basic education, 
health care, sanitation, etc. (World Bank 2007a). 
 
However, what is of concern in China is that the issue with financing rural local 
governments (counties, townships, and villages) is not observed in just remote locations, 
but applies generally. While low revenue capacity and high spending needs are common 
to localities in remote regions, large fiscal gaps are prevalent in virtually all the rural 
counties in China’s current fiscal system.  
 
As the current system decentralizes spending decisions much more than tax revenues, a 
large-scale system of intergovernmental fiscal transfers is required to fill the gap between 
expenditure responsibilities and financial resources at each level of sub-national 
government. In 2003, these transfers financed 67 percent of provincial expenditures, 57 
percent of prefectural expenditures, and 66 percent of county and lower level 
expenditures (Shah and Shen 2006). Chapters 4 and 5 will provide in-depth analysis of 
the redistribution effects of the fiscal transfer system at the provincial and county levels, 
respectively.  
 
Fiscal decentralization, along with the stark gap between sub-national expenditures and 
revenues, has had an important influence on China’s government expenditures. The next 
section elaborates on this point.  




2.2 Expenditure Composition  
 
Effective resource allocation to health, education, and other social services is crucial for 
achieving equitable and sustainable development in a competitive environment (World 
Bank 2003). It is therefore important to take a close look at China’s expenditure 
composition in recent years in order to test whether current public spending policies are 
in line with the nation’s new strategy of growth with equity.   
 
Figure 2.5 provides information about public expenditure allocation in 2005. Expenditure 
on physical capital is high. The accelerated growth of spending on capital construction in 
the late 1990s is mainly attributed to an expansionary fiscal policy that was adopted to 
boost staggering domestic demand after the 1997 Asian crisis, and the heavy 
infrastructure spending under the agencies of the Western Development program 
established in 1998. In 2002, China’s capital spending as a share of GDP was about three 
times the OECD average and almost double that of Korea, the OECD country with the 
highest capital spending (OECD 2006). A more detailed breakdown of capital 
expenditure, given in Figure 2.6, suggests that fully half of capital spending was 
channeled to transport (26 percent) and water & environment (25 percent). The share 
devoted to education and health infrastructure was remarkably low (only 9 percent in 
2004).  
 
The other notable spending item is administration. Capital construction and 
administration together take the largest share of public expenditure (40 percent of total 




government expenditures in 2005) and have been growing the most rapidly. Spending on 
administration made up 21 percent of total expenditure in 2005. Behind the high share of 
spending on administration are not only generous salary increases, but also overstaffing 
and other inefficiencies. Capital spending8 accounted for 16 percent of total government 
spending in 2005.  
 
In contrast, the share of China’s government spending devoted to human development is 
low. In spite of repeated pledges by the State Council to increase the level of investment, 
budgetary expenditure on education remained stagnant at about 2 – 2.5 percent of GDP 
during 1978-2005, half the level aimed for in the 1985 Education Law (Wong 2007). 
Similarly public spending on health care was also low, at less than 2 percent of GDP.  
 
Figure 2.5 Expenditure Composition (2005) 
 
Source: Author calculation from data in China Statistical Yearbook 2006. 
                                                 
8 China’s capital expenditure is determined by the National Development and Reform Commission 
(NDRC), which is constrained only by the availability of total budget resources. An exception is 
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Figure 2.6 Government Capital Spending (2003) 
 




A relatively large share of spending is allocated to the operating expenses of culture, 
education, science and public health. Spending on this broad category made up 26 
percent of total government expenditure and 3.3 percent of GDP in 2005. Spending on 
this category is highly decentralized: it was shared in a 9.6 percent to 90.3 percent 
proportion between central and local governments as of 2005. The largest item in the 
broad category of current operating expenditure on culture, education, science and public 
health is education9, with a share of 11.7 percent of total expenditure and 2.2 percent of 
GDP in 2005.  
                                                 
9 It should be noted that total education expenditure includes not only operating expenses, but also 
education-related infrastructure spending, education subsidies for less developed regions, education-related 
surcharges, and others. As operating expenses account for the majority and due to the difficulty of 
aggregating the total education expenditure, the author only uses the operating expenses as common 
practice in the literature.  




Table 2.3 The Division of Budgetary Expenditures on Major Public Services (2005) 












Operating Expenses for 
Education 11.7 2.8 14.8 6.2 93.8
Operating Expenses for 
Health 3.1 0.2 4.0 2.1 97.9
Social Welfare and Relief 2.1 0.1 2.8 0.7 99.3
Source: Author calculation from China Statistical Yearbook 2006. 
 
To assess how China compares with other countries, Figure 2.7 depicts, the ratio of 
public education expenditure as a percentage of GDP in 13 Asian and Latin American 
countries in 2004. China’s ratio of 2.2 percent ranks poorly in the countries shown. It is 
just ahead of Indonesia and is lower than the ratio in several other Asian developing 
countries with a similar younger age structure of the population, such as Thailand and the 
Philippines.  
 
The lack of government spending on education has led to the proliferation of various fees 
to meet the cost of education services. For example, with only about two thirds of 
expenditure on education covered by budgetary outlays in 2000, the rest financing came 
from tuition and miscellaneous fees (24 percent), school funds and citizens (2.2 percent), 
donations and other fund-raising activities (3 percent), and other revenues (3.9 percent) 
(OECD 2006).  




Figure 2.7 Public Education Expenditure as Percentage of GDP (2004) 
 
 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook 2006 and World Bank (2011).  




In addition to under-resourcing, government funds are often used inefficiently. A large 
proportion of China’s education spending goes on personnel expenses, and half of these 
expenses are actually for non-teaching staff (Jia et al. 2002; OECD 2000). In addition, the 
share of spending on infrastructure and equipment is low compared to that in other 




The public health share in the total government spending fell from 3.7 percent in 1995 



























































a comparatively low fraction of the total spending on health in China. China’s 
government health expenditure in 2006 accounted for only 40.7 percent of total national 
health expenditure, which is among the lowest of the countries in Figure 2.8. Only two 
countries, India and the Philippines, are behind China (World Bank 2008). The decline in 
government financing of health expenditure is partly attributable to the 1996 health sector 
reform, which aimed at establishing a market-based system.  
 
Figure 2.8 Government Health Expenditure (2006) 
 
Source: World Bank (2008).  
 
Between 1978 and 2003, out-of-pocket health spending grew in real terms at an annual 
rate of 15.7 percent, making government spending as a share of the total health spending 
fall from about 80 percent to only about 40 percent (see Figure 2.9). The National Health 
Survey (NHS) in 2003 revealed a worrisome picture of high health care costs having 
become a barrier to obtaining care. The survey found out that 50 percent of respondents 
who had been ill in the past two weeks reported not seeking care (up from 36 percent in 




1993); 30 percent reported choosing not to be hospitalized despite being told to; and 
among those who did go to hospital, almost half discharged themselves against the 
doctor’s advice. Even in public health for immunizations, out-of-pocket payments 
financed as much as half of expenses, even though most of them were supposed to be free. 
In some cases of serious illness, people who received medical treatment in China were 
often faced with financial difficulties and even impoverishment. The 2003 NHS indicated 
that 30 percent of poor households reported that health care costs were the reason why 
they fell into poverty (Ministry of Health 2004).  
 
Figure 2.9 Government and Private Health Spending in China (1990 – 2000) 
 
Source: Wagstaff and Lindelow(2008).  
Note: Government and private spending are measured on the right-hand axis. Private spending as a 
percentage of total spending is measured on the left-hand axis. 




Compared with the selected Asian countries, household spending on health care as a 
share of total household expenditure is highest among the poor in China. In the case of 
catastrophic health expenses – defined as expenses accounting for more than 40 percent 
of nonfood consumption -- China’s percentage is higher than elsewhere in Asia, and it is 
also higher among the poor (Gao, et al. 2002;Wagstaff and Lindelow 2008). Relative to 
per capita income, out-of-pocket spending in China is high, measured by out-of-pocket 
spending for a single inpatient as a percentage of annual per capita consumption (as high 
as about 60 percent in 2003). In comparison, in Switzerland, Mexico, and the Republic of 
Korea, the figure is just over 20 percent, and most other countries selected in Figure 2.10 
have a much lower share.  
 
Figure 2.10 Out-of-Pocket Expenses Share of Inpatient Care in Selected Countries 
 
Source: Wagstaff and Lindelow (2008) 
Note: 1. Data for OECD countries are for the latest year available, which varies across countries (ranging 
from 1999 to 2002). Data for China are from the 2003 National Health Survey and the Ministry of Health 
Statistical Digest and refer to 2003. 2. The y axis represents the cost of a single inpatient episode as a 
percentage of annual per capita household consumption. 
 




In addition, financing of health services is largely reliant on financial input from the local 
government, with 2.1 percent from central government and 97.9 percent from sub-
national governments in 2005 (Table 2.3). China’s substantially decentralized system of 
public services provision poses a challenge for local governments in less developed areas, 
where health issues are usually serious.  
 
A typical county level expenditure is provided here to illustrate the real-life financial 
struggles that have led to significantly low spending on human capital development. Hua 
county (Huaxian), a nationally designated poor county, is located in the central province 
of Henan. Hua County’s budget in 2003 is presented in Table 2.4. The largest budgetary 
spending went to education (39 percent) and administration (22 percent). When translated 
into actual money, Hua County managed to spend only RMB 120 (less than 20 dollars) 
per year per student enrolled in basic education, that is, 62 percent of the national average. 
Spending for social assistance was only RMB 15, or 5 percent of budget. Health spending 
was only 3 percent of budget, RMB 10 per capita, which meant almost nothing in the 
context of skyrocketing health costs (World Bank 2007a).  
 




Share of Total Budget
( percent) 
Administration 68 22 
Capital Construction 17 6 
Agriculture 23 7 
Education 120 39 
Health 10 3 
Social assistance/relief 15 5 
Other 56 18 
Total 309 100 
Source: Adapted from World Bank (2007a). 





China’s authorities have recognized the need to give more emphasis to human capital 
development and social welfare. But because of the vertical fiscal gap analyzed in the 
first section, good policy intentions are not translated into actual spending increases on 
human capital development and social welfare. China’s highly decentralized fiscal and 
administrative systems delegate the vast majority of public services to be financed and 
provided by sub-national governments. As shown in Table 2.3, sub-national governments 
accounted for more than 90 percent of budgetary expenditures on all major social 
services, including education (94 percent), health (98 percent), and social welfare (99 
percent). However, the financing shortfalls of sub-national governments, particularly at 
the lowest levels (counties, townships, and villages) are simply unable to find sufficient 
resources to meet all of their responsibilities.  
 
The low spending on social services also has something to do with the failure of the 
central government to provide matching financing sources. When national development 
targets, such as the nine-year compulsory education10 or a minimum level of expenditure 
per head on birth control, are passed down to local governments, under-resourced local 
authorities will not fulfill those mandates without being given sufficient funds to 
implement the policies.  
 
                                                 
10 National Compulsory Education Programme, promulgated in 1995, is aimed at targeting central 
education transfers to 592 poor counties (about one-fifth of all counties) and some other counties in the 
central and western region, mandating compulsory education of 9 years in cities and 6 years in rural areas, 
guaranteeing teachers’ salaries (by shifting the level of government responsible for payment of teachers’ 
salaries to the county level in 2000 and to the central level in 2002) and providing freetextbooks in many 
counties from 2002. 




In addition, underlying the low level of public outlays on education, health, and other 
critical human development needs is the important factor of local accountability issues. 
Compliance with central policies is not assured at local levels, even when the central 
government provides resources to support local services. In the context of almost no 
formal institutions holding local governments accountable for their performance, central 
transfers are often not used as intended, with local officials being apt to use public funds 




2.3 Local Accountability 
 
China does not have the formal institutions that govern intergovernmental relations. The 
assignment of responsibilities to sub-provincial governments (prefecture, county, and 
township) is not formalized. With the absence of a formal system of responsibilities, sub-
provincial governments do not have clear roles and functions against which they should 
be held accountable. This system of hierarchy is managed by a central bureaucracy with 
only about 50,000 civil servants in the core departments. This bureaucracy delegates 
responsibilities through the hierarchical pyramid that employs more than 32 million 
public servants. The central authority delegates responsibilities to the provinces, relying 
on them to deliver the national policy targets such as achieving universal basic education 
and promoting the New Rural Cooperative Medical Scheme. The provinces then assign 
responsibilities to the prefectures and depend on them to implement policies. Further 




down, the prefectures turn to the countries, and so on. This system of decentralization is 
implicitly carried on without any form of official institutions. In contract, according to 
international practices, the assignment of responsibilities to local governments is mostly 
governed by some sort of formal institutions. For example, the Philippines have 
established the “Local Government Code” in law; Japan supervises the intergovernmental 
relationship through a formal body -- the Ministry of Internal Affairs and 
Communications; Australia governs decentralization by the Council of Australian 
Governments; and Germany, under the system of “cooperative federalism”, makes 
decisions through an extensive net of multilevel committees (World Bank 2007b).  
 
Also contributing to the low effectiveness of public expenditures are the adverse 
incentives for sub-national officials and their limited accountability for expenditure 
decisions. The previous analysis has shown that China’s fiscal system is extensively 
decentralized compared with other countries in the World. However, China is much less 
decentralized than it may appear on the surface. The Center, in addition to its 
authoritarian political arrangement, exerts substantial control over localities through the 
intergovernmental fiscal system, through several binding expenditure laws, and through 
numerous expenditure mandates. The degree of autonomy local governments have over 
expenditure decisions, or their discretion to raise revenues, also indicates a highly 
centralized hierarchy in which local governments are virtually agents acting on behalf of 
the central government. This contrast between the nominal decentralization of 
responsibilities and the high degree of centralization of actual authority, plus with the 




absence of elections11, creates distorted incentives in the local allocation of public 
spending. First, as agents of the central government, together with China’s top down 
system of evaluation and promotion of government officials, sub-national governments 
spend as much as they have in revenue without considering the social trade-off between 
the benefits of their expenditures and the costs of financing (OECD 2006). Also, greater 
priority is given to capital spending, which encourages local governments to undertake all 
sorts of investment projects. Second, to enhance their career prospects, local cadres pay 
great attention to the target responsibility system, which ultimately provides the 
incentives to allocate resources in line with the preferences of the higher level of 
government. In addition, unfunded mandates also distort local allocation of spending in 
favor of easily measurable outputs.  
 
The weakness in holding local officials accountable for their performance in service 
delivery can be also attributed to the distorted incentives created by the current system of 
budgeting. Local governments are apt to overstaffing and also prioritizing administrative 
expenses because staff numbers are used in the budgeting process as the basis for 
calculating local expenditure needs and also for the determination of certain central 
transfers. The program of nationally unified wage-setting for civil servants has created a 
new wave of expansion in government employment, particularly in poorer regions, 
                                                 
11 It is called “predatory federalism” by (Shih, et al. 2004) In China, however, the absence of national 
elections combined with a hierarchical party structure gives central and provincial governments enormous 
leverage over grassroots governments. The top levels of government in China can devolve fiscal 








because compensation of public employees becomes a critical factor in determining local 
revenues.  
 
In the current intergovernmental system, the central government pays little attention to 
the voice of sub-national governments, and policy implementation lacks coordination 
between the multi levels of government. As the central and local interests are not always 
consistent, local governments may assign lower weight to some programs that are 
national priorities set by the central government. For example, reductions in our-of-
pocket expenses for medical care have been small – much less than expected -- under the 
New Rural Cooperative Medical Scheme (NCMS). The main reason is that county 
governments, being concerned about the financial burden to carry on this program, have 
tended to choose insurance schemes with conservative designs. Another grand 
undertaking by the central government to lessen farmers’ financial burden through the 
Rural-Fee-Reform and the subsequent elimination of agriculture taxes has actually 
reduced local governments’ own revenues for services delivery (World Bank 2007b). 
Such a negative impact on rural services delivery happens due to the inadequate central 
transfers for subsidizing the financial losses of local governments. Not only owing to 
insufficient funding, but also these resources leak as they pass through the provinces and 
prefectures before reaching countries.   
 
The local inefficiency in providing essential public services is also related to the limited 
involvement of citizens in public services planning, provision, and monitoring. 
According to the field visits documented in World Bank (2007a), the low quality of 




services observed in Henan and Yunnan is partly owing to local governments’ allocative 
decisions that are not in line with their residents’ interests. For instance, some rural 
schools had no funding for heating or electric lighting, but employed so many teachers 
that each teacher only taught on average twelve hours per week. Similarly, agricultural 
extension services, police stations, and even emergency medical services often allocated 
nearly all of their budgets for staff expenditures, leaving little or no funding for the 
vehicles or fuel needed to take them to the field. The central government has taken some 
steps in the direction of participatory monitoring & evaluating12, such as the community 
driven development (CDD) pilot program and the New Socialist Countryside campaign 
in Ganzhou, as shown in Figure 2.11. People are mobilized at the community level, with 
a monitoring group established in Longshijian village. The main responsibilities of the 
monitoring group include reviewing fiscal income and expenditures, ensuring to 
publicize the financial information in the village, auditing the use of community 
resources in line with the needs and preferences set by the local people, and evaluating 
the performance of the members in other community organizations.  
 
Nevertheless, the significance of community organizations in China is still in a stage of 
infancy (Plummer and Taylor 2004). They are new and mostly in the process of being 
established, such as water user associations. This absence of diverse community 
organizations in China hinders efficient participation by public services users/citizens. It 
is partly caused by the central government’s regulatory framework as well as by the lack 
of understanding, capacity, and incentives of local governments to promote such 
                                                 
12 Chapter V (1) of the 2004 State Council Decision on Reform of the Investment System states that “[a] 
social supervision mechanism for government invested projects shall be established and the public and 
press shall be encouraged to supervise government-invested projects.” 




organizations. Citizens’ grassroots-level organizations are likely to increase the 
participation of beneficiaries in the management, monitoring, and evaluation of public 
services, and thereby to improve local governments’ performance and hold them 
accountable (World Bank 2007b) 
 
Figure 2.11 Ganzhou’s Participatory Monitoring & Evaluation 
 
 





Since China’s authorities initiated the development strategy of building a socialist 
“harmonious society” in 2003, major programs to improve public services delivery have 
been implemented. Central transfers to support rural public services are increasing; 
improvements are being made to ensure salary payments at the county and township 
levels; administrative reforms are being undertaken at the grassroots levels; reforms to 




public service units (PSUs) are being piloted in many parts of the country; the free Rural 
Compulsory Education program is taking place; the New Rural Cooperative Medical 
Scheme and the Rural Medical Assistance Scheme are under way; and the Rural 
Minimum Living Stipend (dibao) is being implemented (World Bank 2007b).  
 
However, although many reforms and new programs have been introduced to build a 
harmonious society or to promote a new socialist countryside, their effects are mixed and 
some are even contradictory. China’s highly decentralized systems of fiscal management 
and administration can be an asset for cost-effective service delivery if the configuration 
of the intergovernmental fiscal system works in line with China’s development priorities. 
At present, though, there exists a stark vertical fiscal gap at sub-national levels of 
government, particularly at the county level that bears the main responsibilities for the 
provision of public services, and the gap has been widening over the years. Secondly, as 
the analysis of public expenditure composition reveals, the allocation of public spending 
appears out of line with China’s development objectives, with a relatively low share of 
spending on education, health, and other social needs, relative to GDP, according to 
international standards. Such a low level of public spending on important human 
development needs is partly attributable to the large fiscal gaps prevalent across sub-
national governments. The financing stress of local governments is aggravated by the 
lack of accountability of local officials who may be keener on accumulating political 
equity than on taking responsibility for ensuring a sufficient level of basic public services. 
This explains why, despite a sharp increase in central transfers for spending on rural 
development, these government funds leak as they processed through the hierarchy 




before reaching the targeted regions; and why in some cases, they are not always used as 
initially intended. The accountability of local governments to citizens is also weak, with 
most services provided without any participation by citizens or communities – for 
example, through their taking part in decision-making on projects and in subsequent 
monitoring.  
 
Thus, to improve the effectiveness of reforms and new programs, China’s more equitable 
development strategy necessitates a reevaluation of the intergovernmental fiscal 
arrangements. The existing fiscal system, established after the 1994 tax assignment 
reform and later fine-tuned by piecemeal reforms as certain issues arose, may not serve 
the country’s new objectives of providing adequate basic public services and promoting 
balanced regional development. That being said, the picture is not complete without 
addressing the other side of coin: the worsening inequality resulting from a highly 
decentralized fiscal system.  Recent years have seen increasing concern among 
policymakers and researchers over the inequality of public services provision across the 
country. Does the substantial fiscal gap result in large fiscal disparities and shortfalls in 
critical public services provision? Chapter 3 will address the former question, and 











Appendix 1 Revenue and Expenditure Shares by Administrative Levels in Province  











Chapter 3:  




Most national governments are concerned about the level and distribution of fiscal 
resources among the various levels of government. China is no exception, and this 
chapter aims to provide an in-depth examination of fiscal inequality in China. There are 
several grounds for the concern over fiscal inequality. Politically, equity and fairness are 
essential for social stability. In some countries, they are even critical for the maintenance 
of national unity – for example, from 1989 an aggressive fiscal equalization program was 
considered necessary to support the unification of the western and eastern halves of 
Germany. Economically, in the long run, vast inequalities impair the sustainability of a 
country's development. Studies show that countries with comparative lower inequality 
tend to achieve better economic performance. And normatively, people care and should 
care about social equity and fairness as goods in themselves. It is not socially acceptable 
for some jurisdictions to be seen spending a lot on their citizens while other jurisdictions 
can barely finance the basic functions of government. In the field of public policy and 
administration, fiscal disparity is a concern because it is directly associated with 
inequality in the provision of public services. Nations are turning to decentralization to 
improve the performance of the public sector. The hope is that state and local 
governments, being closer to the people, will be more responsive to their constituents and 




will be able to find new and better ways to provide public services. However, while it is 
not possible for all jurisdictions to provide a similar level of public services across an 
entire country, poor jurisdictions – ones that cannot expect to be self-sufficient – will 
benefit from some form of financial support to maintain the quality of their public 
services at standards acceptable to their people.  
 
Recent concern about increasing inequality in China has intensified interest in research 
on fiscal disparities. This study extends previous literature of fiscal inequality in the 
following ways. First, this chapter draws upon two panel datasets, for provinces during 
period 1998-2005 as well as for prefectures and counties spanning an eleven-year period 
1994-2004, which ensures that the inequality measurement in this research is more broad-
based and precise. The inequality calculation at prefecture and county levels takes into 
account intra-province dispersion, which helps to correct for underestimation of overall 
inequalities. In doing so, this research extends the study of sub-provincial disparities into 
the most recent period. For example, among the few pioneers who examine distributional 
pattern at the county level, Tsui (2005) carried out his analysis up to 2000, and Yin (2008) 
updated the research up to 2003. The second contribution of this research is to provide a 
comparative analysis of fiscal inequality at the three levels of sub-national government13 
– the provincial, prefectural, and county14 levels. By doing so, it clarifies at which level 
of government the most severe fiscal inequality resides, which is essential to prioritize 
                                                 
13 Township is also an administrative level of sub-national government in China. But it does not manage 
fiscal affairs independently. Therefore, in terms of fiscal system, China only has three levels of sub-
national government.  
14 County-level jurisdictions officially include counties (xian), county-level cities (xianjishi), and districts 
in cities (qu). In this research, ‘county-level jurisdictions’ only refers to rural areas, i.e., counties and 
county-level cities. Unless otherwise stated, all budgetary figures for each county-level jurisdiction are the 
consolidated figures for both the county-level and township jurisdictions. 
 




future fiscal reform. To my knowledge, no studies up to now have addressed the fiscal 
inequality issue of the three hierarchical levels of government at the same time. It is 
worth noting that this study fills the blank left in other studies by expanding the 
inequality assessment to the prefecture levels of government. There are no studies in the 
previous literature that have examined fiscal disparities by using a widespread dataset 
with prefecture units. Although Park et al. (1996) shed some light on the distributional 
pattern among prefectures, but this study was restricted to only one province of Shaanxi. 
Lastly, this chapter also applies spatial inequality analysis to evaluate the distributional 
pattern of public spending on education, health, social security, and capital construction 
at the provincial level. Such an attempt appears to have been worthwhile, for the 
inequality of financing for specific service area can be revealed.  
 
When examining fiscal inequality at each level of sub-national governments, the chapter 
focuses on the following three questions: first, what is current level of fiscal inequality at 
each level of government; second, in addition to static measures, what is the trend of 
fiscal inequality; and third, which contributes more to overall fiscal inequality, within-
region or between-region fiscal inequality? This third dimension involves decomposition 
of inequality indicators.  
  
This chapter is organized as follows. The second section provides a review of existing 
literature on fiscal disparities in China. The next section discusses measures of fiscal 
inequality and decomposition methodology. Fiscal inequality at the provincial, 




prefectural, and county levels is examined separately in Section 3.4. The final section 
offers conclusions and discusses policy implications.   
  
3.2 Fiscal Disparities in China: what do we know? 
 
While a considerable literature exists on income disparities in China, much less is known 
about the fiscal dimension of inequality at different levels of government, and about the 
inequality in public spending for core public services. The issue of fiscal disparities in 
China has, however, captured more attention in recent years15. Most studies focused on 
the analysis of policy intents or anecdotal observations in selected regions. Some studies 
reported ratio of the maximum to the minimum for per capita revenue and expenditure at 
different periods (Ahmad 2004;Bahl and Linn 1994;Wong 2000). However, the max-min 
ratio is not precise measure of inequality owning to its single consideration for extreme 
values. Other studies employ inequality indices such as Coefficient of Variation, the Gini 
index, or Theil index16 (Martinez-Vazquez, et al. 2008;Qiao and Shah 2006;Tsui 
2005;Yin 2008;Zhao and Ou 2008). This section will review the literature of fiscal 
disparities in China according to different levels of aggregation.  
 
At the national level, provinces are usually taken as the unit of analysis. This is the basis 
of most publications on fiscal inequality in China. For instance, Bahl (1999) studied 
fiscal inequality over the period 1990-1995, and found that per capita expenditures in 
                                                 
15 Many studies on China’s fiscal decentralization has examined its impact on economic growth or revenue 
stability (Davoodi and Zou 1998;Jin, et al. 2005;Jin and Zou 2005;Qian 1999;Young 2000;Zhang and Zou 
1998)15. Recent years have seen a shift of research focus from growth to fiscal disparities. 
16 Detailed explanation of these inequality indices is included in the next section of methodology and data.  




1990 ranged as high as 633 yuan—about six times the lowest figure, which was 106 yuan 
in Henan. Five years later, in 1995, per capita expenditures varied from a high of 1,837 
yuan in Shanghai to only 226 yuan in Anhui, roughly 8.1 times less. Bahl (1999) is one of 
the few studies addressing the issue of fiscal disparities in 1990s, but his measurement of 
max-min ratio is not accurate calculation of inequality and the data are now dated. Dollar 
and Hofman (2008) and Martinez-Vazquez et al. (2008) updated the measurement of 
max-min ratio up to 2003. They found that public per capita expenditures in the best-off 
province were 8.5 times those of the worst-off province, and the coefficient of variation 
across provinces was 0.77. The most inclusive study on provincial fiscal disparities is 
provided by Zhao and Ou (2008). Using a dataset over the period 1978-2006, they 
measured Gini coefficient and found the dispersion of per capita public expenditure was 
reduced from early 1980s to 1994 and then stayed about the same level afterwards. The 
key problem of only focusing on provincial fiscal disparities is that it tends to 
underestimate overall inequality without taking intra-province dispersion into 
consideration. As we know, most government revenues and expenditures in China are 
collected and spent by prefectural and county governments, and therefore the pattern of 
fiscal distribution of sub-provincial finance requires even more attention.  
 
Sub-provincial analysis of fiscal inequality facilitates understanding of how reforms have 
affected the availability and distribution of public financial resources at the level of 
government that takes primary responsibility for basic public service provision. Most 
studies of China’s fiscal reforms have focused exclusively on the central-provincial 
division of fiscal responsibilities. Only a few existing studies focus on sub-provincial 




fiscal inequality in terms of public expenditure distribution (Park, et al. 1996;Tsui 
2005;World Bank 2002;Yin 2008). Park, et al. (1996) found declining redistribution of 
financial resources from richer to poorer counties in the province of Shaanxi. The 
coefficient of variation for county expenditures per capita in Shaanxi rose monotonically 
to reach 49.3 by 1992. The coefficient of variation for revenues per capita has also risen 
over time, reaching 86.4 in 1992. This study is revealing but it examined only one 
comparatively poor province, and its data are dated from before the 1994 fiscal reform. 
The World Bank (2002) studied the province of Gansu and found that among its 14 
prefectural level units in 1995, the ratio of maximum to minimum was 6.6 for per capita 
expenditures, with coefficients of variation of 0.66. These numbers are much larger 
compared to the existing findings of fiscal inequality across provinces. The disparities 
shrank moderately through 1999, to 4.3 in expenditures, with coefficients of variation of 
0.51. At the county level, the differences among the 76 county-level units were even 
greater: 1999 expenditures varied 37-fold from the highest to the lowest, with the 
disparities growing between 1995 and 1999 (World Bank 2002). However, Gansu is also 
one of the poor provinces, and the pattern of fiscal inequality in this particular province 
may not be universal across the country. Tsui (2005) gauged county-level fiscal 
disparities for the period 1994-2000 and found that fiscal inequality tended to ratchet 
upwards except for oscillations in the initial years.  
 
While it is meaningful to gauge fiscal inequality at the level of aggregate public 
expenditure, it is illuminating to look at regional disparities in such core public services 
spending as education expenditure, health care expenditure, and expenditure for social 




protection. Only a couple of studies shed light on the inequality of government spending 
for specific public services. Martinez-Vazquez, et al. (2008) found that regional 
disparities in per capita expenditures exist for almost all major expenditure items. The 
disparities are particularly pronounced for some expenditures: in 2003, for example, the 
differences between public health expenditures in the highest and lowest provinces 
differed by a factor of 13, and the coefficient of variation was 0.8. In contrast, 
expenditures on ‘public administration’ in the highest and lowest provinces differed by a 
factor of just 3, and the coefficient of variation was 0.4. Martinez-Vazquez’s research 
was limited to static measurement of major spending categories for the year 2003. 
Observation of the trend is missing from the literature. Liu and Shih (2004) focused on 
the comparison of per capita spending on health and education at the county level 
between the year 1993 and the year 2000. They found that in 1993, the average county in 
Beijing spent 155 yuan per capita on health and education, which is almost 5 times the 
average spending in Henan Province, the province with the lowest per capita county 
health and education spending. In 2000, however, the average county in Beijing—still 
number one in per capita health and education spending—was spending 7.4 times as 
much on health and education as Henan, which remained last in per capita health and 
education expenditure at the county level. The standard deviation of per capita county 
expenses on health and education increased from 37 yuan in 1993 to 53.5 yuan in 2000 
(Liu and Shih 2004).  
 
The literature review on fiscal inequality in China in the above finds that until now, there 
have been few efforts to analyze fiscal inequality systematically at all three levels of sub-




national government in similar time periods. Most research focuses only on provincial-
level inequality, while a few studies examine the county level exclusively. However, in 
order to reveal how fiscal inequality compares at different levels of government, it is 
critical to investigate provincial, prefectural, and county-level fiscal inequality in one 
comprehensive study. Given data availability, this research will fulfill this need by 
examining fiscal inequality at the provincial level over the period 1998-2005, the 
prefecture and the county level from 1994 to 2004. It is hoped that findings from this 
study will provide insightful guidance to prioritize future fiscal reforms in China. Missing 
from the literature is evidence on prefectural (usually called sub-provincial) fiscal 
inequality, despite the popular allegation that prefectural inequality is much larger than 
provincial inequality. My research fills this gap by using a series of measures of 
inequality to shed light on the trend in prefectural fiscal disparity. This study will also 
extend existing knowledge on county-level fiscal inequality through thorough 
examination of more than 2000 county units across the country from 1994 to 2004. 
Another important missing element derives from the fact that current literature focuses 
primarily on aggregate fiscal inequality. My research intends to enhance the 
understanding of fiscal inequality at the provincial level by looking into the inequality in 
spending on basic public services.  
 
3.3 Measures of Fiscal Inequality and Decomposition Methodology  
 
In the literature about China’s fiscal disparities, the magnitude of fiscal inequality is often 
measured by the dispersion of per capita revenue or per capita expenditure. In the ideal 




scenario, it is best to measure quantity and quality of public services provision and 
consideration of their impact on people’s lives (achievements and capabilities). But this is 
not achievable due to difficulty and complexity of designing appropriate indicators as 
well as data availability particularly from local governments in developing countries like 
China. But our goal is not to strive for perfectly equal per capita expenditure. It is not 
possible or desirable as local revenue potential and cost of delivering services are 
different. For instance, cost of service provision is dependent on such factors as location, 
population density, and infrastructure. But a certain level of fiscal inequality is not 
acceptable. In most developing countries, it is considered horizontal equitable if a 
coefficient of variation is about 0.3-0.4 across regions (Martinez-Vazquez, et al. 2008).  
 
Fiscal inequality in terms of per capita public expenditure is used in this research (rather 
than per capita fiscal revenue) because the core concern of my research is the 
distributional effects of public resources.17 Actual public expenditure reflects the ultimate 
effort by government to improve people’s lives, while measurement of fiscal capacity by 
revenues does not incorporate fiscal transfers from upper levels of government. As fiscal 
transfers are a major source of local finance, particularly in China with its revenue-
centralized fiscal system, gauging fiscal disparities by revenue tends to exaggerate 
inequality across jurisdictions.  
One way of assessing the extent of fiscal inequality is to use several inequality 
measures. This research uses four types of inequality measure, each having its own 
advantages and disadvantages.  
                                                 
17 Further research might examine impacts on people’s lives, different ways in which expenditures are 
converted into quality of living.  





Maximum to Minimum Ratio [MMR] 
A comparison of the highest government expenditure per capita in a region with 
the lowest expenditure per capita provides one measure of the range of disparities. If this 
measure is small across regions, then it means different regions have relatively equal 
public expenditure. If this measure is large, the immediate impression indicates high 
inequality. The MMR provides a quick and straightforward quantification of regional 
fiscal inequality. However, the interpretation may be misleading as it is not clear whether 
the high ratio is due to substantial variation in the distribution of per capita government 
expenditure or the presence of outliers. Therefore, other methods of inequality 
measurement are required to supplement MMR.  
 
Coefficient of Variation [CV] 
 The coefficient of variation is one of the most widely used measures of inequality 
in the literature. The CV is a measure of dispersion around the mean. In this study, the 
CV as defined below, ‘weighted coefficient of variation’, attempts to capture the 
dispersion of public expenditure per capita, and the deviation is weighted by its share in 
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where E is public expenditure per capita, E is the overall mean, N is the number of 
observation, P is the total population, and iP is the population of the ith jurisdiction.  
 Although widely used, CV depends on the mean of the distribution, and this 
property of mean dependence is not a desirable property of an inequality measure. 
Therefore, the Gini coefficient is also used in this study.  
 
The Gini Coefficient [G] 
  
In the literature, the most widely used measure of inequality is the Gini coefficient. It is 
derived from the Lorenz curve (see Figure 3.1), a cumulative frequency curve that 
compares the distribution of a specific variable (e.g. income or per capita expenditure) 
with the uniform distribution that represents equality. As shown in the Figure 3.1 with 
cumulative percentage of households on the horizontal axis and the cumulative 
percentage of expenditure on the vertical axis, the diagonal line represents perfect 
equality, and the Gini coefficient is defined as A/(A+B). A and B are the areas shown on 
the graph. If A=0, the Gini coefficient becomes 0, meaning perfect equality; whereas if 











Figure 3.1 Lorenz Curve 
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where P is the total population and N is the number of observations. kP and dP are the 
population of the kth jurisdiction and dth jurisdiction.  
 The Gini coefficient is not entirely satisfactory. For analysis of inequality, it is 
always useful to decompose inequality by regions or by subgroups of the population in 
order to prioritize polices for inequality reduction. For example, total inequality is 
composed by two segments – “between region” (average per capita expenditure varying 
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region). For policy purposes it is helpful to discern these sources of inequality. If 
“between- region” inequality is the culprit, then the focus of policy may need to be on 
balanced regional economic development with special emphasis on the poorer regions. 
However, the Gini coefficient is indecomposable. That is, the total Gini of society is not 
equal to the sum of the Gini coefficients of its subgroups. Therefore, the Theil index is 
introduced below to help decompose total inequality.  
 
The Theil Index [T] 
 
When it comes to decomposable inequality measures, the best known is the Theil index. 
The Theil index belongs to the family of generalized entropy inequality measures that are 
characterized by a single parameter, c. The formula, developed by Shorrocks (1980, 
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where E is the overall mean, and jiE is the public expenditure per capita of the ith 
jurisdiction in region j. In my analysis, I measure fiscal inequality for I0 . I0 is in fact the 
mean logarithmic deviation proposed by Theil (1963).  




 Compared to other measures of inequality such as CV and Gini Coefficient, Theil 
indexes satisfy many desirable properties, such as mean independence, the principle of 
population replication (or population-size independence), and the Pigou-Dalton principle 
of transfers (Bourguignon 1979;Reardon and Firebaugh 2002;Shorrocks 1980). Mean 
independence implies that if all per capita expenditure were changed by the same 
proportion, the measure of inequality would not change. Population-size independence 
means that if the population were to change, the measure of inequality should not change. 
The Pigou-Dalton principle of transfers implies that any expenditure transfer from a 
richer to a poorer jurisdiction, which does not reverse their relative ranks in expenditures, 
reduces the value of the index.  
 The popularity of the generalized entropy measures also lies in their property of 
additive decomposability – the overall inequality value can be calculated as a weighted 
average of the inequality values of subgroups plus a between-group contribution to the 
overall inequality. This property enables researchers to figure out the contribution of each 
subgroup to total inequality, which allows policymakers to identify the specific 
subgroups that are major contributors in the overall inequality value.  
Partitioning E into J sub-vectors Ej, j = 1, 2, . . . , J, the Theil index (T) may be 
broken down into within-group and between-group contributions as follows: 
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 This research groups provinces by eastern, middle, and western regions, and 
groups prefectures/countries by province. WT(E) captures only variation within 
region/province and ignores variations between region/province. BT(E) purges within 
region/province variations by focusing exclusively on variations of regional/provincial 
means.  
For a typical decomposition of inequality in expenditure per capita, consider the 
following simple example of expenditure inequality in Vietnam in 1993 (World Bank 
2005). Using the Theil index, the total inequality is decomposed to “between urban-rural” 
and “within urban-rural”, with the former contributing 22 percent of the total inequality 
and the latter 78 percent. This analysis clarifies that policy focus should be targeted on 
the divergence within urban/rural region.  
 
Table 3.1 Decomposition of Expenditure Inequality by Area, Vietnam (1993) 
 Theil T  percent 
All Vietnam 0.200  
Between Urban – Rural 0.044 22 percent of total 
inequality 
Within Urban – Rural  0.156 78 percent of total 
inequality 
Source: World Bank (2005) 
    
 
 




In this study, prefecture and county level data are from Statistical Material for 
Prefectures, Cities, and Counties Nationwide (Quanguo Dishixian Caizheng Tongji 
Ziliao), released by China’s Ministry of Finance. This survey has detailed figures on 
budgetary revenues, expenditures and fiscal transfers for all sub-provincial jurisdictions 
from 1994 to 2004. Owing to data limitations, my measure of fiscal disparities refers only 
to inequalities in budgetary expenditure per capita.18  
 
 
3.4 Fiscal Inequality at Major Levels of Sub-national Government  
 
This section discusses the measurement and results of fiscal inequality at the provincial, 
prefectural, and county levels of government.  
 
3.4.1 Provincial19 Fiscal Inequality  
 
A snapshot of provincial per capita expenditure in 2005 is provided in Figure 3.2. The 
fiscal inequality across provinces is high. Shanghai, with the highest per capita 
expenditure, spent about eight times as much as Anhui, which ranks at the bottom (per 
capita GDP varies almost sixfold between the two provinces). Compared to the historical 
data from 1995 (Bahl 1999), the difference is almost identical – Shanghai spent about 
                                                 
18 Extra-budgetary data are not complete across all jurisdictions and are only available for a few recent 
years.  
19 Provincial fiscal inequality is also commonly called ‘sub-national fiscal inequality’ in the literature. 




eight times as much as Anhui at that time as well.20 The snapshot also reveals another 
interesting finding. The five top-spending provinces besides Shanghai are Beijing, Tibet, 
Tianjin, Qinghai, and Inner Mongolia. Surprisingly, in per capita terms the relatively poor 
provinces like Tibet (ranked 25th by per capita GDP) and Qinghai (ranked 19th by per 
capita GDP) are able to rank higher than affluent provinces like Zhejiang (ranked 4th by 
per capita GDP) and Guangdong (ranked 6th by per capita GDP). The same pattern is 
reflected in Ningxia, which is ranked 23rd by per capita GDP while per capita expenditure 
is ranked at 8th in the nation. These findings raise challenges on the common practice of 
measuring fiscal disparities based on per capita public expenditure. One possible 
explanation is that these three provinces belong to regions with high concentrations of 
ethnic minorities and so get more attention and financial assistance from the Center. It is 
also possible that higher per capita expenditure in these remote and rural provinces is 
associated with higher per capita cost of public services delivery due to low population 
densities. Another factor is that the measurement only takes into account government 
budgetary figures without considering other revenue sources. For instance, it is highly 
likely that the schools in affluent regions get more financial resources from school fees, 
donation, and other non-governmental investment. Therefore, relatively lower public 
expenditure per capita in the Eastern provinces could not be simply interpreted as lower 





                                                 
20 See details in the Literature Review chapter.  




Figure 3. 2  Provincial Per Capita Government Expenditure (2005) 
 
 
Source: Author’s calculation based on data from China Statistical Yearbook 2006. 
 
Looking at Table 3.2, which compares the shares of GDP and fiscal resources in the five 
richest and the five poorest provinces in 1990, 1998, and 2004, a trend of polarization 
between the richest provinces and the poorest may be observed. During this 15-year 
period, the rich ‘club’ produces more, collects more revenue, and spends more, while the 
poor group produces less, collects less revenue, and spends less. From the revenue side, 
the five richest provinces (12.7 percent of total population) collected 33.2 percent of total 
sub-national revenue in 2004, compared to 26 percent in 1990. The five poorest 
provinces (17-19 percent of total population) only collected 8.8 percent of sub-national 
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less dramatic. The five rich provinces spent 24.4 percent of sub-national expenditure in 
2004, in contrast to 19.8 percent in 1990, while the five poor provinces spent 12.4 percent 
in 2004, less than their 1990s 14 percent.  
 
Table 3. 2 Fiscal and Economic Concentration in Rich and Poor Provinces 
Five richest 
provinces*  1990 1998 2004
 Percentage of population 12.7 12.2 12.7
 Percentage of GDP 22.8 25.1 25.3
 Percentage of revenue collection 26 23 33.2
 Percentage of government expenditure 19.8 18.5 24.4
     
Five poorest 
provinces*     
 Percentage of population 18.9 18.7 17.2
 Percentage of GDP 12.7 11.7 8.7
 Percentage of revenue collection 12.3 9.8 8.8
 Percentage of government expenditure 14 8.6 12.4
Notes:  (1) The five richest provinces in 2004 include Shanghai, Beijing, Tianjin, Zhejiang, and Jiangsu; 
             (2)The five poorest provinces in 2004 include Guizhou, Gansu, Yunnan, Guangxi, and Anhui; 
             (3)The five richest provinces in 1998 and 1990 include Shanghai, Beijing, Tianjin, Guangdong, and  
                  Zhejiang; 
              (4)The five poorest provinces in 1998 and 1990 include Guizhou, Gansu, Shaanxi, Jiangxi, and 
                   Henan. 
Source: 2004 data are from author’s own calculation; 1998 and 1990 data are from World Bank (2002). 
 
The above statistical analysis suggests that provincial fiscal inequality remained high up 
to 2005, with apparent polarization between the richest and poorest provinces. The next 
question that arises is, ‘What is the trend of fiscal inequality at the provincial level? Is it 
getting worse, as most scholars expect?’ Additional data, from 1998 to 2005, casts light 
on the trend of provincial fiscal inequality in this period (see Table 3.3). Opposite to our 
expectation, the trend of provincial fiscal inequality for this eight-year period is relatively 
stable. Although the mean of per capita expenditure more than tripled (1960 yuan in 2005, 
compared to 622 yuan in 1998), the MMR remains about eight times and the CV 
fluctuates between 0.65 and 0.60. The Gini coefficient confirms this trend of stability, 




with a slight falling tendency. My observations on provincial fiscal disparity are therefore 
not congruent with the past literature, which all suggests increasing fiscal inequality at 
the provincial level in China. For example, Martinez-Vazquez et al (2008) looked at the 
period from 1990 to 2003 and concluded that the significant horizontal fiscal disparities 
across provinces were growing.  
 
Table 3. 3 Provincial Disparity of Per Capita Expenditure (1998-2005) 
Unit: yuan 
Year Mean Maximum Minimum MMR CV G 
1998 622 3211 347 9.24 0.65 0.26 
1999 724 3620 409 8.84 0.65 0.26 
2000 828 3635 225 16.14 0.62 0.27 
2001 1036 4387 532 8.24 0.60 0.25 
2002 1198 5307 655 8.11 0.61 0.25 
2003 1342 6361 741 8.58 0.64 0.26 
2004 1591 7936 906 8.76 0.65 0.25 
2005 1960 9259 1165 7.95 0.61 0.23 
Source: Author’s calculation, based on data from China Statistical Yearbooks 1999-2006. 
 
It is conventional in China to group the provinces into three regions – the eastern, middle 
and western. Policymakers at the center are used to making region-targeted policies. 
Therefore, a further question occurs, ‘Should the central government give more attention 
to within-regional or to inter-regional fiscal inequality?’ The decomposition of inequality 
indicator – the Theil index – could reveal the contribution of between-region and within-
region inequality (see Figure 3.3). As shown in the figure, within-region inequality is 
about twice between-region inequality; in other words, more than two-thirds of inequality 




comes from within a region. This finding suggests that in future the central government 
should not only put effort into the regional development strategy, but should also pay 
more attention to the inequality arising from within regions. For example, Anhui and 
Henan both belong to the affluent eastern region, but ranked as the bottom two in the 
whole nation in terms of per capita expenditure in 2005 (see Figure 3.2).  
 
Figure 3.3 Provincial Fiscal Inequality Decomposition, 1998 - 2005 
 
Source: Author’s calculation, based on data from China Statistical Yearbooks (1999-2006).  
 
In short, at the provincial level, there are three major findings. First, provincial fiscal 
disparities remain large. The coefficient of variation across provinces was 0.61 in 2005. 
For developing countries, a coefficient of variation between 0.3 and 0.4 is generally 
considered equitable comparably (Martinez-Vazquez, et al. 2008)21. Second, opposite to 
the mainstream belief that provincial fiscal inequality is growing, my analysis shows that 
it has been stabilizing during the period 1998-2005. Such finding is consistent with Zhao 
                                                 
21 See Appendix 3 for comparison of provincial level fiscal inequality in four East Asian countries, China, 






















and Ou (2008). Third, about two thirds of total provincial fiscal inequality came from 
within-region disparities. This leads to the policy implication that in addition to long time 
focus on regional development policies, in future more effort should be put in bridging 
divergence within each region.  
 
In addition to provincial total public expenditure, what has happened to spending on basic 
public services, such as education and health care? Has the inequality of public services 
financing also stabilized in the same period? Thanks to disaggregated data available at 
the provincial level, my research is able to break down the total expenditure and analyze 
the distribution of education expenses, public health expenses and social security 
expenses, as well as capital construction investment.  
 
Figure 3.4 helps us to visualize provincial per capita budgetary expenditure on education, 
health, and social security in 2005. The provinces are lined up on the X-axis by per-capita 
GDP ranking from high to low, with Shanghai the most affluent province and Guizhou 
the poorest, while the Y-axis shows per capita government expenditure. There are three 
observations immediately illustrated by the figure. First, there is no surprise that the two 
richest provincial jurisdictions, Shanghai and Beijing, spend much more on social 
services compared to the rest of country. Second, expenses for social security are 
unexpectedly high in the following four provinces: Liaoning, Jilin, Qinghai, and Tibet. 
The explanation for Qinghai and Tibet is similar to that for their unexpectedly high total 
government expenditure – that is, they get favorable treatment from the central 
government due to political concerns. The other two provinces, Liaoning and Jilin, have 




to allocate a large budget for social security expenses due to their large population of 
workers laid off from state-owned manufacturing enterprises (SOEs). These two ‘falling’ 
provinces, once affluent manufacturing centers, experienced a high unemployment rate 
due to the massive shutdowns of SOEs following China’s transition to a market economy. 
Third, besides the outlier situation mentioned in the above, there is no clear pattern of 
correlation between economic well-being and public expenditure for major social 
services.  
 
Figure 3.4  Provincial Per Capita Expenditure on Education, Health, and Social 
Security (2005)   
 
 
Note: Expenditure for Social Security comprises three parts: expenditure for pension and relief funds for 
social welfare, expenditure for retired persons in administrative department, and expenditure on subsidies 
to social security programs. 
Source: Authors, based on data from Statistical Yearbook of China 2006. 
 
 
Next, measuring the inequality of major public services spending can provide information 
on the distribution of fiscal resources across provincial jurisdictions. Table 3.4 and 3.5 
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major spending categories – education, health, social security, and capital construction – 
for the period 1998-200522.  
 
Table 3.4  Disparities across provinces in selected categories  









1998 0.65 0.57 0.73 0.71 1.29 
1999 0.65 0.56 0.76 0.95 1.20 
2000 0.62 0.54 0.78 0.84 1.11 
2001 0.60 0.50 0.75 0.76 1.06 
2002 0.61 0.49 0.71 0.72 1.15 
2003 0.64 0.51 0.72 0.67 1.35 
2004 0.65 0.51 0.73 0.71 1.35 
2005 0.61 0.48 0.68 0.75 1.25 








                                                 
22 The charts are attached in the Appendix 1 &2.  




Table 3.5  Disparities across provinces in selected categories  









1998 0.26 0.24 0.28 0.35 0.43 
1999 0.26 0.23 0.29 0.40 0.41 
2000 0.27 0.24 0.32 0.38 0.40 
2001 0.25 0.22 0.29 0.33 0.40 
2002 0.25 0.21 0.29 0.34 0.40 
2003 0.26 0.22 0.29 0.32 0.43 
2004 0.25 0.22 0.29 0.34 0.41 
2005 0.23 0.20 0.26 0.36 0.39 
Source: Author’s calculation, using data from China Statistical Yearbooks 1999 - 2006. 
 
The disparities of spending for major expenditure categories differ considerably. As 
shown in the tables, public financing of education enjoyed the lowest fiscal inequality 
across provinces, less than the overall expenditure, thanks to the traditional culture of 
respecting and emphasizing education. When it comes to the trend in fiscal inequality, 
public financing of education and health care generally matches the fluctuation of overall 
expenditure. This is a steady trend between 1998 and 2005.  
 
Attention needs to be drawn to the equity of public financing in social security, an issue 
highly debated in recent years. Expenditure on social security appears to be going against 
the general trend, with inequality having continuously declined in the period 1999-2003 




but headed up again since 2003. All the other expenditure items have seen a declining 
trend in inequality since 2003. With the exception of social security expenditure, the 
other expenditure inequality was lower in 2005 than in 1998. 
 
There is also marked inequality of capital construction per capita across provinces. The 
capital investment in a few eastern provinces is particularly high. The western provinces 
have experienced increased earmarked central government direct spending as well as 
government bond financing of infrastructure projects under the Western Development 
Program. In contrast, central regions have very low infrastructure spending (OECD 2006). 
As a result, disparities in per capital physical investment are significant.  
 
Figure 3.5 reports the decomposition results by the four expenditure categories. Clearly, 
within-region inequality contributes more than between-region inequality, particularly in 
social security expenditure and capital construction spending. Interestingly, almost all the 
inequality of social security financing comes from within-region, as between-region 
inequality is close to zero for the entire period. Among the four categories of public 
expenditure, only inequality of education financing is split almost fifty-fifty between the 















Figure 3. 5 Provincial Fiscal Inequality Decomposition, 1998-2005 
 
  
Source: Source: Author’s calculation, based on data from China Statistical Yearbooks 1999-2006. 
 
 
3.4.2 Prefectural Fiscal Inequality 
 
Prefectural fiscal inequality, sometimes called ‘sub-provincial’, has attracted more 
attention in recent years, as many scholars believe it is deteriorating along with widening 
income inequality. This section focuses exclusively on prefectural fiscal disparity and 
uses aggregate sub-provincial data to gauge the horizontal fiscal gap between about 300 


































































A snapshot of prefectural per capita expenditure in 2004 is provided in Figure 3.6. The 
comparatively lower-spending prefectural governments are concentrated in the middle 
region instead of the poorer western region. The lowest per capita prefectural spending 
occurred in Anhui and Henan. Contrary to my expectations, a few poor western provinces 
enjoyed high per capita spending (highlighted in blue). For example, Xinjiang spent more 
than 2000 yuan per capita, a similar level of spending to Guangdong and Zhejiang.  
 
Figure 3. 6 Sub-provincial (Prefecture) Per Capita Expenditure Disparities (2004) 
 
 
Notes: Four metropolitan cities, Beijing, Tianjing, Shanghai, and Chongqing, are not counted because they 
are considered as provincial jurisdictions in China. Tibet is not included due to data availability.  
Source: Author’s Calculation based on data from China Statistical Yearbook 2005. 




Table 3.6 summarizes some basic indicators across prefecture-level jurisdictions during 
the period 1994-2004. Compared to the similar table at provincial level (Table 3.3), the 
maximum-to-minimum rate of per capita expenditure is remarkably higher at the 
prefectural level. The provincial MMR is about eight to nine, while the prefectural MMR 
goes as low as about 36 and up to more than 90. If we look at the dispersion from the 
mean per capita expenditure, the coefficient of variation at the prefectural level is 
significantly larger than at the provincial level. For instance, in 2004, the sub-provincial 
CV is 1.04 while the provincial CV is 0.61. Since the mean changes dramatically over the 
years, the Gini coefficient is in this case a better indicator for measuring inequality. The 
prefectural Gini is also much larger than the provincial Gini (0.34 vs. 0.25 in 2004). 
Therefore, according to the statistics of more than 300 prefectural units, sub-provincial 
fiscal inequality is more severe than provincial level fiscal inequality.  
 
What about the trend in prefectural fiscal inequality? Has it escalated, as many scholars 
allege? Given the Gini coefficient from 1994 to 2004 shown in Table 3.6, it is easy to 
find out. The answer is ‘NO’. Prefectural fiscal inequality remained surprisingly stable 
over this eleven-year period, with only a slight increase from 0.32 in 1994 to 0.34 in 2004. 
One can argue that despite the changes going on in the fiscal system, the impact of 
policies on the distribution of public expenditure at the prefectural level is negligible. 
However, the period was one of rapid economic development and widening income 
inequality at all levels of jurisdiction, and thus the opposite argument also makes sense: 
maintaining the fiscal inequality at a level almost the same as a decade previously reflects 
the government’s effort to balance the distribution of public spending across the country. 




The next chapter will shed light on this issue by analyzing the key policy instrument – the 
intergovernmental transfer system.  
 
 
Table 3. 6 Prefectural Disparity of Per Capita Expenditure (1994-2004) 
Unit: yuan 
Year Mean Maximum Minimum MMR CV G 
1994 243.99 5922.07 73.60 80.46 1.03 0.32 
1995 294.77 2830.43 75.90 37.29 0.86 0.32 
1996 350.70 10301.31 109.40 94.16 1.18 0.31 
1997 376.49 4186.73 94.74 44.19 0.87 0.31 
1998 440.24 5276.76 144.89 36.42 0.91 0.32 
1999 500.39 6295.46 165.01 38.15 0.96 0.33 
2000 567.74 13556.87 178.07 76.13 1.14 0.34 
2001 700.56 13788.15 222.37 62.01 1.05 0.34 
2002 821.24 22070.71 265.75 83.05 1.19 0.34 
2003 938.72 23120.16 300.50 76.94 1.14 0.34 
2004 1114.24 22865.14 344.51 66.37 1.04 0.34 
Source: Author’s calculation based on data from Statistical Material for Prefectures, Cities, and Counties 
Nationwide 1995 - 2005. 
 
 
 Besides the trend in prefectural fiscal inequality, it is also useful to find out 
whether fiscal inequality originates primarily between provinces or within provinces. If 
between-province inequality is the key factor, fiscal programs, particularly transfers, at 
the central level are worth more attention. However, if within-province inequality makes 
the major contribution to overall inequality, the provincial government rather than the 
central government is to blame, and thus provincial governments need to pay more 




attention to fiscal resource distribution. To address this problem, it was necessary to 
calculate and decompose the Theil index.  
 The Theil index is decomposed into between-province and within-province 
inequality, and the results are reported in Figure 3.7. Within-province inequality was 
almost the same as between-province inequality in the initial year of 1994 – in other 
words, the two categories contributed half-and-half to overall fiscal inequality. Over the 
years, between-province inequality remains almost the same. The slight increase in 
prefectural inequality comes from the within-province divergence. In 2004, the within-
province inequality contributes more than 60 percent of the total inequality. Comparing 
2004 with 1994, the within-province Theil index increases about 40 percent, but the 
between-province inequality falls more than 10 percent.  
 
Figure 3.7 Prefectural Fiscal Inequality Decomposition (1994-2004) 
 
Note: WJ means within-jurisdiction (province); and BJ stands for between-jurisdiction (province).  
Source: Source: Author’s calculation based on data from Statistical Material for Prefectures, Cities, and 
Counties Nationwide 1995 - 2005. 
In conclusion, at the prefectural level, there are three major findings: first, I am 
























level; second, contrary to the popular allegation that sub-provincial fiscal inequality 
increased, my calculation proves that it remained relatively stable over the period 1994-
2004; and third, prefectural fiscal inequality came mostly from within-province 
divergence and therefore each provincial government should pay close attention to the 
distribution of fiscal resources at the level immediately subordinate to them.   
 
 
3.4.3 County-Level Fiscal Inequality 
 
There are more than 2000 counties in China. It is more meaningful to look at county-level 
fiscal inequality by province. Figure 3.8 presents the divergence of county-level per 
capita expenditure across provinces in 2004. As with the provincial and prefectural levels, 
the lowest county per capita expenditure resides in Anhui and Henan. Compared to the 
prefectural level, it is more apparent at the county level that some poor western provinces 
bear a relatively high per capita expenditure. For example, Inner Mongolia, Qinghai, and 
Tibet compete with Zhejiang, spending more than 1000 yuan per capita. Xingjiang, 
Yunnan, Ningxia, and Shanxi spend more than 800 yuan per capita, an expenditure 
similar to that of Jiangsu province. The unfortunate segment of low-spending counties is 









Figure 3. 8 County Per Capita Expenditure Disparities (2004) 
 
Notes: Four metropolitan cities, Beijing, Tianjing, Shanghai, and Chongqing, are not included.  
Source: Source: Author’s calculation based on data from Statistical Material for Prefectures, Cities, and 
Counties Nationwide 2005. 
 
In addition to the level of per capita spending, what about the distribution of county-level 
fiscal resources by province? Figure 3.9 provides a ranking of county-level Gini 
coefficients by province in 2004. The four metropolitan cities – Beijing, Tianjing, 
Shanghai, and Chongqing – are not included in the figure. The province of Jiangsu, one 
of the richest regions, stands out with its highest county-level fiscal inequality (Gini 
coefficient 0.46). The level of inequality is higher than the overall provincial or 
prefectural fiscal inequality in 2004 (0.25 and 0.34 respectively). In contrast, Guizhou, 
one of the poorest provinces, ranks lowest by measure of the Gini coefficient (0.12). 
Except for Jiangsu, all provinces had a lower county-level fiscal inequality than the 
overall prefectural fiscal inequality in 2004. Most provinces even had a lower county-




level fiscal inequality than the overall provincial fiscal inequality in the same year. So, at 
least for 2004, the evidence goes against the common allegation that county-level fiscal 
inequality is much worse than fiscal inequality at the provincial level.  
 
Figure 3.9 County-Level Fiscal Inequality by Province (2004) 
 
     Overall Provincial    Overall Prefectural 
     Fiscal Inequality        Fiscal Inequality   
            
     
Notes: Four large metropolitan areas (Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, and Chongqing) are excluded.  
Source: Source: Author’s calculation based on data from Statistical Material for Prefectures, Cities, and 
Counties Nationwide 2005. 
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 Taking Jiangsu, Yunnan, and Guizhou as representatives, we are able to take a 
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has 52 counties, Yunnan 116, and Guizhou 75 county-level jurisdictions. Comparing 
maximum-to-minimum ratios at different levels of jurisdiction, the county-level ratio is 
considerably lower than the overall prefectural ratio (66.37 in 2004), compared to the 
most unequally distributed province of Jiangsu,23 which has a county-level MMR of 14.5. 
Yunnan’s county-level MMR24 (8.43) was close to the overall provincial MMR (8.76) in 
2004, while Guizhou’s county-level MMR25 (3.18) was much lower. If we compare the 
distribution of fiscal resources at the county level using the Gini coefficient, Jiangsu’s 
Gini (0.46) was higher than the overall provincial Gini (0.25 in 2004) and the overall 
prefectural Gini (0.34 in 2004). But Yunnan and Guizhou had a much lower Gini, both 
less than the provincial Gini in 2004.  
 





Mean Maximum Minimum MMR G 
Jiangsu 52 922.00 5171.70 356.71 14.50 0.46 
Yunnan 116 806.44 2870.71 340.66 8.43 0.2 
Guizhou 75 535.02 1114.02 350.32 3.18 0.12 
Source: Source: Author’s calculation based on data from Statistical Material for Prefectures, Cities, and 
Counties Nationwide 2005. 
 
 
                                                 
23 Among 52 counties in Jiangsu, the county with the highest per capita expenditure is Kunshan, located in 
the city of Suzhou, while the lowest spending county is Guanyun County belonging to the city of 
Lanyungang. Kunshan is adjacent to Shanghai, and therefore is becoming a major manufacturing base for 
Shanghai.  
24 Yunnan has the highest county-level spending 2870.71 yuan per capita in Anning City, Kunming, and the 
lowest 806.44 yuan in Zhenxiong County, Zhaotong.  
25 In Guizhou, the highest 1114.02 yuan per capita in Yuping County, Tongren, verses the lowest 535.02 
yuan in Dafang County, Bijie. 




The above analysis finds that county-level fiscal inequality is similar to that at the 
provincial level and far below the prefectural level’s. The next question is, ‘What is the 
trend of fiscal inequality at the county level?’ Table 3.8 depicts the trend from 1994 to 
2004 by comparing county-level fiscal inequality with the provincial and prefectural 
levels. The pattern is quite flat, with no sign of the deterioration that many scholars claim 
exists. Comparing 1994 and 2004, the Gini coefficient remains at 0.27. It seems that the 
fiscal reforms since 1994 have not had much impact on the overall fiscal disparities at the 
county level.  
 
Table 3.8 County-Level Fiscal Inequality (1994 – 2004) 
 
Year 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
CV 0.602 0.592 0.553 0.575 0.574 0.565 0.564 0.673 0.555 0.583 0.631 
Gini 0.268 0.265 0.251 0.252 0.261 0.255 0.262 0.316 0.253 0.258 0.274 
Theil 0.117 0.120 0.101 0.104 0.118 0.104 0.115 0.166 0.107 0.108 0.123 
Source: Author’s calculation based on data from Statistical Material for Prefectures, Cities, and Counties 
Nationwide 1995 - 2005. 
 
 
 Over the eleven-year period of dramatic economic growth, did some provinces 
also succeed in bringing down fiscal inequality? Table 3.9 compares the county-level 
Gini coefficient in 1994 and 2004 by province. Jiangxi reduced the county-level Gini 
coefficient almost 50 percent, followed by Hubei 34 on percent and Guangdong on 31 
percent. The most remarkable jump in fiscal inequality resides in three relatively affluent 




provinces – Jiangsu increased by 117 percent, Liaoning by 76 percent, and Shandong by 
72 percent. Tibet had the same county-level Gini coefficient in both 1994 and 200426.  
 
Table 3.9 County-Level Gini Coefficient by Province: 1994 vs. 2004 
Province 1994 2004  percent Change 
Jiangxi 0.2439 0.122 -49.98 percent 
Hubei 0.1855 0.1225 -33.96 percent 
Guangdong 0.3184 0.2189 -31.25 percent 
Yunnan 0.2787 0.2035 -26.98 percent 
Heilongjiang 0.1931 0.1453 -24.75 percent 
Hunan 0.1999 0.1615 -19.21 percent 
Henan 0.2239 0.181 -19.16 percent 
Gansu 0.2268 0.1954 -13.84 percent 
Guizhou 0.1352 0.1212 -10.36 percent 
Qinghai 0.2504 0.2355 -5.95 percent 
Xinjiang 0.214 0.2039 -4.72 percent 
Fujian 0.2035 0.2032 -0.15 percent 
    
Tibet 0.2074 0.2074 0.00 percent 
    
Anhui 0.1991 0.2001 0.50 percent 
Ningxia 0.1507 0.1521 0.93 percent 
Jilin 0.199 0.2075 4.27 percent 
Shanxi 0.1624 0.1721 5.97 percent 
Inner Mongolia 0.2681 0.2848 6.23 percent 
Sichuan 0.2434 0.2671 9.74 percent 
Zhejiang 0.1437 0.1838 27.91 percent 
Shaanxi 0.2144 0.2767 29.06 percent 
Guangxi 0.1698 0.221 30.15 percent 
Hebei 0.1497 0.1965 31.26 percent 
Shandong 0.1594 0.2748 72.40 percent 
Liaoning 0.1523 0.268 75.97 percent 
Jiangsu 0.2111 0.4572 116.58 percent 
Source: Source: Author’s calculation based on data from Statistical Material for Prefectures, Cities, and 
Counties Nationwide 1995 and 2005. 
 
It is also important to examine whether county-level fiscal inequality comes 
mostly from between provinces or within provinces. The Theil index is decomposed into 
between-province and within-province inequality, and the results are reported in Figure 
                                                 
26 See Appendix 4 for a comparison of county level fiscal inequality (Theil index) by province in 2002.  




3.10. Apparently, within-province inequality makes the major contribution to the overall 
inequality. In 2004, within-province county-level inequality contributed about two-thirds 
of the total inequality. Comparing 2004 with 1994, the within-province Theil index 
increased about 17 percent, but the between-province county-level inequality measured 
by the Theil index fell more than 10 percent. Therefore, in order to bring down fiscal 
inequality at the county level, provincial governments need to put more effort into 
equalizing the distribution of fiscal resources across counties within each provincial 
boundary.  
 
Figure 3.10 County Fiscal Inequality Decomposition (1994-2005) 
 
Note: WJ means within-jurisdiction (province); and BJ stands for between-jurisdiction (province).  
Source: Source: Author’s calculation based on data from Statistical Material for Prefectures, Cities, and 


























3.5 The Factors Contributing to Fiscal Inequality 
 
The significant spending disparities across provinces can be attributed to variations in 
revenues arising from differences in incomes. OECD (2006) indicated that China’s tax 
yields tend to be more unequally distributed than income. Using data from 1995-2004, 
the report found that a small increase in income disparities led to a more marked rise in 
revenue disparities. Furthermore, per capita expenditure and per capita income presented 
a positive relationship (see Figure 3.11), with the inequality of spending even larger than 
inequality in income. The rising disparities in income are mainly caused by China’s 
market reform and the coastal strategy which has given favorable policies to more 
advanced coastal regions (World Bank 2002). The inequality of fiscal spending and the 
inequality of per capita income tend to reinforce each other. On one hand, the inequality 
of public expenditure is mainly caused by unbalanced economic growth across regions; 
and on the other hand, without proper policy intervention, the disparity of government 
spending may aggravate income inequality as essential public services are not provided 
adequately in the disadvantaged localities. However, according to the regression analysis 
by Zhao and Ou (2008), per capita GDP did not have statistically significant effect on per 
capita expenditure, which indicated that public spending might be more susceptible to 
other factors27.  
 
 
                                                 
27 In effort to figure out to what extent, the fiscal disparities are attributed to socio-economic factors, Zhao 
and Ou (2008) experimented different functional forms of regression using per capita expenditure and per 
capita revenue as dependent variables, and chose double-log specification which presented the best 
statistical fit. The details of their methodology are attached in the Appendix 5. 




Figure 3.11 Relation of Per Capita Expenditure and Per Capita GDP at the   




Source: OECD (2006). 
  
China’s large and persistent fiscal inequality is not only associated with unbalanced 
regional development, but also related to the present inter-governmental fiscal system 
which pushing down spending responsibilities without providing adequate financial 
resources. As reviewed in Chapter 2, fiscal decentralization is believed to facilitate more 




effective and efficient provision of public services, but meanwhile it may cause greater 
inequality among regions. This is exactly observed in China. Fiscal inequality is 
widening over some years and then persistent in recent after-1994 period. Moreover, the 
issue is particularly of great concern due to the key problem of the large gap between 
expenditure and revenue assignments at the local level. The financing and delivery of 
most core public services are devolved to municipalities and counties that vary 
remarkably across country in terms of their financial capacity. There is no mechanism to 
ensure national minimum standards of vital public services including education and 
health care. As a result, governments in poor regions are delivering fewer and lower 
quality services and passing along a higher proportion of the costs to their constituents, in 
most cases, farmers (World Bank 2003). Whether the current system of 
intergovernmental transfers is designed to support more equitable services provision will 
be examined thoroughly in the next chapter.  
 
Another significant factor may be the population density. With other things being equal, 
lower population density tends to bring up average costs of public services delivery. In an 
extreme example of remote mountain regions, class size may be smaller; certain public 
facilities may not be used in full capacity; or a premium has to be paid to attract teachers, 
doctors, and administrative staff. Zhao and Ou (2008) confirmed this estimation. They 
found that population density had a strong negative effect on per capita expenditure.  
 
China’s fiscal inequality may be also related to the center’s special treatment for 
minority regions. For instance, Wang (2001) suggested that provinces with 




predominantly non-Han population had received the highest levels of subsidies even 
though their income levels surpassed those of the poorer provinces. This explains why 
those poor provinces, such as Tibet, Xinjiang, and Qinghai, have low per capita revenue 
but comparatively high per capita expenditure, which indicates sizable central transfers 
are received in these provinces.  Therefore, the most financially deprived were those poor 
provinces that were largely Han, the majority ethnic group, populated areas. However, 
the regression model designed by Zhao and Ou (2008) did not approve this speculation. 
They found although minority autonomous areas had lower per capita revenue but 
relatively higher per capita expenditure, the effects were not statistically significant.  
 
Persistent fiscal inequalities may just reflect China’s authorities’ emphasis on revenue 
mobilization. As described in the first chapter, the central government has always been 
concerned with its revenue capacity measured by the “two ratios” – ratio of total 
government revenue to GDP and ratio of central government revenue to the total. As the 
central policymakers are faced with more challenges in coping with the troublesome 
health care system, the collapsing social safety nets, the inequality of public services 
provision, the marginalized rural population, and so on so forth, a sufficient supply of 
fiscal resources is essential to undertake any of those challenges, which also explains why 
the central government has taken grip on the few most lucrative taxes including VAT, 
corporate income tax, and personal income tax. In the meantime, despite the center’s 
effective propaganda in promoting the message of building a harmonious society, the 
government still maintains the most un-equalizing fiscal transfer program of tax rebate 
which literally rewards rich provinces for their contribution of large revenue collection.   




3.6 Does Fiscal Inequality Matter?  
 
Fiscal inequality matters in a country if it results in large disparities in service delivery 
and outcomes. This is the case in China. The persistence of large fiscal inequality is a 
major cause of concern because poor jurisdictions are spending so little that the most 
basic public services such as education and health care are provided at remarkably 
insufficient levels. Although none of China’s provinces is still categorized as “low 
development” according to the United Nations Human Development Index (HDI), HDI 
indicators vary substantially across regions.  The poorer, predominantly rural provinces, 
such as Gansu, Guizhou, Tibet, Qinghai, and Yunnan, have HDI 0.59-0.67 similar to 
Vietnam and Indonesia (with HDI 0.68), while more urbanized provinces, such as Beijing, 
Guangdong, Jiangsu, Shanghai, Tianjin and Zhejiang, have HDI 0.80-0.89, similar to the 
levels in Hong Kong, Korea, and Singapore (with HDI about 0.88). The reenrollment 
rates in junior secondary education arrange from 49 percent in Tibet, to about 60-70 
percent in Guangxi, Guizhou, Hainan, Heilongjiang, Ningxia, Yunnan and Qinghai, to 
about 99 percent in Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin and Zhejiang. The enrollment rates in 
senior secondary education vary from less than 30 percent in Anhui, Henan, Inner 
Mongolia and Yunnan, to 96 percent in Beijing. The completion rate of nine-year 
compulsory education was 70 percent in poorer provinces in contrast to 100 percent in 
East China (World Bank 2003). There is also vast inequality in education between rural 
and urban areas (Figure 3.12). The average length of schooling is about 7 years in rural 
areas, compared to urban over 10 years and town above 9 years. Few rural students have 




the chance to complete junior college or above (0.71 percent) while about 14 percent 
urban students can do that (World Bank 2007a).  
 
Figure 3.12 Inequality in Educational Attainment: Urban, Town, and Rural Areas
Source: World Bank (2007a).  
 
As for health indicators, life expectancy at birth arranges from about 65 years in Guizhou, 
Tibet and Yunnan, to 76-79 years in Beijing, Jiangsu, Shanghai and Tianjin. Infant 
mortality rates are three times higher in rural compared to urban areas (World Bank 
2003). Currently, China’s health insurance participation is low which means most people 
pay directly out-of-pocket for health services. People with low income in poorer regions 
are less likely to have health insurance, and therefore are more vulnerable to 
impoverishment due to ill health. Figure 3.13 demonstrates that in Guangdong province, 



















Figure 3.13 Where Need is Greater, Resources are Less 
 
 
Source: World Bank (2011).  
 
People’s unequal access to education and health care is important aspect of poverty and 
inequality in their experience. Comparatively low educational attainment and poorer 
health among children in underdeveloped regions may ultimately pose a major 
impediment to local economic development, leading to even larger spatial inequality in 
future28. Equal access to health care is also crucial to reduce inequality. Many of the poor 
are driven into poverty by illness which in turn hinders people from obtaining 
opportunities for greater income and wealth. It is very likely that today’s unequal access 
to education and health care will be materialized into inequality in income tomorrow 
(World Bank 2011).  
 
To assess whether there is a significant relation between fiscal inequality and disparities 
in service delivery, Hofman and Guerra (2005) conducted regression analysis using three 
                                                 
28 See Appendix 6 for information about evolution of China’s income inequality from 1980s to 2004. 




indicators of provincial level service outcomes, persons per hospital bed, life expectancy, 
literacy rates, and combined student enrollment for primary, secondary, and tertiary 
schools for the period 1994-2002. They found except life expectancy, the rest three 
service outcome indicators had a significant correlation with sub-national expenditures 
across time, suggesting that persistent fiscal inequalities do matter.  
 
It is important to note that although public spending is critical to improve health and 
education outcomes, there exist many reasons why increased public services spending 
does not ensure better services or better outcomes. Allocative efficiency (where money 
goes to, personnel expenses or infrastructure or poor households) and administrative 
effectiveness are key factors determining whether more funding would lead to better 
service outcomes. For example, both Thailand and Peru increased government spending 
on primary schooling, but school completion rates fell in Thailand while rose in Peru 
(World Bank 2004).  
 
3.7 Conclusion and Policy Implications 
 
The empirical findings in this chapter provide a basis for assessing the distribution of 
fiscal resources at three levels of sub-national government – provincial, prefectural, and 
county – after the 1994 tax sharing reform. Fiscal inequality has become a major cause of 
concern in China because it undermines government’s ability to provide core public 
services at relatively equitable, socially acceptable standards. It also prevents poor 




regions and jurisdictions from delivering sufficient basic services, such as compulsory 
education, public health care, water and sanitation. In the long run, fiscal inequality has 
serious implications for China’s capacity to sustain its remarkable economic performance. 
If fiscal inequality is not contained, it might well be detrimental to social and political 
stability. 
 
Consistent with the common perception, fiscal inequality at provincial, prefectural, and 
county levels remains large, and that there is no evidence of a sustained reduction in 
fiscal disparities after the 1994 tax sharing reform. Importantly, fiscal inequality at the 
prefectural level is remarkably higher. But county-level fiscal inequality is not 
significantly high, as expected; instead, it is similar to provincial-level fiscal inequality. 
This finding reinforces the importance of sub-provincial fiscal reform. As mentioned in 
the introduction, China has a five-tier hierarchy, with each tier of government responsible 
for fiscal arrangements with its subordinate governments. Therefore, the severe fiscal 
inequality at the prefectural level requires immediate policy attention from provincial 
governments. The central government can provide appropriate policy guidance to the 
provinces in coping with the vast fiscal disparities at the sub-provincial level. 
 
It is worth mentioning that the measurement of provincial fiscal inequality using the Gini 
coefficient and the Theil index may be smaller than its true value. In Figure 3.1, the curve 
Lorenz (A) is continuous and smooth when the number of observations (N) is sufficiently 
large. But if the N is small (N = 31 at the provincial level), the curve becomes a broken 
line (A’). Since Lorenz curve is always convex, the broken line A’ is located above the 




smooth line (A). Thus, a small N leads to a small value of Gini coefficient29. In general, 
Theil index and Gini index move in same direction. The comparison of fiscal inequality 
at the three levels of government is likely to be affected by this N factor.  
 
Another important finding is that the comparatively lower-spending governments at all 
three levels are concentrated in the middle region rather than the western areas. Chinese 
policymakers always think in terms of the tripartite partition of China into eastern, central 
and western regions. Less attention seems to be paid to the central region, which makes it 
more difficult for them to catch up with wealthier provinces. Various fiscal subsidies 
have been introduced to target the western provinces in the late 1990s. The establishment 
of the ‘go-west’ campaign in 1999 added more impetus to the pro-west initiative by 
shifting more fiscal transfers to the west. Many jurisdictions in the central and eastern 
provinces do not qualify for these transfers, simply because of their administrative labels. 
For example, in 2004, all three levels of government in Anhui and Henan, both central 
provinces, had the lowest per capita public expenditure. A few poor western provinces 
enjoyed high per capita public spending – for instance, Tibet, at the sub-national level, 
ranked in the same tier as Beijing. Xinjiang at the prefectural level spent more than 2000 
yuan per capita in 2004, about the same as Guangdong. At the county level, Inner 
Mongolia, Qinghai, and Tibet spent at a similar level to Zhejiang, with more than 1000 
yuan per capita.  
 
                                                 
29 In my experience, if N is greater than 150, its impact on the Gini coefficient and the Theil index is trivial 
and could be negligible. At the prefectural level, N>300 and at the county level N>2000, the measurement 
of fiscal inequality is relatively more accurate.  




Furthermore, the results from inequality decomposition indicate that the fiscal disparities 
within each region are large. At the provincial level, within-region inequality is about 
twice the between-region inequality – in other words, more than two-thirds of inequality 
comes from within a region, suggesting that the fiscal capacities of jurisdictions within 
each of these regions are very different and that the current policy with primary emphasis 
on balancing between-region disparities needs to be reevaluated.  
 
The findings suggest not only that the policy effort should be shifted from between-
region to within-region, but also that it should be shifted from the central government to 
sub-provincial public finance. As shown in the Theil index decomposition results, at the 
prefectural level over the period 1994-2004, within-province fiscal inequality increased 
by about 40 percent, while between-province inequality fell by more than 10 percent. At 
the county level over the period 1994-2004, within-province inequality increased by 
about 17 percent, while between-province inequality fell by more than 10 percent.  
 
One salient feature of these findings is the steady trend in fiscal inequality at all three 
levels of government in the post 1994 period up until 2004. This finding contradicts the 
mainstream allegation that fiscal inequality is widening along with the increasing income 
inequality flowing from unbalanced economic development across the country. At the 
same time, the steady trend also suggests that the fiscal reform of 1994 has not delivered 
the original intention of using centralized revenues to reduce fiscal disparities, even 
though the current fiscal system managed to maintain the prefectural and county fiscal 
inequality in 2004 at a level similar to that of a decade before.  





China’s large and persistent fiscal inequality at provincial, prefectural, and county levels 
of government may be attributed to the following reasons. First, significant spending 
disparities are related to variations in regional revenue collection arising from differences 
in incomes. Second, the stark fiscal inequality is partly caused by the current 
arrangements of inter-governmental fiscal system which pushing down spending 
responsibilities without providing adequate financial resources. Another significant factor 
may be the population density which affects the costs of public services provision. 
Moreover, from the political perspective, the issue of wide fiscal disparities is closely 
associated with Chinese authorities’ generous financing towards minority regions which 
are not necessarily in the poor needy areas. Lastly, persistent fiscal inequality may just 
reflect China’s emphasis on revenue mobilization.  
 
Fiscal inequality matters if it leads to large disparities in service delivery and outcomes. 
People’s unequal access to basic public services, such as education and health care, is 
regarded as an important aspect of poverty and inequality in their experience. This is the 
case in China. There is profound and accumulating evidence showing that educational 
attainment and health care services are unequally provided in certain backward areas in 
the country. Those disadvantaged governments are spending so little that the most basic 
public services are provided at remarkably insufficient levels. The outcomes, measured 
by human development indicators, are differing substantially across the country, leaving 
those with less and lower quality of education and/or poorer health today translated into 
tomorrow’s even widening inequality of living standards/income.  





In order to reduce fiscal disparities, intergovernmental fiscal transfers serve as key policy 
instrument for the government. The next chapter will make an in-depth investigation of 
China’s intergovernmental transfer system and assess its effectiveness in addressing the 
























Figure 1  Comparison of Provincial Fiscal Inequality across Expenditure Items  
      Coefficient of Variation  
                 (1998-2005) 
 
 












































Figure 2  Comparison of Provincial Fiscal Inequality across Expenditure Items  
      Gini Coefficient  
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Table 2 Fiscal Disparities in Selected East Asian Countries 
                 (US$, latest available years) 
 
Provincial-level Revenues before Grants, per capita 
 
 




Note: The coefficients of variation for China are much larger than the calculation presented by 
the author, which may be partly due to different data source.  












Figure 3 County-Level Fiscal Inequality by Province (2002) 






















After experimenting with different functional forms (including linear, semilog, and 
double-log), we adopt the following double-log specification, which in general has the 






The dependent variable, Y, is either PCEXP or PCREV. PCGDP is per capita GDP. 
PRIME is the Primary Ratio, the percentage of GDP that is contributed by the prime 
industry, a measure of urban-rural dichotomy in production. MINOR refers to Minority 
Autonomous Areas. MUNICP refers to Municipalities. CENTRAL and WEST refer to 
provinces in the central or west region, respectively. Summary statistics of these variables 
in 2006 are provided in the following table. 
 
 




Note: * significant at 10 percent level; ** significant at 5 percent level; *** significant at 1 percent level. 
 






Figure 2 Income Inequality in China Relative to Selected Countries, 1981–2003 
 
 
Note: Income (inc) and consumption (con) by the country name refer to the basis for calculating the Gini 
coefficients from household survey information. 
Source: Bourguignon (2008).  
 
Income inequality in China has rising sharply by international standards. It was 
comparable to the most egalitarian countries in Northern Europe in the early 1990s. In 
2004, China’s inequality was higher than in the least egalitarian developed country (the 
United States) and reached the level similar to the world’s most unequal countries, in 









Chapter 4:  
Evaluating Fiscal Transfer System at Provincial and County 
Levels 
 
4.1 Introduction  
 
As analyzed in Chapter 2 on the issue of large vertical fiscal gap, China’s fiscal system 
relies heavily on the intergovernmental transfer system to rebalance the mismatching 
between revenue resources and spending needs at each level of sub-national governments. 
Furthermore, the large and persistent horizontal fiscal disparities in the course of China’s 
swift economic advancement (examined thoroughly in Chapter 3) also require the 
transfer system to play an important role in dampening fiscal inequality and promoting 
people’s equal access to public services across the country.  
 
Sub-national governments are highly dependent on fiscal transfers from upper-level 
government. In 2004, central fiscal transfers accounted for about half of fiscal resources 
at the provincial level, and made up more than half of total revenues at the county level. 
Therefore, how transfers are allocated has a great impact on the distribution of fiscal 
resources. 
 
The existing literature is divided between research focusing exclusively on the provincial 
level and research that focuses solely on the county level.30 Conclusions drawing upon 
only one level of government tend to be biased. This chapter aims to fill this gap by 
                                                 
30 Literature review is included in section 4.3.  




drawing on fiscal data from the post-1994 period to conduct a comprehensive evaluation 
of the redistributive effects of intergovernmental transfers in China, at both provincial 
and county levels. It would be of interest to examine how fiscal transfers have different 
impact on the redistribution of fiscal resources at the provincial and county levels.  
 
The chapter also aims to resolve the controversy in the literature regarding the 
redistributive effects of the fiscal transfers across provincial units. One possible 
explanation for the conflicting findings is that as the intergovernmental fiscal transfer 
system continues to adjust and evolve -- reflecting the shift of the country’s political 
agenda as well as new issues brought up by ongoing market reform -- studies focusing on 
different period of time may generate inconsistent observation and analytical results. But 
even for the same period of time, the existing literature reaches no consensus as to 
whether the fiscal transfer system is equalizing or not. This is what the chapter intends to 
work on, resolving the confusion and updating the assessment of the equalization effects 
of fiscal transfers to the most recent period at both provincial and county levels of 
government.  
 
In an effort to conduct systematic analysis of the redistributive impact of fiscal transfers, 
this chapter employs two sets of methodology. One is conventionally used in the 
literature by comparing the change in fiscal inequality indices (e.g. the Coefficient of 
Variation or Gini index) before and after transfers. The application of the conventional 
method helps to ensure intertemporal comparability of results with the existing literature. 
The other is decomposition method recently introduced to the study of fiscal disparities.  





The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. The next section provides an institutional 
analysis of current system of fiscal transfers. Section 4.3 specifies methodology and 
examines empirical findings of the equalization impact of the intergovernmental transfer 
system. The conclusion and policy implications are discussed in Section 4.4.  
 
4.2 Current System of Fiscal Transfers: an institutional analysis 
 
As the issue of fiscal inequality grasped central attention in the late 1990s, more 
resources have been poured into the pool of intergovernmental transfers. As Figure 4.1 
shown, the central transfers rose from RMB 328.5 billion in 1998 to 1017.7 billion in 
2004, more than 200 percent increase in seven years31. In 2004, transfers are over 70 
percent of central revenues (6.5 percent of GDP), a share that is one of the highest in the 
world.  
 
Intergovernmental transfers are widely used around the world to provide local 
governments additional resources for a mixture of purposes – to bridge fiscal gap, to 
reduce regional fiscal disparities, to compensate for benefit spillovers, to set national 
minimum standards, to advocate central policy mandate, and to promote stabilization 
(Shah and Shen 2008).32 The fast expansion of China’s transfers system is mostly 
financed by introduction of new transfer types (World Bank 2007a). For instance, 
                                                 
31 See appendix 1 for complete data of total transfers during 1986-2005.  
32 For elaboration of grant purpose and design, see appendix 2.  




“Grants for Increasing Wages of Civil Servants” was introduced in 1999 to help sub-
national governments implement central policy of civil service wage increases; “Grants 
for Rural Tax Reform” was established in 2001 to subsidize county, township and village 
due to their financial loss in the process of downsizing rural fees and taxes; and “Grants 
for Agricultural Tax Reduction” was added in 2003 to further support grassroots 
government to cope with the central mandate of abolishing agricultural taxes levied on 
farmers. A complete list of new transfer programs is provided in Table 4.1.  
 
 
Figure 4.1 Rapid Increasing Fund for Central Transfers  
 
 























Table 4.1 Calendar of Introducing New Transfer Programs 
Year 
Introduced 
New Transfer Programs 
1998 Earmarked grants from state bonds 
1999 Grants for increasing wages of civil servants 
2000 Grants for minority regions 
2001 Grants for rural tax reform 
2002 Tax Rebate on income taxes 
2003 Grants for agricultural tax reduction  
 
In addition to rapid increase of total volume, current transfer system is featured with its 
main reliance on earmarked grants. According to the Chinese official definition of 
“earmarked grants”, in 2004 the central government had RMB 322.3 billion in this 
category, about one-third of the total (see Table 4.2). But if we reclassify the transfer 
types in accordance with the general concept of “general purpose transfer” and “specific 
purpose transfer”, the specific purpose transfers accounted for more than half, but if tax 
rebate is exclude, the percentage goes up to 88 percent. The financial resources injected 
into the transfer system through earmarked grants mainly comes from two channels, one 
is from the Fiscal Stimulus Programs implemented in dealing with financial crisis in 1997, 
and the other source is increased spending on capital construction, mostly for western 
provinces.  
 




Table 4.2 Transfers at Different Administrative Levels 
 Central-Provincial Provincial-Prefecture Provincial/Prefecture-County 
 2004 2003 2003 2003 
 








Transfers (billion yuan) Total Transfers 
(billion 
yuan Total Transfers 
General Purpose Transfers 
Tax Rebate 405 40 percent 342.4 43 percent 166.7 29 percent 126.2 29 percent 
Equalization Transfer 74.5 7 percent 38 5 percent 39.6 7 percent 30.5 7 percent 
Subtotal 479.5 47 percent 380.4 47 percent 206.3 36 percent 156.7 36 percent 
         
Specific Purpose Transfers 
Grants for Increasing 
Wages 91.9 9 percent 89.9 11 percent 79.2 14 percent 68.5 16 percent 
Grants for Rural Tax 
Reform 52.3 5 percent 30.5 4 percent 33 6 percent 33.8 8 percent 
Grants for Minority 
Regions 7.7 1 percent 5.8 1 percent 1.7 0 percent 1.7 0 percent 
Prio-1994 Subsidies 12.6 1 percent 12.4 2 percent 18.2 3 percent 16.5 4 percent 
Earmarked Grants 322.3 32 percent 242.6 30 percent 149.3 26 percent 98.2 23 percent 
Others 51.4 5 percent 43.7 5 percent 84.2 15 percent 54.4 13 percent 
Subtotal 538.2 53 percent 424.9 53 percent 365.6 64 percent 273.1 64 percent 
         
Total 1017.7 100 percent 805.2 100 percent 571.7 100 percent 429.8 100 percent 
 
Source: Authors calculation based on the transfer data from Ministry of Finance, China. 




Another salient feature of current transfer system is that the transfer system appears to be 
funded completely by the central government, with little contribution from intermediate 
levels. There is no official report about the role of provinces, prefectures, and counties in 
financing intergovernmental transfers. But according to the calculation in Table 4.2, in 
2003 the prefecture level receives RMB 571.7 billion, and the county level gets RMB 
429.8 billion. These figures add up to 1,001.5 billion, almost equivalent to the total 
central transfer of 1017.7 billion, which suggests that provinces virtually contribute 
nothing to their subordinate levels of government. This observation is confirmed by 
anecdotal evidence collected from fieldwork studies (World Bank 2007a). This is likely 
due to the fiscal gap faced by provincial governments which are already financially 
stressed to meet their own spending needs. The concern associated with such 
arrangements is that the central transfers may not be used as intended or be subject to 
leakage when going through the multi-tiered hierarchy because the intermediate levels of 
government do not pay and therefore have little ownership in the use of transfers, 
particularly when the center’s policy intention is not fully agreed by provincial 
governments.  
 
In spite of vast territory and marked regional variety, China employs one-style-fits-all 
approach in designing fiscal transfers at all levels of government. As illustrated in Figure 
4.2, transfer composition at provincial, prefecture, and county levels is almost identical, 
with the same mix of transfer programs and similar weight of each grant. The tax rebate 
and the equalization transfer are regulated by the center and calculated by similar 
formulas at sub-national levels (Shah and Shen 2008). Given the size of the country and 




the diversity of local jurisdictions (including financial and administrative capacity), a 
uniform strategy across the board can be hardly justified. As each intermediate level of 
government allocates transfers using the same criteria, such an approach fails to take into 
account the difference among local governments by population size, urban/rural character 
of public services, geographic endowment, local preferences, etc.  
 
Lastly but most importantly, China’s fiscal system demonstrates a clear pattern of 
increasing local dependency on intergovernmental transfers as result of declining local 
share of revenues while being responsible for more public services. In 2003, fiscal 
transfers financed more than half of sub-national expenditures, and close to 60 percent of 
spending at county and township levels (World Bank 2007a). To compare China with 
OECD countries, Figure 4.3 depicts sub-national share of total expenditure relative to 
sub-national share of total revenue. Most OECD countries reside close to the 45 degree 
trendline, which indicates that expenditure decentralization is roughly aligned with 
revenue assignments. A few countries have relatively large sub-national share of 
expenditure responsibilities, such as Denmark, US, and Norway, but not as exceptional as 
China which has 74.1 percent of spending made at sub-national levels where only 47.7 
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It also appears that transfer dependency is higher at lower levels of government. This is 
expected because the vertical fiscal gap intensifies at lower tiers of hierarchy (see 
Chapter 2 for detailed analysis). Table 4.3 compares transfer dependency of provinces 
with that of counties and townships. The average transfer dependency of provinces is 
50.4 percent, with a range of 20.4 percent to 90.9 percent. In contrast for counties and 
townships, the mean transfer dependency is 57.7 percent, with a minimum value of 40.8 
percent in Shandong and a maximum value of 88.5 percent in Tibet.  
 
Figure 4.3 Local Transfer Dependency: China vs. Selected OECD Countries (2005) 
 






































0.0% 10.0% 20.0% 30.0% 40.0% 50.0% 60.0% 70.0% 80.0%


















Table 4.3 Transfer Dependency (2003) 
 
 
Source: World Bank (2007a). 
 
Another characteristic associated with transfer dependency is that provinces vary 
considerably due to their vast difference in revenue and expenditure assignment (see 
Chapter 2 Figure 2.4). As further disaggregating data by all levels of sub-national 
governments and by province (see results in Figure 4.4), it appears that prefectures in 
general are less transfer dependent than provinces. The exceptions are the two wealthiest 
municipalities (Beijing and Shanghai), and two north-eastern provinces (Heilongjiang 
and Liaoning), as well as the coastal province of Zhejiang. This is mainly due to sub-
provincial fiscal arrangements in these provinces. For example, Zhejiang employs the 
model of “province managing county” with counties directly reporting to provinces, 
which makes prefectures lose financial authority over counties and thereby more relying 
on transfers. Transfer dependency of counties appears quite identical to their respective 
province, but generally more dependent on transfers than provinces (consistent with 
Figure 2.3). Townships appear less relying on transfers than their counties, particularly in 
agriculture provinces, such as Hubei, Anhui, Jiangxi, and Henan (OECD 2006), which 
may have changed with more updated data due to grand endeavor of the central 




government to eliminate fees and agriculture-related taxes in effort to relieve farmers’ 
financial burden since 2001.  
 
Figure 4.4 Transfer Dependency at Different Levels by Province (2001) 
  
Source: OECD (2006). 
 
4.3 Assessing Redistributive Impact of Intergovernmental Fiscal Transfers 
 
As examined in the previous section, China’s fiscal transfers have grown rapidly in recent 
years and sub-national governments are heavily dependent upon transfers as they manage 
to make ends meet with large spending needs but limited financial resources. Funding 
more than half of sub-national expenditures, fiscal intergovernmental transfers play a 
critical role in redistribution of fiscal resources and serve as key policy instrument to 
dampen marked inequality of public services provision across the country. As pursuing 
balanced development and building a harmonious society replace the leading single 




objective of economic growth in early 2000s, the role of fiscal transfers in promoting 
regional equalization has been gaining more emphasis and therefore studies of China’s 
transfer system become crucial. Not until recently has the literature started to explore the 
redistributive impact of the transfer system.  
 
A few studies analyze provincial-level fiscal transfers, but they provide mixed results 
regarding the equalization role of intergovernmental fiscal transfers. Some scholars argue 
that the transfer system is equalizing. For instance, Lou (2008) claimed that the 
redistributive efforts became increasingly effective for the period 1994-2005. But he 
compares only the percentage of per capita revenue in national average before and after 
transfers in five wealthiest and five poorest provinces. 33 This makes his approach 
problematic, for such calculations can lead to an exaggerated view of how successful 
transfers are in narrowing provincial fiscal disparities. Using the aggregate data of the 
five poorest provinces without taking the remaining 22 provinces into account leaves it 
unclear, for example, whether the central government has universal treatment to all poor 
regions or whether it has in fact favored certain ethnic-minority provinces. Wang (2001), 
who analyzed the political logic of central transfers in the late 1990s, lent support to the 
suspicion that the central government was favoring ethnic-minority regions. He suggested 
that the concern of central policy-makers for national unity was a very important 
determinant in the transfer system. Wong (2000), studying central-provincial transfers in 
1998, argued that the overall impact of the transfer system was actually counter-
equalizing,  as most transfers were pegged to revenue collection, with more revenue 
                                                 
33 The five wealthiest provinces are Shanghai, Beijing, Tianjing, Zhejiang, and Guangdong. The five 
poorest provinces are Sichuan, Anhui, Gansu, Guizhou, and Tibet.  




being returned to rich regions. She also argued that the equalization transfer program did 
not have much impact due to its underfunded resource pool (amounting to around only 
1.8 percent of all central transfers to provinces). However, her view is not entirely 
compelling since it is based mainly on her analysis of policy intents and her observations 
in a single year.  
 
With improved measurement of fiscal inequality using the Coefficient of Variation or 
Gini index, existing empirical studies also provide conflicting conclusions about whether 
intergovernmental transfers play an equalization role. Bahl (1999) studied fiscal 
inequality over the period 1990-1995 and suggested the fiscal system provided some sort 
of equalization during this period. Jiang and Zhao (2003) found an improvement in 
regional fiscal inequality in 2000 and 2001 that could be attributed to increasing central 
transfers to less developed regions. Based on data in 2002, Hofman and Guerra (2005) 
suggested that provincial-level grant system contributed to equalization because the 
disparity of revenues per capita dropped as a result of intergovernmental grants. In 
contrast, Wong (2002) observed a worsening of the distribution of fiscal resources for the 
period 1993-1998 and argued that the fiscal transfer system failed to equalize. This 
argument is not convincing, however, because in the same period income inequality was 
increasing sharply (Kanbur and Zhang 2005) due to market reform and the coastal 
strategy, which led to widening disparities in revenue collection across provinces (World 
Bank 2002). It might have been the distribution of revenue instead of the allocation of 
central transfers that accentuates the inequality of provincial spending. More compelling 
evidence was provided by Zhao and Ou (2008), who examined the equalization effects of 




fiscal transfers for the period 1978-2006 by decomposing the Gini index of per capita 
provincial expenditure. They found that central transfers did not play an equalization role, 
particularly in the post-1994 period, but further contributed to large shares of fiscal 
dispersion across provinces. Their finding is confirmed by a recent published study, Lin 
(2011), using the data from 31 provinces for the period 1995-2004 by applying random 
effects model34. They found that provinces with a higher level income received more per 
capita transfers, and provinces with a higher growth rate received more per capita 
transfers. The main problem with Lin’s work is that his research only examines the 
overall impact of the central-province transfer system with the assumption that the Tax 
Rebate is growth stimulating and all the rest transfer programs are mainly equity 
promoting. As pointed out in the previous section, the transfer system is expanding 
rapidly mainly owning to the proliferation of earmarked grants since late 1990s. Instead 
of assuming these transfer schemes are equalizing (the name may sound equity promoting 
or policy intention is for equity), it is critical to investigate their real impact.  
 
As for the assessment of the county-level fiscal transfer system, only three studies 
examined its impact on county-level fiscal divergence. For the period 1994-2000, Tsui 
(2005) found that fiscal transfers contributed to large shares of fiscal disparity across 
counties, with only pre-1994 subsidies playing an equalization role in the dispersion of 
county public expenditure. Equalization grants actually increased inequality, although the 
impact was negligible. Tsui’s work is intriguing because his introduction of the 
decomposition method helps to quantify the contribution of fiscal transfers to the 
inequality of local public spending. However, his data only extend up to the year of 2000. 
                                                 
34 See details of Lin’s model in Appendix 3.  




Since then, the transfer system has been undergoing great changes. The size of central 
transfers was more than doubled in 2004 (see Figure 4.1) and quite a few new transfer 
schemes have been established (see Table 4.1). Using more recent data extending up to 
2003, Yin (2008) also found that fiscal transfers widened fiscal disparities, with all major 
transfer schemes contributing to unequal distribution of fiscal resources across county-
level units. In contrast, applying fixed effects model for county level data over the period 
1997-2003, Zhang and Zheng (2011) found that the transfers excluding tax rebate were 
equalizing, but overall impact of the transfer system was pro-rich due to the dominant 
effects of the tax rebate.35 Their work is important because they are able to compile 
county-level data and provide in-depth analysis on the distributive impact of individual 
transfer programs at the county level. However, without comparing this information with 
central-provincial transfer programs in the same period, it is hard to tell whether the 
distributive pattern of fiscal transfers at the county level is attributable to the overall 
structural design of the transfer system or to administrative effectiveness in the allocation 
of transfer funds.  
 
4.3.1 Assessing Intergovernmental Fiscal Transfers: conventional method 
 
In an effort to assess the redistributive impact of fiscal transfers, one commonly used 
method is to compare the change in fiscal inequality indices (e.g. the Coefficient of 
Variation or Gini index) before and after transfers (e.g. Bahl 1999; Hofman and Guerra 
2005; Lou 2008; OECD 2006(OECD 2006)). .  
 
                                                 
35 See Zhang and Zheng’s model in Appendix 3.  






Table 4.4 shows major indicators for per capita expenditure and per capita revenue. The 
maximum to minimum rate (MMR) and the coefficient of variation (CV) of per capita 
revenue are consistently higher than their respective equivalents for per capita 
expenditure during the period 1994-2005. As my data sources and variable definitions 
may be different from Martinez et al. (2008) and Wong (2002), which are the source of 
the data for 1994-97, these results may not be directly comparable. However, the results 
for the period 1998-2005 are comparable as they have consistent data sources and 
definition. In 2005, the MMR of per capita revenue is more than double of the MMR of 
per capita expenditure, 18.37 versus 7.95; and the CV of per capita revenue is 0.96, 
compared to 0.61 on the expenditure side (Table 4.4).  
 
Since the MMR tends to biased by outliers and the CV is dependent on the mean, a better 
inequality measurement of Gini coefficient is also calculated here. Figure 4.5 depicts the 
trend of Gini indices for both per capita revenue and per capita expenditure from 1998 to 
2005. We see that disparities of per capita revenue are significantly higher than those of 
per capita expenditure over all years. In 2005, the Gini coefficient of per capita revenue is 
0.36, compared to 0.23 for per capita expenditure.  
 
All inequality measurements confirm that per capita expenditure is less dispersed than per 
capita revenue at the provincial level for the period 1998-2005. In other words, after 
central transfers are added, fiscal resources appear more equally distributed. In past 




literature, this result has been interpreted as evidence that the fiscal system provides some 




What about the re-distributional effects of intergovernmental transfers across county units? 
Is it consistent with the findings at the provincial level? Table 4.5 provides major 
indicators on county-level fiscal inequalities. Comparing the MMR of per capita revenue 
and per capita expenditure, the value on the expenditure side is much lower than the 
revenue side over the entire period of 1994-2004. In 2004, the MMR of per capita 
revenue is almost three times that of per capita expenditure. The dispersion from mean, as 
measured by coefficient of variation, is also less significant on the expenditure side. In 
2004, the CV of per capita expenditure is 0.63, compared with 1.24 for the CV of per 
capita revenue. Figure 4.5 shows the trend of fiscal inequality on both the revenue and 
the expenditure sides measured by Gini coefficient from 1994 to 2004. It clearly depicts 
the revenue Gini coefficient positioned above the expenditure Gini coefficient through all 
these years, and in recent years the gap between the two is widening. In 2004, the Gini 
coefficient of per capita revenue is 0.46, compared to 0.27 for per capita expenditure.  
 
 




Table 4.4 Provincial Fiscal Disparities: per capita expenditure vs. per capita revenue (1994-2005) 
Year Per Capita Expenditure Per Capita Revenue 
  Mean Maximum Minimum MMR CV Mean Maximum Minimum MMR CV 
1994 444 1452 157 9.25 0.69 272   15.2 0.99 
1995 538 1837 226 8.13 0.71 334   16.3 1.01 
1996 632 2348 278 8.45 0.72 414   15.9 1.03 
1997 698 2806 308 9.11 0.77 486   16.8 1.09 
           
1998 615 3,211 347 9.25 0.65 399 1,600 144 11.11 0.83 
1999 714 3,620 409 8.85 0.65 444 2,849 179 15.92 0.85 
2000 826 3,635 225 16.16 0.62 506 2,900 105 27.62 0.84 
2001 1,029 4,387 532 8.25 0.60 611 3,776 232 16.28 0.92 
2002 1,190 5,307 655 8.10 0.61 663 4,363 274 15.92 0.96 
2003 1,333 6,361 741 8.58 0.64 762 5,180 302 17.15 0.97 
2004 1,591 7,936 906 8.76 0.65 904 6,350 366 17.35 0.98 
2005 1,924 9,259 1,165 7.95 0.61 1,138 7,972 434 18.37  0.96 
Note: 1994-97 indicators are calculated from 29 provincial units with Tibet excluded and Chongqing includes in Sichuan province; 1998 - 2005 indicators are 
calculated from data of all 31 provinces. 
Source: Expenditure data for 1994-97 from Martinez et al (2008), Revenue data for 1994-97 from Wong (2002), data for 1998-2005 from author's own 
calculation. 
Table 4.5 County Fiscal Disparities: per capita expenditure vs. per capita revenue (1994-2004) 
Year Per Capita Expenditure Per Capita Revenue 
  Mean Maximum Minimum MMR CV Mean Maximum Minimum MMR CV 
1994 153 2531 29 86.27 0.60 83 1652 3 508.31 0.80 
1995 178 3875.25 9 444.66 0.59 106 3029 2 1425.41 0.76 
1996 215 4260.5 71 59.73 0.55 134 3708.5 2 1912.20 0.69 
1997 241 4082 29 141.09 0.57 150 2602 8 325.25 0.67 
1998 264 4232 23 188.08 0.57 167 2426 8 286.82 0.72 
1999 298 4903 52 94.90 0.57 181 3100 16 200.03 0.80 
2000 327 4475 46 97.31 0.56 190 2852 5 570.40 0.82 
2001 359 2937 76 38.87 0.67 217 3295 16 203.36 0.97 
2002 483 7785 45 174.04 0.56 212 3656 6 595.86 0.94 
2003 558 7244 137 53.02 0.58 245 3902 21 182.11 1.08 
2004 672 9265 97 95.80 0.63 280 4949 18 274.96 1.24 
Source: Author’s calculation based on data from Statistical Material for Prefectures, Cities, and Counties Nationwide 1995 - 2005. 
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The results measured at the county level are consistent with those for provincial units – 
the distribution of per capita expenditure is less dispersed than per capita revenue for the 
period 1994-2004 across county level units. According to the convention in past literature, 
this could approve that the transfer system helps to bring down fiscal inequality of 
resource allocation.  
 








Source: Author’s calculation based on the provincial data from China Statistical Yearbooks 1999-2006, and 
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A slightly different way to apply this method is to compare inequality indices for per 
capita revenue before and after each transfer program in hope to reveal the equalization 
impact of individual transfer schemes (see Table 4.6 for illustration). As shown in table, 
at provincial level, all transfer programs are bringing down fiscal inequality as measured 
by Theil index, even VAT tax rebate (lowering Theil index from 0.337 to 0.277) and 
Income tax rebate (lowering Theil index from 0.337 to 0.32). Therefore, OECD (2006) 
concluded that the grant of tax rebate had somewhat reduced fiscal inequality across 
provinces. At the county level, only VAT tax rebate aggravates the inequality of fiscal 
allocation (increasing Theil index from 0.197 to 0.267), with all the other transfer 
programs equalizing to different extent.  
 













Source: Adapted from OECD (2006).  
 
According to the conventional method of comparing inequality measurement before and 
after transfers, the conclusion is that the transfer system is equalizing at both provincial 
and county levels, not only the overall impact, but also the effect of most transfer 
programs.  
 
However, such conclusion is puzzling because how possible tax rebate is also pro-poor at 
provincial level (Table 4.6) in view of loud criticism, from a number of close observers 
of Chinese affairs as well as many leading scholars, about its nature of rewarding rich 
regions. It is likely that this methodology is flawed. Lower fiscal inequality on the 
expenditure side than on the revenue side does not necessarily indicate that the fiscal 
transfer system is equalizing. It is common to get lower inequality figures when two data 
streams are combined for the measurement of inequality as the mean on denominator gets 
larger36.   
                                                 
36 Zhao and Ou (2008) also mentioned this issue in their conference paper.  




In short, it is hard to tell whether the fiscal transfer system is equalizing or not based only 
upon the comparison of inequality between the revenue side and the expenditure side, or 
through observing the trend of fiscal inequality37. An additional methodology is required 
to analyze the redistributive effects of the transfer system. In the next step, decomposition 
of the Theil index is used to identify the impact of intergovernmental transfers on the 
inequality of per capita expenditure at both provincial and county levels.  
 
4.3.2 Assessing Intergovernmental Fiscal Transfers: decomposition method 
 
The decomposition method, through constructing an income-generation function to relate 
expenditure to transfers, can facilitate quantifying not only the aggregate impact of the 
overall transfer system but also the individual effects of each fiscal transfer scheme. The 
intergovernmental transfer system serves as the primary policy mechanism for the 
government to deal with the issue of fiscal inequality in China. Although not all transfer 
programs are dedicated to equalizing fiscal resource distribution, it is useful to learn, 
from the policy perspective, how major transfer programs affect fiscal inequality, and the 
extent to which they decrease/increase fiscal inequality. The findings will be helpful for 
the government to improve the effectiveness of fiscal equalization through future reforms 




                                                 
37 Another methodology flaw is identified and analyzed in Appendix XX.  






Decomposition by factor component, proposed by Shorrocks (1982) and extended by 
Tsui (1998) and Tsui (2005), allows one to attribute total inequality to the income sources. 
Before discussing the methodology, it is necessary to introduce briefly the budgetary 
accounting system in China. In China’s fiscal accounting system, total revenues (zhong 
shouru) consist of two main components, annual revenues and transfers from upper-level 
government. Annual revenues (bennian shouru), denoted as R, is the sum of all tax and 
non-tax revenues collected in the current year. The balancing components are primarily 
fiscal transfers (T) as well as any surplus from last year and other items that are not 
included in annual revenues also add up in the total revenues. On the expenditure side, 
annual expenditure (bennianzhichu), denoted as E, is the total of current expenditure 
items. The balancing components include all intergovernmental remittances as well as 
expenditure items that are not accounted for in annual expenditure. The relationship is 
summarized by the following accounting identity: 
 
ASBEEBRR ++=+                                                                                                   (1) 
 
where R means annual revenue; BR refers to balanced components on the revenue side, 
including fiscal transfers and any other items that are supposed to be added up in the total 
revenue; E means annual expenditure; BE stands for balance components on the 
expenditure side; and AS refers to the accumulated surplus (gunquan jieyu).  
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Rearranging the above identity, I have: 
 
E = R +BR −BE −AS                                                                       (2) 
 
The following table 4.7 provides a snapshot of the accounting components in 2003 at the 
county level.  
 
Since balanced components on the revenue side, BR, are mostly transfers, and 
balanced components on the expenditure side are very small, function (2) could be 
rewritten as follows:  
 
δ++= TRE                (3) 
where E is annual expenditure, R is tax revenue, T is fiscal transfer, and δ captures all 
other items that cannot be categorized as tax or transfer.  
From (3), the annual expenditure per capita of the ith jurisdiction in the jth region, 
Eji, is expressed as follows: 
 
Eji = R1ji +R2ji +···+RMji +T1ji + T2ji +···+TNji + δji,                                  (4) 
 
where Rmji, m = 1, 2, . . . , M , is the mth category of revenue per capita included in R, 
Tnji, n = 1, 2, . . . , N, is the nth type of intergovernmental transfers per capita, and δji is 
the per-capita residuals. 
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Table 4.7 Revenues and Fiscal Transfers at the County-level Government (2003) 
 Unit: 10,000 yuan 
Total Revenue   84,948,653 100.00
 Annual Revenue (R)   37,944,601 44.67
     Value-added tax   6,997,804 8.24
     Business Tax   9,390,038 11.05
     Enterprise Income Tax   2,507,526 2.95
     Personal Income Tax   1,621,638 1.91
     Urban maintenance & construction tax 2,045,782 2.41
     Agricultural taxes   6,067,687 7.14
     Miscellaneous revenues   8,988,528 10.58
 Balancing Components (BR)     
     Tax rebate   12,598,704 14.83
     Pre-1994 subsidies   1,614,323 1.90
     Earmarked grants   9,790,349 11.53
     Equalization transfer   3,090,509 3.64
     Grants for minority regions  129,189 0.15
     Grants for rural tax reform   3,354,785 3.95
     Miscellaneous subsidies   14,314,080 16.85
     Surplus from last year   2,660,226 3.13
      
Total Expenditure   82,070,651 100.00
 Annual Expenditure (E)   73,616,437 89.70
 Balancing Components (BE)     
     Pre-1994 remittances   3,312,409 4.04
     Earmarked remittances   4,474,241 5.45
     Others   667,564 0.81
Accumulated Surplus (AS)   2,878,002 
Source: Author, based on data from Statistical Material for Prefectures, Cities, and Counties Nationwide. 
 
For ease of exposition, the following vectors, which correspond to the above categories 
of expenditures and transfers, are used: 
                           
                                      (5) 
 
Let I (E) be some inequality measure of E. The decomposition exercise divides I (E) into 
contributions by the factors on the right-hand side of Eq. (2) as follows: 
δ,,2,1,,2,1 ... NM TTTRRRV =













);();();()( δ             (6) 
 
where each term on the right-hand side is the absolute contribution of a factor S, I(E) is 
measure of inequality on per capita expenditure, R is tax revenue, T is fiscal transfers, 












);(  may be interpreted as the respective 
contributions of the local tax system and the intergovernmental transfer system as a 





EVSEVs =             (7) 
where s is relative contribution of factors and S is absolute contribution of factors.  
Forcing the factor components S(V;E) to satisfy certain desirable properties 
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where cov(V;E) is the population-weighted covariance between V and E and var(E) is 
the population-weighted variance of E. If V is negatively correlated with E, the factor 
components may be negative. In such a case, the corresponding factor contributes to a 
decrease in inequalities. In the subsequent discussion of empirical results, we use s(V;E) 
to gauge the relative importance of the contribution of V to fiscal disparities in a given 
year.  
 
My data sources mainly come from two channels. For provincial/sub-national data, I have 
collected government finance information from various years of China Statistical 
Yearbook from 1998-2005. Besides, the provincial transfer data are from Ministry of 
Finance directly. For sub-provincial/prefectural and county data, I rely upon the 
Statistical Material for Prefectures, Cities, and Counties Nationwide (Quanguo Dishixian 
Caizheng Tongji Ziliao), released by the Ministry of Finance that has detailed figures on 
budgetary revenues, expenditures and fiscal transfers for all county-level jurisdictions 
from 1994 to 2004. 
 
Discussion of Results 
 
Table 4.8 summarizes the relative contributions of different transfer schemes across 
provincial and county units in 2004. The advantage of the decomposition method is that it 
identifies the contribution to the inequality by each income source without having to 
collect a number of controlling variables. As expenditure is derived from two income 
sources – local revenue collection and transfers from upper level of government -- the 
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contribution to the provincial fiscal inequality was 47 percent by revenue and 53 percent 
from central transfers.  
 







































        















Thus, the decomposition results provide accurate evidence showing that the transfer 
system does not play an overall equalization role in the distribution of fiscal resources 
across provincial units.  
 
In addition to the aggregate impact of the transfer system, the decomposition also 
identifies the equalization effect of individual transfer programs. As shown in Table 4.8, 
tax rebate stands out as the most un-equalizing central transfer program, contributing to 
more than half to the inequality of provincial per capita expenditure. As noted in the first 
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chapter, the tax rebate program was instituted to ensure provinces that centralization of 
tax administration in 1994 would not have adverse consequences for their revenues. The 
program assured that provinces should expect to receive at lease the same revenues they 
received from value-added tax in 1994 and personal income tax and enterprise income 
tax in 200138. Richer provinces submit more to the center, and therefore receive more in 
return.  
 
Although the aggregate impact of the transfer system is un-equalizing, three transfer 
programs provide minor equalization on the distribution of fiscal resources although the 
effects are almost negligible. These three transfers are Grants for Increasing Wages of 
Civil Servants, Grants for Rural Tax Reform, and the Equalization Transfer. The negative 
sign means it has negative inequality contributions. Grants for Increasing Wages of Civil 
Servants compensate provincial governments for centrally mandated wage increasing for 
government employees. This transfer program allocates funding in favor of poorer 
regions as poorer provinces need more financial assistance to implement such central 
policy mandate. It reduces about three percent of fiscal inequality at the provincial level. 
However, the establishment of this transfer scheme has created perverse incentives for 
inflating payrolls in the form of over-employment by those provincial governments 
striving to get more funding. Grants for Rural Tax Reform is intended to deal with fiscal 
gap for rural governments due to the elimination of rural taxes and charges since 2000. It 
reduces fiscal disparities by approximately two percent at provincial level. The 
Equalization Transfer, initiated in 1995, is designed for the purpose of advancing 
regional fiscal equity and harmony. At the provincial level in 2004, the equalization 
                                                 
38 See chapter one for detailed information of the transfer program.  
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transfer scheme only cut roughly one percent of fiscal inequality, suggesting a mild 
impact on provincial fiscal distribution. The weak effect can be attributed mainly to the 
underfunded pool of resource, which accounts for only about 5 percent of total central 
transfers in 2004.  
 
The other three major transfer programs also have positive inequality contributions, but 
the effects are trivial. The Earmarked Grants are the second largest transfer program, 
second to tax rebate (see Table 4.8). Earmarked grants increase fiscal disparities at the 
provincial level by no more than two percent. Pre-1994 Subsidies are equivalent to fiscal 
gap experienced by some provinces in 1993. In 2004, sixteen provinces, including twelve 
western provinces and Jilin, Fujian, Shandong, and Hainan, received the transfer. It 
slightly contributes to fiscal disparities by 2.3 percent. As minority populations generally 
reside in remote and poor regions, it is surprising to find that Grants for Minority Regions 
also have a positive impact on fiscal inequality. Against this conventional view, minority-
populated provinces such as Tibet, Xinjiang, and Qinghai, are not among the poorest in 
the country, as ranked by per capita GDP in the previous chapter. These provinces, no 
matter what their fiscal condition, get favorable treatment from the center because 
preserving the national union is the foremost goal of the Chinese government. Provinces 
inhabited by ethnic minorities receive an ad hoc grant equal to a base amount of one 
billion yuan in 2000 with a yearly growth rate of central VAT revenue and the rebate of 
80 percent of the central increased VAT collection in the minority provinces (Shah and 
Shen 2008). Grants for minority regions contribute to provincial fiscal disparities by 0.57 
percent.  




The decomposition results clearly indicate that fiscal transfers at the county level are 
counter-equalizing, with all of major transfer programs making a positive contribution to 
inequality. The aggregate contribution of the transfer system to the inequality of per 
capita expenditure at the county level is about 39 percent in 2004, lower than the 
provincial level where it is more than a half. Most of the inequality contribution comes 
from the Tax Rebate program which accounts for more than 20 percent of fiscal 
disparities in 2004. Ranked second is the Earmarked Grants, with approximately an 11 
percent shares. The inequality contributions from the other transfers programs are trivial. 
Surprisingly, the impact of the equalization transfer program at the county level also 
increases fiscal disparities, although the effect is slight (only 1.63 percent).  
 
Why some programs are equalizing at the provincial level but un-equalizing when 
executed at the county level? And why some transfers, initially design to promote 
equalization, are actually un-equalizing? One plausible explanation is that counties 
receive transfers from prefectural governments or directly from provincial governments39; 
the effect of passing down through the tiers of government might weaken the equalizing 
impact of the program. Another possibility is that the program design attempts to equalize 
both fiscal capacity and expenditure needs. While the program aspires to be an ideal 
model conceptually, in practice, it is highly complex in design and the formula may be 
poorly crafted, leading to the distortion of the funding allocation. For example, the 
equalization transfer and the grant for minority regions define “expenditure needs” of 
                                                 
39 In provinces using “province managing county” model, county governments receive transfers directly 
from provincial governments.  
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local governments mainly by personnel spending based on current staff numbers (World 
Bank 2007b). And the last but not least,  political favoritism for jurisdictions with large 
populations of minority groups which are not necessarily in poorer regions may also have 
some negative impact on the equalization effort.  
 
4.4 Conclusion and Policy Implications 
 
This chapter focuses on analysis of the redistributive effects of the intergovernmental 
transfer system at both the provincial and county levels in China. The results provide 
empirical evidence for the discussion of many issues pertinent to reform of China’s 
intergovernmental transfer system and the sub-provincial fiscal system.   
 
The impact of fiscal transfers on regional fiscal disparity has been a debatable issue, and 
existing literature provides mixed results about whether intergovernmental fiscal transfers 
play an equalization role in the distribution of fiscal resources. In the first step, we look at 
fiscal disparities before and after transfers through comparing fiscal inequality indicators 
for per capita revenue with the indicators for per capita expenditure. Consistent with the 
common perception, the inequality on the revenue side is much larger than on the 
expenditure side, and the gap has widened in recent years. Some scholars interpret this as 
evidence that the fiscal transfer system does provide some degree of redistribution and 
that the equalization effects have been getting stronger in recent years. My analysis 
challenges this claim since lower inequality of per capita expenditure may not be 
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interpreted as equalization effect because the calculation of two data streams tends to 
produce a lower inequality figure as the mean gets larger on the denominator.  
 
Another common practice in the study of fiscal equalization is to look at the trend of 
fiscal inequality over a period of time. In the light of rising fiscal inequality over years, 
some scholars suggest that the intergovernmental transfer system fails to equalize. 
However, my analysis does not find widening fiscal inequality for per capita expenditure.  
At the provincial level for the period 1998-2005, fiscal inequality remained stable with 
the trend actually being downward in some of the more recent years; and at the county 
level from 1994 to 2004, fiscal inequality barely changed at all, except for slight ups and 
downs from year to year. Even if the trend was rising, it would not necessarily imply that 
the intergovernmental transfer system was counter-equalizing because the transfers might 
have been allocating more fiscal resources to poor regions while in the mean time the 
sharply rising inequality of local revenue collection overshadowed redistributive efforts 
by the transfer system. This is likely to occur in China due to skyrocketing income 
disparities that result from unbalanced economic growth across the country.  
 
Neither comparison of the fiscal inequality before and after transfers, nor observation of 
the trend in inequality measures, is able to provide accurate evidence of the redistributive 
effects of intergovernmental fiscal transfers. Therefore, the method of inequality 
decomposition is used to quantify the contribution of fiscal transfers to inequality. The 
findings help to settle the debate in the literature by providing clear evidence that the 
aggregate impact of the intergovernmental transfer system as a whole was not fiscally 
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equalizing up to 2004 at either the provincial or the county levels. One of the key 
justifications for centralized revenue collection since 1994 has been to use extra resources 
at the Center to reduce regional fiscal disparities. But although the central government 
claims that additional resources have been allocated to poorer regions to increase fairness 
and harmony in intergovernmental fiscal relations (Lou 2008), my analysis suggests that 
such a policy intention is not manifest in the outcome. However, we cannot ignore the 
fact that the redistributive effort is evident in some particular areas. For instance, in 2005 
Tibet had the lowest per capita revenue but ranked only behind Shanghai and Beijing in 
terms of per capita expenditure. Being one of the most remote and underdeveloped 
provinces, Tibet had received a higher level of subsidies. The equalization effort is 
remarkable in Tibet because, as some scholars argue (e.g. Wang 2001), maintaining 
national unity is an overriding priority for Chinese policy makers. The reason why my 
analysis is not consistent with the observations in Tibet may lie in the reality that the 
poorest regions are not always the ones that are most favored politically. Hence, a higher 
level of subsidies may end of going to the areas where income levels exceed those of the 
poorer regions.  
 
As my analysis provides a quantification of inequality contributions by all the major 
transfer programs, the results reveal that if any action is to be taken to improve the 
equalization of the intergovernmental transfer system, the action should target the Tax 
Rebate program. This program accounted for a majority of non-equalization effects of 
fiscal transfers at both the provincial and the county levels in 2004. The tax rebate 
transfer was established in the 1994 reform as a static guarantee for richer provinces in 
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return for their cooperation with revenue centralization at that time. The original intention 
was to terminate the program in a few years. More than a decade since the reform and 
large fiscal disparities remaining persistent over the years, the tax rebate transfer 
continues to channel the largest chunk of fiscal transfers – 43 percent of total transfers at 
the provincial level and 29 percent of total transfers at the county level – into affluent 
regions. It is hard to justify its extension beyond the initial “hold harmless” provisions. 
Unless this transfer program is reviewed and modified, it will be almost impossible to 
have the intergovernmental transfer system play an equalization role in distribution of 
fiscal resources.  
 
My findings also indicate that the Equalization Transfer, established in 1995 to target 
fiscal disparities, fails to serve a meaningful equalization function at either the provincial 
or the county levels. Its effect is negligible at the provincial level and it even increases 
fiscal inequality at the county level. Its complex structure, together with several design 
flaws, makes this program unlikely to achieve a good equalization impact. First of all, the 
yearly resource of allocation is from an ad hoc year-to-year variable fixed pool, and the 
pool is small. In 2004, the equalization transfer accounted for only 7 percent of total 
transfers at the provincial level. No matter how well it might be implemented, such a 
level of financing would make no difference in the overall distribution of fiscal resources.  
 
At the county level, this formula-based transfer, adopted from the Australian model with 
cutting edge concepts and models, actually works in the wrong direction. To some extent, 
the purpose of the program is lost in the calculation and administration, which results 
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from its complexity. China’s equalization transfer applies the representative tax system 
(RTS) and the representative expenditure system (RES) to equalize both fiscal capacity 
and expenditure needs40. The RTS system is usually adopted in the context of high local 
revenue autonomy, that is, where there is flexibility in deciding tax rates and tax bases. 
The standardization of local revenue capacity through the RTS method is to avoid the 
disincentive effects for tax administration when using actual revenues in determining 
equalization grants. In China, local governments, however, simply implement central tax 
policies and have little leeway in defining their own tax rates and bases. Therefore, the 
implementation of the RTS system in China only complicates matters, and the outcome 
does not differ much from directly equalizing actual revenues. China also uses the RES 
system to calculate expenditure needs. While desirable conceptually, expenditure need 
equalization requires a wide range of reliable data and competent personnel handling 
calculation and analysis – conditions that are difficult to meet in an emerging economy 
like China. Even in Australia, this approach to expenditure needs calculation is highly 
debated and can prove frustrating for anyone who wants to understand it. In view of its 
calculation complexity, its requirement for dependable data, and its costliness of 
implementation, expenditure need equalization is better achieved through separate 
transfer programs for merit goods, rather than through being incorporated in the 
equalization transfer (Shah and Shen 2008). In short, in order to make the equalization 
transfer work properly at the county level as well as improve its overall design, it is better 
not to use the RTS and RES systems in China’s context, but rather to adopt a simple 
system of equalizing actual revenues. 
 
                                                 
40 See detailed explanation of the equalization transfer in the first chapter.  
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My findings also have important implications relating to administrative reform at the sub-
national level.  As shown in the analysis, the same transfer program has a contradictive 
impact on fiscal equalization at provincial and county levels. For instance, while the 
equalization transfer, the transfer for rural tax reform, and the transfer for increasing the 
wages of civil servants, all play an equalization role at the provincial level, they actually 
increase fiscal inequality at the county level. It appears that the effect of the transfers 
deviates from their original intention as they go down through the four tiers of 
government, that is, from central to province, from province to prefecture, and finally 
from prefecture to county, the “layer-cake model of intergovernmental grant flows,” as 
Shah and Shen (2008) call it. Such s strict vertical hierarchical relationship among the 
different levels of government requires each tier of government only to manage the 
allocation of transfers to its directly subordinate governments. The transfer programs, 
designed by policy makers at the center, seem to lose their purpose as they filter down the 
layers of administration. One possible explanation is that the funds supposed to reach 
poor counties may be diverted to other uses by intermediate levels of government. Or a 
richer county may obtain more transfers because it is placed administratively under a 
relatively poor province and/or a poor prefecture (Tsui 2005). In this regard, achieving 
effective fiscal equalization at the county level may entail removing some intermediate 
tiers of government. Such a policy implication is in line with the ongoing reform of 
China’s administrative hierarchy, as more provinces are experimenting with the 
“province managing county” model under which provinces bypass the prefecture level 
and deal directly with county governments on fiscal matters. This model has been 
implemented in 11 provinces by 200541. In order to improve fiscal equalization at the 
                                                 
41 For detailed explanation of the model and the list of 11 provinces, see the first chapter.  
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county level, the reform may be a move in the right direction. But whether the model is 
desirable in all provinces, particularly those with a vast land area and a sparse population, 
requires further empirical research, as does the question of how fiscal transfers are 
administered in the province-managed counties.  
 
Pertinent to fiscal transfers at the county level, my findings indicate that none of major 
transfer programs plays an equalization role in the distribution of fiscal resources. As 
studied in the previous chapter, fiscal inequality at the county level in China remains high. 
This is even more worrisome than the inequality at the provincial level, as core public 
services like basic education, health care, and social security are mainly provided by 
county level governments. Therefore, fiscal disparities result in the inequality of public 
services provision, which in turn escalates unbalanced economic development across the 
county. In the meantime, county governments are faced with financial stress and are 
becoming more dependent on fiscal transfers since the central government has pushed 
rural tax reform since 2000 and since 2004 has eliminated agricultural taxes in order to 
reduce the tax burden on farmers and ease rural unrest. To fill the fiscal gap caused by 
this series of reforms, the central government established the grants for rural tax reform 
to compensate the financially starved county governments. However, the size of the 
transfer was far from adequate, accounting for less than 10 percent of total transfers at the 
county level in 2004, and its allocation actually increased fiscal inequality, as the 
decomposition results indicate. In other words, poor counties are not fiscally 
compensated with more transfers in order to ensure a sufficient level of basic public 
services provision. Therefore, my findings suggest that transfers for merit goods such as 
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education and health care may be also required if these critical public services are to be 
delivered up to the national minimum standards in the poorest counties. Such transfer 
programs are likely to make a big difference in addressing the issue of fiscal disparities at 
the county level, and they may work more effectively than a complex equalization grant 
by considering both revenue capacity and expenditure needs.  
 
Despite Chinese authorities’ effort to pump more fiscal resources into the transfer system 
and to introduce new transfer schemes targeting at the poor regions, the analysis reveals 
that these transfers have done little to ease the large disparities in the allocation of fiscal 
resources across provincial and county units. Plus the pro-rich transfer scheme of tax 
rebate as well as earmarked grants further aggravates fiscal inequality. Reducing 
inequality and promoting growth with equity require the allocation of fiscal transfers to 
the needy. The recent equalization efforts are far from enough, and the transfer system 














Table 1 Increasing Central Transfers 
 
 













The intergovernmental transfers are the dominant source of revenues for sub-national 
governments in China. The design of these transfers is of critical importance for 
efficiency and equity of local service provision and fiscal health of sub-national 
governments. For enhancing accountability, it is desirable to match revenue means (the 
ability to raise revenues from own sources) as closely as possible with expenditure needs 
for all orders of government. However, higher level governments must be allowed greater 
access to revenues than needed to fulfill own direct service responsibilities so that they 
are able to use their spending power through fiscal transfers to fulfill national and 
regional efficiency and equity objectives. We can identify six broad objectives for 
national fiscal transfers each of which may apply to varying degree in China and each of 
which calls for a specific design of fiscal transfers 
 
 
Table 2 Principles and Better Practices in Grant Design 
 
 
Source: Shen and Shah (2006). 
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Appendix 3  
To test the relationship between intergovernmental fiscal transfers and economic factors, 
one option is to employ fixed effects model or random effects model depending on the 
mixture of independent variables and the construction of regression equation42. In general, 














itV represents different independent variables such as 
per capita GDP and population, 1D … mD are a set of dummy variables (e.g., minority 
region), and itε is the error term.  
 
Table 3 shows the regression results from the random effects model experimented in Lin 
(2011). Per capita central transfers are positively related to per capita provincial GDP 
(regression 1) even when other explanatory variables are incorporated into the equation 
(regression 3 and 5), which indicates that provinces with higher per capita GDP receive 
more per capita transfers from the central government. The level of statistically 
significance is at 1 percent. Second, per capita central transfers are also positively 
associated with growth rate of GDP (regression 2-5), indicating central transfers favor 
provinces with higher growth rate. The significance level is also 1 percent. Third, 
                                                 
42 In general, the decision to treat the between-subject (in our case between-province or between-county) 
variation as fixed or random depends largely on three conditions: (1) whether it is important to control for 
unmeasured characteristics of subjects; (2) whether it is important to estimate the effects of stable 
covariance; and (3) whether the substantial loss of information that stems from discarding the between-
subject variation can be tolerated.   
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population growth rate is not statistically significant (p value 10 percent). Lastly, the 
dummy variables of western region and minority have both positive sign and are 
statistically significant at the level of 5 percent, suggesting that the western/minority 
region receives more per capita transfers from the central government.  
 
Table 3 Regression of Real per capita Transfers from the Central Government  
                 (1995-2004) 
 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Per capita real GDP 0.068   0.054   0.057 
 (0.006)***  (0.006)***  (0.006)*** 
Growth rate of real GDP  13.798 7.745 13.907 7.482 
  (1.642)*** (1.631)*** (1.643)*** (1.607)*** 
Population growth rate  -4.938 -2.744 -4.949 -2.679 
  (2.558) (2.852)* (2.521)  
West region (dummy)    0.214 1.023 
    (0.490) (0.502)** 
Minority region (dummy)    1.479 1.366 
    (0.648)** (0.653)** 
Constant 0.118 0.114 -0.402 -0.219 -1.066 
 (0.274) (0.285) (0.283) (0.316) (0.319)*** 
Observations 310 310 310 310 310 
R-square 0.1091 0.1182 0.1436 0.2504 0.3636 
Source: Adapted from Lin (2011) 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses; *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
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Table 4 shows the regression results from the fixed effects model used by Zhang and 
Zheng (2011).  
 




Tax Rebate Tax Rebate Total Transfer 
Per capita GDP -0.001 0.006 0.006 
 (2.75)*** (44.54)*** (17.9)*** 
Population -0.22 0.115 -0.106 
 (1.57) (1.64) (0.69) 
Lag of per capita exp. 0.244 -0.011 0.233 
 (40.15)*** (3.70)*** (35.37)*** 
Share of rural population 1.214 -0.129 1.086 
 (4.29)*** (0.91) (3.54)*** 
Share of public 
employee/pop. 591.989 1,428.969 2,020.958 
 (3.89)*** (18.90)*** (12.27)*** 
Per capita own revenue -0.039 0.164 0.126 
 (5.75)*** (49.14)*** (17.24)*** 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 159.247 -22.236 137.01 
 (6.72)*** (1.89)* (5.34)*** 
Obervations 14,433 14,433 14,433 
Number of counties 2,703 2,703 2,703 
R-square 0.45 0.48 0.53 
Source: Adapted from Zhang and Zheng (2011) 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses; *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 





Another popular way of investigation the equalization impact of the transfer system is 
based upon the trend of fiscal inequality. For the period 1998-2005, the trend of fiscal 
inequality on the expenditure side remains stable, with only a slight downward trend in 
more recent years. The coefficient of variation declines from 0.65 in 1998 to 0.61 in 2005, 
and the Gini coefficient drops from 0.26 in 1998 to 0.23 in 2005. For other periods, when 
fiscal inequality continued to increase, some scholars argue that the transfer system failed 
to equalize (e.g. Wong 2000; 2002). However, it needs to be clarified whether the 
increase of fiscal inequality is attributable to a growing disparity of revenue distribution 
or to the transfer system itself. It is likely that while the transfer system is equalizing with 
more transfers going to poor regions, the impact cannot offset the growing inequality of 
local revenue collection that results from unbalanced economic growth across the country. 
The following example proves this argument (see Table 5). Say there are three 
jurisdiction A,B, and C, each having the same population. The fiscal inequality on the 
expenditure side is increased from 0.53 in year 1 to 1.061 in year 2. Can we draw the 
conclusion that the transfer system has failed to equalize? The answer is NO, because in 
this example the transfer system is indeed equalizing, with more resources being 
allocated to the poorer jurisdictions. The reason why fiscal inequality has increased rests 
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Table 5 Illustration of Revenue Impact on Inequality Calculation 
 Year 1   Year 2   
 Revenue Transfer Expenditure Revenue Transfer Expenditure
A 100 20 120 100 20 120 
B 150 15 165 300 15 315 
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Conclusion and Policy Recommendations 
 
 
China’s transition from a centrally-planned to a market-based economy has led to a major 
reconfiguration of its intergovernmental fiscal system. Is China one of the world’s most 
decentralized countries, or one of the most centralized? The answer is, both. In terms of 
fiscal arrangements, China’s sub-national governments are handling more than 70 percent 
of total government expenditures, compared to the average of one-third in OECD 
countries. However, sub-national governments have a much smaller share on the revenue 
side, and virtually no freedom to decide tax bases or set tax rates in a way that matches 
local revenues with spending needs. The taxing power is entirely in the hands of the 
central government. Nevertheless, fiscal decentralization is advocated by many for its 
contribution to China’s remarkable economic performance over the last 30 years.  
 
Towards the end of the 1990s, China’s development strategy shifted slightly away from 
single-minded pursuit of GDP growth to redressing imbalances and patching up social 
safety nets. Some attempt to redirect fiscal resources for equalization was made in 1998 
(under the Zhu Rongji Administration 1989 – 2002), with the most publicized program -- 
Western Development – being launched in 1999. Since then, many new programs have 
been established to improve public services provision in rural and poorer regions, and 
more resources have been allocated for human capital development. Central transfers to 
support rural public services are increasing; improvements are being made to ensure 
salary payments at the county and township levels; administrative reforms are being 
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undertaken at the grassroots levels; reforms to public service units (PSUs) are being 
piloted in many parts of the country; the free Rural Compulsory Education program is 
taking place; the New Rural Cooperative Medical Scheme and the Rural Medical 
Assistance Scheme are under way; and the Rural Minimum Living Stipend (dibao) is 
being implemented.  
 
It appears China is fully engaged in implementing the remarkable objective of building a 
harmonious society and a new socialist countryside. However, accumulating studies in 
recent years suggest that these new programs are having mixed and in some cases even 
contradictory effects, which may be largely attributable to the intergovernmental fiscal 
system. Not only does the current fiscal system hinder the central effort to promote 
growth with equity, but also the system itself is lagging behind since it is not compatible 
with today’s calls for equitable access to public services and increasing emphasis on 
human development. This research sheds light on the issue by providing an in-depth 
analysis of the intergovernmental fiscal system through three of its aspects: public 
expenditure policies, fiscal inequality, and the fiscal transfer system.  
 
First, an institutional analysis of China’s public expenditure policies reveals that there 
exists a stark vertical fiscal gap at sub-national levels of government (particularly at the 
county level that bears the main responsibilities for public services provision), and that 
the gap has been widening over the years. Moreover, as the analysis of public expenditure 
composition reveals, the allocation of public spending appears out of line with China’s 
development objectives, with a relatively low share of spending on education, health, and 
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other social needs, relative to GDP, according to international standards. Such a low level 
public spending on important human development needs is partly attributable to the large 
fiscal gaps prevalent across sub-national governments. The financing stress of local 
governments is further aggravated by the lack of accountability of local officials who 
may be keener on accumulating political equity than on being responsible for ensuring a 
sufficient level of basic public services. This explains why, despite a sharp increase in 
central transfers for spending on rural development since late 1990s, these government 
funds leak as they passing through the hierarchy before reaching the targeted regions; and 
why in some cases, they are not always used as initially intended. The accountability of 
local governments to citizens is also weak, with most services provided without any 
participation by citizens or communities.  
 
Second, fiscal inequality has become a major cause of concern in China because it 
undermines government’s ability to provide core public services at relatively equitable, 
socially acceptable standards. It also prevents poor regions and jurisdictions from 
delivering sufficient basic services. Consistent with the common perception, fiscal 
inequality at provincial, prefectural, and county levels remains large, and there is no 
evidence of a sustained reduction in fiscal disparities having taken place since the 1994 
tax sharing reform. Importantly, fiscal inequality at the prefectural level is remarkably 
high. But county-level fiscal inequality is not significantly high, as expected; instead, it is 
similar to provincial-level fiscal inequality. Furthermore, the comparatively lower-
spending governments at all three levels are concentrated in the middle region, rather 
than in the western areas. For example, in 2004 all three levels of government in Anhui 
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and Henan, both of them central provinces, had the lowest per capita public expenditure. 
A few poor western provinces enjoyed high per capita public spending – for instance, 
Tibet, at the sub-national level, ranked in the same tier as Beijing. Xinjiang at the 
prefectural level spent more than 2000 yuan per capita in 2004, about the same as 
Guangdong. At the county level, Inner Mongolia, Qinghai, and Tibet spent at a similar 
level to Zhejiang, with more than 1000 yuan per capita. Besides, the results from 
inequality decomposition indicate that the fiscal disparities within each region are large. 
At the provincial level, within-region inequality is about twice the between-region 
inequality – in other words, more than two-thirds of inequality comes from within a 
region, suggesting that the fiscal capacities of jurisdictions within each of these regions 
are very different and that the current policy, with its primary emphasis on balancing 
between-region disparities, needs to be reevaluated. In addition, the findings suggest not 
only that the policy effort should be shifted from between-region to within-region, but 
also that it should be shifted from the central government to sub-provincial public finance. 
As shown in the Theil index decomposition results, at the prefectural level over the 
period 1994-2004, within-province fiscal inequality increased by about 40 percent, while 
between-province inequality fell by more than 10 percent. At the county level over the 
period 1994-2004, within-province inequality increased by about 17 percent, while 
between-province inequality fell by more than 10 percent. Lastly but importantly, fiscal 
inequality demonstrates a steady trend at all three levels of government in the post 1994 
period up until 2004. This finding contradicts the mainstream allegation that fiscal 
inequality is widening along with the increasing income inequality flowing from 
unbalanced economic development across the country. At the same time, the steady trend 
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also suggests that the fiscal reform of 1994 has not delivered the original intention of 
using centralized revenues to reduce fiscal disparities, even though the current fiscal 
system managed to maintain the prefectural and county fiscal inequality in 2004 at a level 
similar to that of a decade before.  
 
China’s large and persistent fiscal inequality at provincial, prefectural, and county levels 
of government may be attributed to the following reasons. Significant spending 
disparities are related to variations in regional revenue collection arising from differences 
in incomes; the stark fiscal inequality is partly caused by the current inter-governmental 
fiscal arrangements which push spending responsibilities downward without providing 
adequate financial resources to the subordinate levels. Another significant factor may be 
population density which affects the cost of public services provision. Moreover, from 
the political perspective, the issue of wide fiscal disparities is closely associated with the 
Chinese authorities’ generous financing of minority regions which are not necessarily in 
poor, needy areas. Lastly, persistent fiscal inequality may just reflect China’s emphasis 
on revenue mobilization.  
 
Fiscal inequality matters if it leads to large disparities in service delivery and outcomes. 
People everywhere regard unequal access to basic public services, such as education and 
health care, as an important aspect of poverty and inequality in their own experience. 
This is no less the case in China. There is profound evidence showing that educational 
attainment and health care services are unequally provided in certain backward areas of 
the country. The disadvantaged governments of these areas are spending so little that the 
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most basic public services are provided at remarkably insufficient levels. The outcomes, 
measured by human development indicators, differ substantially across the country, 
translating those with less and lower quality education and/or poorer health today into 
tomorrow’s victims of widening inequality of living standards/income.  
 
Third, the large vertical fiscal gaps at sub-national levels of government (particularly 
those financially-starved counties, townships and villages in poor regions) and the 
marked horizontal fiscal disparities both necessitate a large scale system of fiscal 
transfers. China’s fiscal transfer system has been expanding rapidly in terms of both 
volume and number of transfer schemes. In view of the effort by the central government 
to shift towards more equitable development, what is the redistributive effect of the 
transfer system?  
 
To examine the impact of fiscal transfers on regional fiscal disparity, this research 
employs two sets of methodology. The first looks at fiscal disparities before and after 
transfers by comparing fiscal inequality indicators for per capita revenue with the 
indicators for per capita expenditure. Consistent with the common perception, the 
inequality on the revenue side is much larger than on the expenditure side, and the gap 
has widened in recent years. Some scholars interpret this as evidence that the fiscal 
transfer system does provide some degree of redistribution and that the equalization 
effects have been getting stronger in recent years. However, my analysis challenges this 
claim. Using a hypothetical example, it proves that the lower inequality of per capita 
expenditure may not be interpreted as equalization effect because the calculation of two 
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data streams tends to produce a lower inequality figure as the mean gets larger on the 
denominator. Therefore, it may be “converging” effect, not “equalizing” impact.  
 
Another common practice in the study of fiscal equalization is to look at the trend of 
fiscal inequality over a period of time. In the light of rising fiscal inequality over years, 
some scholars suggest that the intergovernmental transfer system fails to equalize. 
However, my analysis does not find widening fiscal inequality for per capita expenditure.  
At the provincial level for the period 1998-2005, fiscal inequality remained stable with 
the trend actually being downward some of the more recent years; and at the county level 
from 1994 to 2004, fiscal inequality barely changed at all, except for slight ups and 
downs from year to year. Even if the trend was rising, it would not necessarily imply that 
the intergovernmental transfer system was counter-equalizing because the transfers might 
have been allocating more fiscal resources to poorer regions while in the mean time the 
sharply rising inequality of local revenue collection overshadowed redistributive efforts 
by the transfer system. This is likely to occur in China due to skyrocketing income 
disparities that result from unbalanced economic growth across the country.  
 
Neither comparison of fiscal inequality before and after transfers, nor observation of the 
trend in inequality measures, is able to provide accurate evidence of the redistributive 
effects of intergovernmental fiscal transfers. Therefore, the method of inequality 
decomposition is used to quantify the contribution of fiscal transfers to inequality. The 
findings help to settle the debate in the literature by providing clear evidence that the 
aggregate impact of the intergovernmental transfer system as a whole was not fiscally 
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equalizing up to 2004 at either the provincial or the county levels. One of the key 
justifications for centralized revenue collection since 1994 has been to use extra resources 
at the Center to reduce regional fiscal disparities. But although the central government 
claims that additional resources have been allocated to poorer regions to increase fairness 
and harmony in intergovernmental fiscal relations, my analysis suggests that such a 
policy intention is not manifest in the outcome. However, we cannot ignore the fact that 
the redistributive effort is evident in some particular areas. For instance, in 2005 Tibet 
had the lowest per capita revenue but ranked only behind Shanghai and Beijing in terms 
of per capita expenditure. Being one of the most remote and underdeveloped provinces, 
Tibet had received a higher level of subsidies. The equalization effort is remarkable in 
Tibet because, as some scholars argue, maintaining national unity is an overriding 
priority for Chinese policy makers. The reason why my analysis is not consistent with the 
observations in Tibet may lie in the reality that the poorest regions are not always the 
ones that are most politically favored. Hence, a higher level of subsidies may end up 
going to the areas where income levels exceed those of the poorer regions.  
 
As my analysis provides a quantification of inequality contributions by all the major 
transfer programs, the results reveal that if any action is to be taken to improve the 
equalization of the intergovernmental transfer system, the action should target the Tax 
Rebate program. This program accounted for a majority of non-equalization effects of 
fiscal transfers at both the provincial and the county levels in 2004.  
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My findings also indicate that the Equalization Transfer, established in 1995 to target 
fiscal disparities, fails to serve a meaningful equalization function at either the provincial 
or the county levels. Its effect is negligible at the provincial level and it even increases 
fiscal inequality at the county level. Its complex structure, together with several design 
flaws, makes this program unlikely to achieve a good equalization impact. First of all, the 
yearly resource of allocation is from an ad hoc year-to-year variable fixed pool, and the 
pool is small. In 2004, the equalization transfer accounted for only 7 percent of total 
transfers at the provincial level. No matter how well it might be implemented, such a 
level would make no difference in the overall distribution of fiscal resources. At the 
county level, this formula-based transfer actually works in the wrong direction. To some 
extent, the purpose of the program is lost in the calculation and administration, which 
results from its complexity.  
 
My findings also have important implications relating to administrative reform at the sub-
national level.  As shown in the analysis, the same transfer program has a contradictive 
impact on fiscal equalization at provincial and county levels. For instance, while the 
equalization transfer, the transfer for rural tax reform, and the transfer for increasing the 
wages of civil servants, all play an equalization role at the provincial level, they actually 
increase fiscal inequality at the county level. It appears that the effect of the transfers 
deviates from their original intention as they go down through the four tiers of 
government, that is, from central to province, from province to prefecture, and finally 
from prefecture to county, the “layer-cake model of intergovernmental grant flows,” as 
Shah and Shen (2008) call it.  




Pertinent to fiscal transfers at the county level, my findings indicate that none of major 
transfer programs plays an equalization role in the distribution of fiscal resources. As 
studied in the previous chapter, fiscal inequality at the county level in China remains high. 
This is even more worrisome than the inequality at the provincial level, as core public 
services like basic education, health care, and social security are mainly provided by 
county level governments. Therefore, fiscal disparities result in the inequality of public 
services provision, which in turn escalates unbalanced economic development across the 
county. In the meantime, county governments are faced with financial stress and are 
becoming more dependent on fiscal transfers since the central government has pushed 
rural tax reform since 2000 and since 2004 has eliminated agricultural taxes in order to 
reduce the tax burden on farmers and ease rural unrest. To fill the fiscal gap caused by 
this series of reforms, the central government established the grants for rural tax reform 
to compensate the financially starved county governments. However, the size of the 
transfer was far from adequate, accounting for less than 10 percent of total transfers at the 
county level in 2004, and its allocation actually increased fiscal inequality, as the 
decomposition results indicate. In other words, poor counties are not fiscally 
compensated with more transfers in order to ensure a sufficient level of basic public 
services provision. Therefore, my findings suggest that transfers for merit goods such as 
education and health care may be also required if these critical public services are to be 
delivered up to the national minimum standards in the poorest counties. Such transfer 
programs are likely to make a big difference in addressing the issue of fiscal disparities at 
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the county level, and may work more effectively than a complex equalization grant by 
considering both revenue capacity and expenditure needs.  
 
China’s development strategy of building a harmonious society cannot be achieved 
without a comprehensive reform of the intergovernmental fiscal system that will facilitate 
equitable and adequate delivery of core public services as well as enhance human capital 
development in poor localities. This research suggests the following guidelines for future 
reforms to improve the equity and efficiency of China’s fiscal system.  
 
 
Realign responsibilities with financial and institutional capacity at all levels 
 
The current fiscal system has allowed the emergence of marked gaps between the 
expenditure responsibilities of sub-national governments and their financial resources. 
One of the most urgent tasks of fiscal reform is to clarify expenditure assignments for 
each government level and make sure that funds are available to finance the spending 
requirement. Currently, many programs are not being implemented or are implemented 
ineffectively, which is because of the murkiness regarding which level of sub-national 
governments is responsible for them. Sometimes there are overlapping or even 
conflicting responsibilities. Some expenditure categories could be centralized without 
foregoing the benefits of decentralized public service provision. For example, 
unemployment benefits would be reassigned to the Center, and a gradual shif of township 
finances to the county level or joint provision of public services could be considered to 
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solve the problem of scale economies. On the revenue side, one option is to boost local 
own revenue by developing a modern property tax, and the other suggestion is to offer 
local governments more discretion in setting local tax rates, such as for property tax or 
personal income tax.  
 
Increase government spending on human capital development 
 
China’s allocation of public spending appears out of line with the country’s development 
needs and objectives, with too much taken by capital construction and general 
administration and too little (by international standards) going to human development. 
Reducing inequality is likely to require investing in the poor to help them build the 
capacity to escape the poverty trap. Such a capacity lies largely on two essential factors, 
educational attainment and health, which can be influenced by government policies. 
Therefore, the government can play an important role in reducing poverty and dampening 
inequality with a policy of investing in people through adequate and equitable service 
delivery in basic education and health care. The urgency is to increase spending on 
education, health care, and other social needs, as a share of overall public expenditure 
and relative to GDP, and meanwhile improve the efficiency of public infrastructure 
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Streamline administrative hierarchy  
 
The strict vertical hierarchical relationship among the different levels of government 
requires each tier of government only to manage the allocation of transfers to its directly 
subordinate governments. The transfer programs, designed by policy makers at the 
Center, seem to lose their purpose as they filter down the layers of administration. One 
possible explanation of this is that the funds supposed to reach poor counties may be 
diverted to other uses by intermediate levels of government. Or, a richer county may 
obtain more transfers because it is placed administratively under a relatively poor 
province and/or a poor prefecture. In this regard, achieving effective fiscal equalization at 
the county level may entail removing some intermediate tiers of government. Such a 
policy implication is in line with the ongoing reform of China’s administrative hierarchy, 
as more provinces are experimenting with the “province managing county” model under 
which provinces bypass the prefecture level and deal directly with county governments 
on fiscal matters. This model has been implemented in 11 provinces by 2005. In order to 
improve fiscal equalization at the county level, the reform may be a move in the right 
direction. But whether the model is desirable in all provinces, particularly those with a 
vast land area and a sparse population, requires further empirical research, as does the 
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Enhance local government performance and accountability 
 
Also contributing to the low effectiveness of public expenditures are the adverse 
incentives for sub-national officials and their limited accountability for expenditure 
decisions. As agents of central government, together with China’s top down system of 
evaluation and promotion of government officials, sub-national governments spend as 
much as they have in revenue without considering the social trade-off between the 
benefits of their expenditures and the cost of financing. Also, greater priority is given to 
capital spending, which encourages local governments to undertake all sorts of 
investment projects. Moreover, to enhance their career prospects, local cadres pay great 
attention to the target responsibility system, which ultimately provides incentives to 
allocate resources in line with the preferences of the higher level of government. In 
addition, unfunded mandates distort local spending allocations in favor of easily 
measurable outputs. The inefficiency of many local governments in providing essential 
public services is also related to the limited involvement of citizens in public service 
planning, provision, and monitoring. 
 
The central government may need to consider revising the targets and indicators used for 
evaluating the performance of local governments. The current appraisal system of, 
although recently amended, still encourages local officials to channel resources into 
investment projects that are included in GDP, rather than into education or health care 
which produce no immediate outputs. Therefore, action is required to revise the criteria 
and designing more explicit indicators for performance in social sectors.  
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Overhaul the intergovernmental fiscal transfer system to promote equalization  
 
Given the size of China and wide dispersion of government and population across regions, 
it is unlikely that every sub-national government could be self-sufficient. Therefore a 
redistributive transfer system would still be indispensable to ensure adequate and 
equitable public services provision across the country. The current fiscal transfer system 
still favors the rich at both the provincial and the county levels. Reducing inequality and 
building a harmonious society require revamping the transfer system to allocate more 
resources to the needy.   
 
The current fiscal transfer system is overly complex, with a large number of transfer 
programs being designed ad hoc as short-term palliatives to deal with emerging issues, 
and then being allowed to continue in perpetuity without any serious reexamination. In 
the interests of streamlining the fiscal system with the explicit objectives of equalization 
and promoting the provision of public services, a series of reform options could be 
considered.  
 
First, introduce an explicit standard of equalization. China’s equalization transfer applies 
the representative tax system (RTS) and the representative expenditure system (RES) to 
equalize both fiscal capacity and expenditure needs. The RTS system is usually adopted 
in the context of high local revenue autonomy, that is, where there is flexibility in 
deciding tax rates and the exploitation of tax bases. The standardization of local revenue 
capacity through the RTS method is to avoid the disincentive effects for tax 
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administration when using actual revenues in determining equalization grants. In China, 
however, local governments simply implement central tax policies and have little leeway 
in defining their own tax rates and bases. Therefore, the implementation of the RTS 
system in China only complicates matters, and the outcome does not differ much from 
directly equalizing actual revenues.  
 
Second, experiment with output-based fiscal transfers to achieve national minimum 
standards in merit goods such as education, health, and infrastructure. China uses the 
RES system to calculate expenditure needs. While desirable conceptually, expenditure 
needs equalization requires a wide range of reliable data and competent personnel 
handling calculation and analysis – conditions that are difficult to meet in an emerging 
economy like China. Even in Australia, this approach to expenditure needs calculation is 
highly debated and can prove frustrating for anyone who wants to understand it. In view 
of its calculation complexity, its requirement for dependable data, and its costliness in 
implementation, instead of being incorporated in the equalization transfer, expenditure 
needs equalization could be discontinued and replaced with transfers for national 
minimum standards of basic public services.   
 
Such transfers could be based on the relevant service population. In view of the 
inadequate potential for raising adequate own-source revenues by rural areas, a larger 
role for the central government must be recognized in financing rural services. 
Formulating a list of national minimum standards, including schooling, health care, social 
relief, clean water, sanitation, and rural roads, would help provide guidelines for 
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introducing new transfer schemes and establish a commitment for financing. The 
minimum-guarantee system for basic public services is not only a matter of urgency, but 
also a feasible policy choice. Based on this concept, a proposal to guarantee public 
funding for compulsory rural education was adopted in 2006.  
 
Third, correction of the problems in China’s grant system is likely to require reducing or 
even abolishing the transfer of tax rebate. The tax rebate transfer was established in the 
1994 reform as a static guarantee for richer provinces in return for their cooperation with 
revenue centralization at that time. The original intention was to terminate the program in 
a few years. It is now over a decade since the reform, and large fiscal disparities have 
persisted over the years, with the tax rebate transfer continuing to channel the largest 
chunk of fiscal transfers – 43 percent of total transfers at the provincial level and 29 
percent of total transfers at the county level – into affluent regions. By doing so, tax 
rebate makes up more than half of the inequality of per capita expenditure at the sub-
national level; it also accounts for about one-fifth of fiscal inequality at the county level. 
It is hard to justify its extension beyond the initial “hold harmless” provisions. Unless this 
transfer program is reviewed and modified, it will be almost impossible to have the 
intergovernmental transfer system play an equalization role in the distribution of fiscal 
resources. One possible option is to discontinue tax rebate for personal income tax and 
corporate income tax, allowing supplementary variable flat-rate charges by provincial-
local governments.  
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Last but not least, simplify and formalize the existing earmarked grants. The earmarked 
grants are the second un-equalizing transfer program at the county level, contributing 
more than 10 percent to overall fiscal inequality. The centrally sponsored schemes 
account for a critical source of revenue for local governments in China, and they are 
supposed to be justified on the same bases as conditional grants in other countries: 
addressing externalities, pursuing national objectives, and so on. However, one current 
issue is that China has just too many of these schemes. In the past decade, they have 
continued to grow. These oversized earmarked grants blur lines of responsibility, burden 
the administrative capacity of local governments, and undermine local budget autonomy.   
 
China’s highly decentralized systems of fiscal management and administration can be an 
asset for cost-effective service delivery if the intergovernmental fiscal system works in 
line with China’s development priorities. The matter of concern in China is not the size of 
the nation’s financial resources, but the efficiency of their use. Further amendment and 
reforms of the existing fiscal system are likely to be required in order to promote social 
fairness and equity. To achieve more equitable access to fiscal resources across regions, 
the reform of the intergovernmental fiscal system suggested in this section also requires 
being complemented by a clear and proper definition of government’s roles and functions 
at all levels, and by better mechanisms to strengthen vertical and horizontal 
accountability.  
 
The reform of China’s intergovernmental fiscal system will be a mission requiring 
enormous political commitment and determination to navigate a way through a variety of 
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sources of resistance. Let me conclude the dissertation with a popular Chinese proverb. 
What is desirable to modernize China’s fiscal system is “to get at the root of the problem 
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